NUNC COGNOSCO EX PARTE

TRENT UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

J. Fitch
1927

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2019 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation

https://archive.org/details/canadagreatriver0000newb

CANADA

THE GREAT RIVER, THE LANDS AND THE MEN

Author of

"THE MEDITERRANEAN LANDS"

ETC., ETC.



QUEBEC: THE CITADEL

CANADA

THE GREAT RIVER, THE LANDS AND THE MEN

By

MARION I. NEWBIGIN

D.Sc. (Lond.)

"I seek to bee short, howsoever my Subject causeth mee to bee voluminous"—LESCARBOT.

(*Voyage of M. de Monts into New France*)

LONDON:

CHRISTOPHERS

22 BERNERS STREET W.1

TORONTO : MELBOURNE : WELLINGTON : CAPE TOWN

F 5057. N49

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
THE LONDON AND NORWICH PRESS, LIMITED, ST. GILES' WORKS, NORWICH

PREFACE

THIS book had its origin in a visit to Canada. Of all the new experiences which such a visit yields perhaps none is more memorable than the preliminary journey from the entrance of the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the river, and up its tranquil waters. There can be few journeys of equal length which combine so many diverse impressions: one sees shores that seem still untouched by the hand of man; near Quebec every point and promontory has its associations and its significance in world history; upstream the old-world hamlets with their shining churches and their green forest backing face one another in a peacefulness that seems never to have been disturbed; Montreal, with its royal mountain behind and its troubled waters above, is at once an end and a beginning, both old and new. Even when, as in my own case, the journey is continued right across the continent, one comes back to the great eastern river with the feeling that here must be sought the secret of what Canada has meant and means. The purpose of this book then is to try to unravel that secret by re-telling the early story of the St. Lawrence area that is of French Canada, from a somewhat unfamiliar standpoint. The book is intended both for those who know the scenes described from actual contact, and for those whose knowledge is derived only

8930

from the printed page ; but it has been written with the hope that it may encourage some of the latter to undertake a journey which is at once easy and instructive. The Old World takes on a different aspect when one has seen it even for a short time from the further side of the ocean. That stretch of barren land, also, which fences the cities of the river from the great thoroughfare over which the ships of the nations ply, gives to the journey by the St. Lawrence an element of romance absent when one makes landfall directly at some large port. From the first sight of the rocky shores of Newfoundland, through the narrow strait and into the wide estuary, where land disappears once more, one has always the sense of a great adventure, can recapture some of the feelings with which the pioneers navigated those fog-shrouded waters. That emotional background sharpens the powers of observation, prepares one by the sense of physical check for new experiences. It is as when one tops the last rise to a mountain pass in the breathless expectation of a new landscape to be revealed at the gap. If then in what follows there may seem a lavish amount of detail, this is perhaps justified by that pause at the threshold, that moment when the eyes, wearied of the monotony of the ocean, feel as if they could never be satiated by the endless variety of the lands. The effort to visualise the details is the equivalent of the climb without which on the mountains the vision is not vouchsafed.

To aid the reader to grasp the details, sketch-maps, drawn for the book by my sister, Miss Florence Newbigin, have been added to the illustrations. They represent an attempt to take out of large-scale and atlas maps the facts required to understand the text, with the

rigorous omission of everything irrelevant to the immediate purpose.

For help in obtaining illustrations I am indebted to Mr. H. P. Biggar, Chief Archivist for Canada in Europe. In addition Mr. Biggar read a considerable part of the book in manuscript, and made a number of helpful criticisms and comments. For the illustrations which bear their names I have to thank Miss Munro and Miss Johnston, both of whom kindly put at my disposal their large collections of photographs. In other cases I have to express my indebtedness to the Canadian Government and to the administrations of the Canadian National Railways and the Canadian Pacific Company. I owe much also to the authors named in the brief bibliographical note at the end, and to the Canadian men and women whose charming courtesy and hospitality made my visit so delightful. I hope that the book may help in some measure to meet the debt so incurred by increasing general interest both in the past of the Dominion, and in those who are striving to-day to solve the problems presented by its vast and diverse territories.

Edinburgh, 1926.

CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE v

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY 3

CHAPTER II

CARTIER AND INDIAN CANADA: THE SEARCH FOR CATHAY

Cartier's predecessors—The story of his three voyages in 1534, 1535 and 1541—"They call a town Canada"—The Indians of Stadacona and of Hochelaga—Failure of Cartier's attempt at settlement 11

CHAPTER III

THE COMING OF CHAMPLAIN

Champlain's first visit in 1603—Tadoussac and the "Caban of the great Sagamo which is called Anadabijou"—Champlain's bargain with the Indians and its meaning—His journey up the river—Changes since Cartier's visit—Indian politics and the Iroquois 33

CHAPTER IV

THE FOUNDING OF QUEBEC: PROBLEMS OF EXPLORATION AND SETTLEMENT

Champlain and the "first colonie sent to Kebec" in 1608—The choice of the Narrows—Advantages of the site—Champlain's journey up the Richelieu and the first attack on the Iroquois—His great journey in 1615—Discovery of the route to Lake Huron—His visit to the Huron country and to Lake Ontario—The raid on Iroquois lands 53

PAGE

CHAPTER V

Years of Trouble

Slow growth of Quebec—The Recollet friars and the Jesuits—Kirke's capture of Quebec in 1629 and its return to the French in 1632—Foundation of the Three Rivers in 1634—The Society of Our Lady of Montreal—Founding of Montreal in 1641–2—The Huron Missions—The Iroquois wars and the Iroquois menace to Canada 73

CHAPTER VI

The Era of Settlement

Canada a Royal Province—The beginnings of systematic settlement—The French attacks on the Iroquois—Their apparent success and the new menace due to the appearance of the English on the Hudson River—King Louis XIV's objects and methods—Results of his policy: the Seigniors and the Habitants along the St. Lawrence, the Coureurs de Bois outside—Coming of La Salle to Canada—The English in Hudson Bay in 1668 . . . 95

CHAPTER VII

French Expansion: Its Motives and Meaning

French activity and English passivity, their causes and future consequences—The new Jesuit Missions in the west—Lines of access to the Mississippi—The Sulpicians on Lake Ontario—Discovery of new route to the west—Marquette and Jolliet and the discovery of the Mississippi—La Salle and his journey to the Gulf of Mexico 117

CHAPTER VIII

Canada under Frontenac's First Governorship

The position in Canada when Frontenac arrived in 1672—His character—The fur trade and its changes since early days—Hudson Bay and the events there: the northern menace to the French trade—The Iroquois and the menace from the east—Recall of Frontenac in 1682—La Barre and Dongan—The English attempts to reach the western lakes—Denonville's attack on the Senecas—The Iroquois reprisals and Frontenac's return in 1689 138

CHAPTER IX

Frontenac and the Iroquois

The position in Canada on Frontenac's return in 1689—The Iroquois as the central problem of his policy—His raids on the English

PAGE

colonies: their motives and results—Attacks on the Mohawks (1693) and Onondages (1696)—Restoration of Fort Frontenac and founding of Detroit—The Iroquois treaties with the French and the English and their meaning—The Caughnawaga Indians 163

CHAPTER X

Canada, New England and Acadia: The Two Combatants and the Victim

Canada at the opening of the eighteenth century—New England and Acadia—The French and Indians raids on New England—The English response: attempted attacks on Canada and capture of Port Royal (1710)—The Peace of Utrecht (1713): its American clauses and their effects—The founding of Louisberg (1713)—Continued Indian raids on New England 185

CHAPTER XI

A New French Policy and an Inconclusive War

The French Scheme of Domination and the difficulties—Acadia and the sea-gateway—The lines of access to the Mississippi and the landgate at Montreal—Exploration in the far west and north-west: the work of the Verendryes—Canada and New York opposed: Forts Niagara and Oswego—The French at Crown Point—War renewed: the capture of Louisberg—Crown Point as a base for raiding-parties—Massachusetts and New York: the contrasts in their policy and its causes 207

CHAPTER XII

The Beginning of the Final Struggle

The position after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chappelle (1748)—Halifax and Louisberg as rivals—Beauséjour and Fort Lawrence: the Acadian Problem—Lake Ontario and Lake Champlain: the effects of the Fur Trade—The French and the Ohio Region—Bienville's Journey in 1749—The French attack on Pickawillany in 1752 and the advance towards the Allegheny in 1753—Founding of Fort Duquesne and Washington's defeat (1754)—Braddock's defeat (1755)—Capture of Beauséjour and expulsion of Acadians—Failure of English attempts to take Fort Niagara and Crown Point 231

PAGE

CHAPTER XIII

The Conquest of Canada

The birch-bark canoe and its significance for the French of Canada—The stages in the conflict—Failure of the English attempts to advance by the Mohawk and Lake Champlain Gaps in 1756 and 1757—The year 1758 as the beginning of the end: capture of Louisberg and the opening of the seaway to Quebec: destruction of Fort Frontenac: French abandonment of Fort Duquesne—Surrender of Quebec and Fort Niagara in 1759—The threefold advance on Montreal and the capitulation in 1760—The Peace of Paris (1763) 259

EPILOGUE: The Later History . . . 285

APPENDIX: Bibliographical Notes . . 301

ILLUSTRATIONS

Quebec : The Citadel	*Frontispiece*
	FACING PAGE
Lachine Rapids	20
The Cliffs of the Saguenay River . . .	42
The Canadian Shield :	
North Shore of Gulf	48
One of the Thousand Islands . . .	48
Near Lake Simcoe	68
Montreal and Mount Royal	84
Grand Manitoulin Island, Georgian Bay . .	90
Valley of St. Francis River	108
The Thousand Islands	126
Tadoussac	148
French River	158
Entrance to Annapolis Valley	188
Quebec in 1699	198
Lower St. Lawrence	212
Niagara Gorge	238
The Roche Percée, Gaspé Peninsula . . .	290

SKETCH MAPS

		PAGE
I.	The Site of Quebec City	2
II.	The Lower St. Lawrence, Illustrating Cartier's Voyages	12
III.	The Iroquois Country and its Relations	34
IV.	Illustrating Champlain's Journey of 1615	54
Va.	The Site of Three Rivers	74
Vb.	The Site of Montreal	74
VI.	Hudson Bay and Strait	96
VII.	The Great Lakes and the Routes to the Mississippi	118
VIII.	Father Alabanel's Route from Tadoussac to James Bay	140
IX.	Illustrating Frontenac's Raids on New England and New York	164
X.	Acadia and the Lower St. Lawrence	186
XI.	Eastern Cape, Boston Island, Showing Position of Louisberg	208
XII.	Illustrating the Struggle for the Upper Ohio Area	232
XIII.	The Central Low Plains of the United States	260
XIV.	The Provinces of the Dominion and the International Frontier	286

INTRODUCTORY



MAP I. THE SITE OF QUEBEC CITY

CHAPTER I

Introductory

THE leaf of the Red Maple, of the tree whose gorgeous colouring sets the autumn woods aflame, is the national emblem of Canada. At first sight it may seem as if its beauty is reason enough for the choice; for the tree is one of the first to take on that strange brilliance which is at once the harbinger of coming winter and the symbol of fruition. More than this, the pioneers, after their long journey over the wild wastes of the Atlantic waters, hailed with joy the maples of the summer woods of the shores of the St. Lawrence as a proof that they had reached lands resembling those which they had left. A maple leaf "pluckt off" might well be a symbol not only of waters abated but of a land abounding in wood and pasture, able to carry corn and cattle, of a New World differing from the Old chiefly in its wider spaces, its greater opportunities.

But it is when we look at the region through which the tree is spread that we seem to find a deeper meaning below such possible ones. The Red Maple is absent from the prairies which roll endlessly westward; it does not occur among the dark pine and fir woods which clothe rugged British Columbia. From the Atlantic coast of Nova Scotia to the island-sprinkled Lake of the Woods it stretches, in a belt always growing narrower westward.

The rich, moist lands near the St. Lawrence and the more easterly Great Lakes suit it well, while the wilderness of the interior of Quebec and Ontario knows it as little as the ultimate west or the wide plains.

We have but to glance at the map to learn that this means something in the history of Canada. Lake of the Woods, which is at once the limit of the Red Maple and the boundary between Ontario and the prairie province of Manitoba, by an odd coincidence marks also a change in the nature of the International Frontier. Eastward of that lake the frontier shows at least a general correspondence to natural features. It is, that is to say, a frontier of the Old World type, one of which we can say with some certainty that for it men fought and died, men who knew the actual surface even if they had perhaps never seen a map. But from the lake to the Strait of Georgia in the far west the frontier is a mathematical line, such as can only be drawn through empty lands, lands without a past and with an unknown future, a line drawn by men ignorant of the area demarcated and to whom it meant nothing. To-day these western lands are beginning to fill up, to show man's print on a surface which yesterday was virgin; but that could not have happened if another Canada, the Canada of the Maple leaf, had not already existed. The story of Canada cannot, therefore, be concerned primarily with those western lands—it is not there that we have to look for origins.

There is something more even than this. In their spread westwards the Red Maples thin out steadily till they cease at the threshold of Lake of the Woods, as if indicating that here another world begins. The boundary line between Manitoba and Ontario seems to suggest the

same fact. But though Manitoba[1] is a prairie province, one has to travel some hundred miles westward from the lake before the real prairie begins in the vicinity of Winnipeg. Ontario belongs to Eastern Canada; but a journey not of one but of many hundred miles separates the homes of the eastern folk from the boundary at the lake. Not only, that is to say, is there an older Canada and a newer, an eastern and a western, but between the two there is a very definite belt of barren land; not a line but a zone of separation.

That despite the barrier the two halves are locked together is one of those facts whose strangeness is apt to be overlooked in its familiarity. Only because a community with a nascent consciousness of nationhood already existed on the nearer side of the barrier was it possible to build a greater Canada from two sections which nature seemed to have set apart. Clearly then it is somewhere in the populous east that we have to look for answers to the questions of why and how Canada came to be.

But here we come to a deeper mystery still. That east which stretched out a hand to the west is not a unit; two great traditions coexist there, two tongues are spoken. From the south-west end of Lake Erie to the lower St. Lawrence towns and cities follow one another along the water front. Of these Toronto is to all intents and purposes an English-speaking city; Quebec[2] is almost purely French; Montreal, the greatest city of the Dominion, is French and English, French in origin, but in part at least now English in speech. Further, from Windsor on the Detroit river, to Cornwall on the St. Lawrence, some sixty miles above Montreal, the

[1] Map XIV. [2] Map I.

English-speaking towns face an alien shore; boat or even bridge will carry them forthwith to a land of similar speech but different allegiance. But from Montreal to Quebec the French-speaking towns and villages look across to a shore inhabited by men of their own speech, sharing a common tradition and a common faith. In other words, while the people of what was once Upper Canada are in close contact, in all the concerns of daily life, with the inhabitants of the United States, in Lower Canada there is a separation in space, due to the rugged, thinly peopled upland which for the most part forms the boundary here—and an even greater separation in outlook.

Here then we are obviously getting nearer the real kernel of our problem. How is it that Canada to-day is an entity distinct from the United States, even though the latter is richer, far better peopled, far more fully developed, and separated from it largely either by a purely artificial line which means nothing, or by a belt of water easy to cross? At this stage it is sufficient to say that it was essentially because, before the United States existed, the French had established themselves on the St. Lawrence; had brought under cultivation a strip of land between Quebec and Montreal; had defended themselves heroically against the Iroquois Indians who sought to oust them; had kept watch and ward on all the ways which led towards their lands from the Indian-haunted wilderness around; had, finally, witnessed the growth of a tradition which has shown and is showing all the vitality which comes from a long attachment to the soil.

It is for these reasons that this book is limited, practically speaking, to the French period, that which

closed with the Peace of Paris in 1763. It may be said, however, that so far, if we have shown that the foci of national life lie in the strip of level, fertile land which stretches from the shores of the nearer lakes to the vicinity of Quebec, the region which contains to-day three-fifths of the total population of Canada on an area which forms less than one per cent. of its total land surface, we seem yet to be leaving out of account one of the greatest factors in the making. If Montreal, with its 600,000 people, is the largest city, Toronto, with more than 500,000, runs it close, and no other city as yet even approaches these figures. Toronto was once the capital of Upper Canada, the Canada which owed its origin to the United Empire Loyalists, who came into the lakes region in the latter part of the 18th century, when the end of the War of Independence forced them to leave their earlier homes. Was not, it may be justly asked, this immigration one of the main causes which led to the origin of Canada ?

But we have to note that the possibility of this immigration—which meant so much for the future—depended on the existence here of empty, fertile lands waiting to be tilled. That no prior French agricultural settlements existed here does not mean that French influence had never extended above Montreal. The town of Kingston stands on the site of a fort named after the great Frenchman Frontenac ; Toronto is built on a site occupied by the French Fort Rouillé ; in the earlier part of the 17th century there were French Jesuit Mission stations on the south shore of Georgian Bay. French activity had in short played a large part in bringing about those changes in the Indian population here which left these lands available for white settlement

when the Loyalists came in. If then it is true that Canada as we know it had a double origin, one on the shores of Lakes Erie and Ontario and one on the St. Lawrence between Quebec and Montreal, the one area settled by French cultivators and the other first by incoming Loyalists, yet it was what had happened in the French period that made it possible to find homes and lands for the newcomers. Those homes and lands also were in a region sufficiently remote from the French area to allow a new tradition to develop side by side with the old—and without that Canada had not been.

Once again, the International Frontier east of Lake of the Woods came into being largely as a result of experience obtained during the French period, and that frontier in its turn determined the direction of future developments in Canada. Whichever way we turn, that is to say, whichever line of thought we follow in considering the factors which went to the making of Canada, we are led back inevitably to the French period. What the French did and what they failed to do has influenced and is still influencing the whole history of the Dominion.

It may seem, however, that the limitation of the subject-matter of this book to the French period means leaving out most of the great achievements, means an emphasis on war and bloodshed rather than on deeds of which man may be more justly proud. It leaves us with a Canada without railways or canals, without wide-stretching wheatlands, with a still unknown west; a Canada not yet conscious of its future place in a great Commonwealth of Nations, of the sheaves of corn and of the strength of young manhood with which it was to pay back in

overflowing measure the gifts it had received from the Old World in an earlier day. It means the telling of a tale in which heroism and brutality go hand in hand, in which failure seemed often more marked than success, one which dwells inevitably on sorrow and tragedy. It ends with the collapse of a great ideal and leaves but lightly sketched in the story of the birth of a new and greater one. But it has the advantage that the emotions which swayed the actors no longer stir us deeply ; their problems are not ours, and freed from their need for immediate action we can trace more clearly the way in which they strove to adapt themselves to the unchanged and unchangeable natural conditions, and note how speedily failure followed any attempt to ignore these.

Here, indeed, we come to the object of this re-telling of the story of how Canada came to be. Everywhere on the surface of the " machine ronde," what man does is less what he wills than what he is able to do ; freedom of action is, if not fettered, at least limited by his physical setting. French Canada offers a particularly beautiful example of this interaction of man and place, and the purpose here is primarily neither to recount events, nor to describe the area within which they took place, but to attempt to trace causes, to discuss the why and the wherefore. The successes and the failures of the men who lived and died within the sharply demarcated period selected are intimately bound up with the characters of the lands within which they settled or over which they roamed, and both by what they did and by what they were unable to do they made in a very literal sense the Canada which they did not live to see. But their actions in their turn were justified or stamped as errors largely in the measure in which they did or did not

involve an adaptation to the land-forms and to all that they implied. Our purpose is thus to show, within a definitely limited period of time and area of space, how historical events were moulded by the framework within which they occurred, how the foundations of the Dominion of Canada were laid by men who knew not what they did.

CARTIER AND INDIAN CANADA: THE SEARCH FOR CATHAY



MAP II. THE LOWER ST. LAWRENCE, ILLUSTRATING CARTIER'S VOYAGES

There were no settlements at Tadoussac and Three Rivers in Cartier's time, but he visited the future sites of both.

CHAPTER II

Cartier and Indian Canada: The Search for Cathay

CANADA is a word which has had many meanings, and our own use of the word for the present Dominion dates only from the latter part of the 19th century. But there is at least no doubt about its origin and first meaning. The Breton sailor, Jacques Cartier, in the Indian vocabulary affixed to the narrative of his Second Voyage says :—"they call a town, *Canada*." Even he, however, is inconsistent in that he uses the word habitually not as the name of a settlement, but to signify a narrow strip of inhabited land along the shore of the St. Lawrence.

Before we consider what Cartier saw in his Canada we have to inquire first how he got there and what he went out to seek. Without attempting to tell the whole story of exploration so far as it affects the north-eastern part of the continent of North America, we may note briefly the work of the Cabots. Nearly forty years before Cartier first sailed into the Gulf of St. Lawrence, John Cabot left Bristol, in May, 1497, to look for Cathay (Northern China). He made landfall at some disputed point either in what is now Atlantic Canada or in Newfoundland, but he firmly believed that he had found what he sought. So sure was he that, according to the story, he induced certain London merchants to take

part in his second journey the following year, to the extent of supplying small stocks of merchandise intended to be traded for the products of the Far East. This second voyage, on which Sebastian Cabot accompanied his father, was a failure and little is known of it. But the notion that some part of Asia could be reached by Cabot's route persisted. Its only direct appearance in Cartier's narratives is in the King's Commission for the Third Voyage, but there can be no doubt that it was present in his mind throughout. In one form or another it lingered indeed for a prolonged period, and was a great motive for journeys of exploration.

The London merchants' hope of utilising Cabot's discoveries to establish a direct trade with China was doomed to failure; but these nevertheless resulted almost at once in the development of another kind of trade. He brought back tidings of the great wealth of fish in the waters visited, and this was taken advantage of by Bretons, Normans, Basques—both French and Spanish—and Portuguese, who began to make regular journeys to work the fisheries, the English being much slower in putting in an appearance. When Cartier, in 1534, was making preparations for his First Voyage the merchants of St. Malo put all the obstacles they could in his way. They feared that he might make public information about routes, harbours and fishing-grounds, which they wanted kept secret lest still other rivals should appear on the scene. It was only a definite assurance that he intended to pass beyond the known waters to the unknown that enabled him to make a start.

This First Voyage was of the nature of a reconnaissance. Cartier found his way into the Gulf without

difficulty, sailed round its shores and coasted along the greater part of the large island of Anticosti; but he made no attempt to enter the river proper. The main point of interest to us in this voyage is that he came into contact with two distinct groups of Indians.

The first band he met in the beautiful inlet which still bears his name of Chaleur Bay.[1] Of this bay he speaks in enthusiastic terms. The country, he says, "is more temperate than Spain, and the finest it is possible to see." There is, however, no mention of any permanent settlement nor of any signs of cultivation, and indeed he indicates that the Indians met with here were migratory fishers, "who go from place to place maintaining themselves and catching fish in the fishing season for food." As gifts in return for the "hatchets, knives, beads and other wares" offered by the explorers they brought furs and "strips of cooked seal." Their apparent poverty diminished Cartier's interest, and he gives little detail in regard to them. To us the important point is that they show that in Indian times, as afterwards, the Gulf was the portal of Canada, of the land where grain could be cultivated and settlements established; but it was not Canada.

The second band of Indians was encountered in July, 1534, when the two ships of the expedition ran into Gaspé Bay for shelter during stormy weather. While detained there Cartier records the arrival in forty canoes of a party of some three hundred Indians, men, women and children, who had come from a great distance to fish for mackerel, of which he says there was great abundance. The Indians showed themselves well-disposed towards the explorers, but their chief displayed some not

[1] Map II.

unnatural doubt and resentment when Cartier proceeded to erect a large cross at the entrance to Gaspé Harbour. The chief, Indian-fashion, delivered a long harangue of which the words were quite unintelligible to the Bretons, but the gist of which, they gathered from his gestures, was that the region was Indian territory, and that Cartier had no right to erect a symbol of authority without permission. In reply, by a somewhat unworthy ruse, Cartier had the chief, with his three sons and his brother, enticed on board his vessel. Three of the party were later liberated, with presents to soothe their wounded feelings, but two of the young men were detained and taken to France. The action brought not undeserved trouble on Cartier in the long run, but these first captives, unlike later ones, were brought back the following year.

By direct observation, by the use of signs and, almost certainly, from the two young men later on, when these were able to communicate with their captors, Cartier learnt a good deal from this band of Indians. He tells us that they only came down to the salt water for fishing, and lived the rest of the time in a country where Indian corn or maize was grown, which they ate, he says, " in place of bread, and of this they had a large quantity with them." He learnt that they used beans also as food, and gives a somewhat imaginative account of their fruits.

His two captives obviously told him much more later, for though he started on his return to France shortly after the visit to Gaspé Bay, yet when he began his Second Voyage the following year the appearance of feeling his way in the dark had given way to a definite determination to go to " Canada," the home of his

captives, and to follow its great river to a point called Hochelaga, a place which bulked large in his imagination.

On this Second Voyage he found his way into the St. Lawrence river without difficulty, and, apparently at the suggestion of his Indian guides, visited and anchored at the mouth of "a very deep and rapid river," which entered the main river on the left or north-western bank, and is the River Saguenay of our maps.[1] This, he was told, was "the river and route to the kingdom and country of the Saguenay." He was impressed by the scenery, by the bare and lofty mountains, and especially by the way in which tall trees—now alas a thing of the past—seemed to spring from the naked rock. He records also that he saw four canoes containing Indians who had come downstream from Canada to fish.

Later he went upstream to Canada, and found on the site where Quebec was to rise later an Indian village, Stadacona, the residence of the "lord of Canada." In his narrative he uses this name for a short strip of inhabited land on the left bank of the river, extending from Grosse Île, north-east of the larger Island of Orleans, to some undefined point between the present sites of the towns of Quebec and Three Rivers. "This region," he says "is as fine land as it is possible to see, being very fertile and covered with magnificent trees of the same varieties as in France." He tells us also, that it lay where the fresh water of the river proper began, and therefore where the abundant sea-fish, the seals and whales of the lower waters, gave place to the "pike, trout, carp and bream" of the upper. Thus the people of Canada had to go downstream to take part in the rich

[1] Map II.

sea fisheries of the estuary and gulf, and it was to one of those periodic excursions that he had owed his first contact with "Canadian" Indians.

He does not, however, give any definite description of the village and surrounding land, being filled with an intense desire to go on upstream to Hochelaga, the accounts of which given by his captives had evidently aroused his curiosity greatly. The sight of the wide, open water beyond the narrows [1] must also have had for a navigator an attraction not to be resisted.

A difficulty, however, arose from the fact that his captives, now once more at home among their own people after their long enforced absence, began to show what Cartier regarded as a very unreasonable distrust. They "were altogether changed in their attitude and goodwill, and refused to come on board our ships, although many times begged to do so." They manifested also much reluctance to implement a promise previously made to act as guides to Hochelaga. One of them, says Cartier severely, "was a worthless fellow, who was intent on nothing but treason and malice." In view of the trick by which Cartier had originally seized this Indian and his brother, this is not without its element of humour.

Eventually, after some quaint discussions and incidents, Cartier lost patience and, in the words of his latest translator, said "that if they were not ready to go willingly, they could stay at home [2] and that on their account he would by no means give up his attempt to reach that place." Leaving two of his ships behind, therefore, he set out with the third and smallest and two long-boats.

[1] Indian *kebec* = Quebec, Map I.

[2] *qu' ilz demeurassent*—in modern speech "they might jolly well stop where they were," with an implied addition!

His description of his journey upstream is sufficiently detailed to be followed without difficulty on a modern map. He found the shallow expansion which is now called Lake St. Peter[1] difficult to negotiate, in the absence of the dredged and buoyed channel by means of which steamships to-day pass through it. Finally, he left his ship behind at its upper end and continued the journey in his two long-boats. His impatience to reach Hochelaga was evidently great, and his narrative becomes brisker and more interesting as he gets near.

Eventually the long-boats were run ashore at a point which is thought to be covered by part of the present docks of Montreal, and Cartier was met and welcomed by a crowd of Indians which he estimates as numbering more than a thousand persons. He had encountered Indians hunting musk-rats on the islands at the upper end of Lake St. Peter, so that it is probable that news of the approaching arrival of the party had been sent on to Hochelaga.

The Indians brought presents of fish and "of their bread, which is made of Indian corn, throwing so much of it into our long-boats that it seemed to rain bread." As it was now the beginning of October the maize would probably be harvested, and the lofts which Cartier saw afterwards in the village would doubtless be full of corn. The "bread," as it is afterwards explained, was in the form of flat cakes, baked on a hot stone with a covering of pebbles.

The morning after their arrival the party set out, under Indian guidance, to pay a ceremonial visit to the village. A well-trodden path led from the water's edge through oak woods, the oaks being "as beautiful as any

[1] Map Vb.

in France." After a walk of about two leagues the oak woods gave place to cultivated land—"fine lands with large fields covered with the corn of the country . . . and in the middle of these fields is situated and stands the village of Hochelaga, near and adjacent to a mountain, the slopes of which are fertile and are cultivated, and from the top of which one can see a long distance. We named this mountain Mount Royal." This name, of course, it still retains, and if the Indian fields are now replaced by the streets of Montreal, the mountain in its beautiful public park is probably not greatly altered since Cartier's party saw it. After examining the village with its defensive palisades, Cartier, like most travellers since, did not fail to ascend to the summit of the hill, and his is the first recorded description of the magnificent view which rewards the climb.

Whatever faults one may find with his literary style, one has to admit that he picks out all the essential points in this famous view, and it is of interest to note that almost every feature which he mentions was destined to exert great influence on the future history of the land.

What was it he saw? As with most travellers his eye was first drawn to the hill country. North, he tells us, there was a range of mountains. We know now that this so-called mountain range was but a part of that rugged upland to which the name of the Canadian Shield or Laurentian Plateau has been given. Next to the St. Lawrence river, if in a different way, it has exerted more influence on the history of Canada than any other feature, for while to Cartier and to those who followed him the river was a line of attraction, the Shield right down to the present day has repelled man.

Photo by Miss M. Munro

THE LACHINE RAPIDS

To the south he saw other mountains, the Adirondacks and Green mountains, a part of that extensive belt of upland destined for long to shut off the Dutch and English settlers on the Atlantic coast of what was to become the United States from the vast plains of the interior. "Between these ranges lies the finest land it is possible to see, being arable, level and flat. And in the midst of this flat region one saw the river extending beyond the spot where we had left the long-boats." His eye, that is to say, drops from the barren hill country to the region fit to be the home of man. In the midst of the plain the great river sweeps majestically onwards, "grand, large et spacieulx," he tells us, "extending as far as the eye can reach," multiplying his words in the effort to convey the impression it made upon him. The joy at seeing his boats lying safely in the calm water where he had left them is accentuated by the sight above that point of "the most violent rapid it is possible to see, which we were unable to pass." He saw, that is to say, as every tourist sees to-day, the white tumbling waters of what we call the Lachine Rapids, but what for many a day was to be called only *The* Sault,[1] as if there was only one rapid in the world. His Indian friends intimated to him that there were other rapids on the river above those which he saw. To-day, of course, those first rapids are circumvented by the Lachine Canal, a notable feature in the modern view from Mount Royal. But much of the significance of future events is missed if one fails to realise—as it seems quite clear that Cartier did realize—that the "violent rapid" meant that this point marked the end of free upward navigation on the St. Lawrence. Hochelaga—"at the

[1] Modern French *Saut* = fall.

beaver dam," that is, at the break, had a position corresponding to Assuan on the Nile. To Cartier this fact meant the destruction of a hope on which he had built much.

Unfortunately he tells us nothing of his feelings, and his narratives were possibly written up by someone else from his rough log ; they are in many ways wooden and disappointing. His attention was called to the last important element in the landscape by the Indians. This is the River Ottawa, the expanded lower portion of which, before it joins the St. Lawrence above the Lachine Rapids,[1] is visible from the hill. The land up that river, they gave him to understand, contained silver and gold, and was inhabited by bad people, continually at war. Cartier was unable to make out their meaning very well, and came to the conclusion that this river was the way to the " kingdom and province of the Saguenay."

His visit to Hochelaga was very short ; from his narrative indeed it would appear that only a complete day was spent on the spot. It would seem that, quite after the fashion of a band of present-day excursionists, the party devoted the morning to the town and the afternoon to Mount Royal. Like many tourists since, also, some of them found the day very tiring, and the kindly Indians lifted them up, pickaback, and carried them thus to their boats. The really curious point, however, is that Cartier, after having come so far, and longed so intensely to see Hochelaga, should have been content with so cursory an inspection. The lateness of the season may have had something to do with this, but it looks as if his disappointment at the block in the waterway was very great.

[1] Map Vb.

A certain amount of exploration was carried out on the journey back to Stadacona, but with obviously diminishing energy and enthusiasm. Thus the party anchored off the point where the St. Maurice river enters the main stream, where the important French settlement of Three Rivers[1] was to arise later, and Cartier ordered the two long-boats to row up the river. But the sailors who carried out these instructions soon found the river "to be of no importance and shallow," and so came back. He seems to have missed entirely the very important Richelieu river, a right bank tributary of the St. Lawrence coming in at the head of Lake St. Peter. He learnt of its existence after his return to Canada, the Indians of Stadacona telling him that they were in the habit of travelling up it in their canoes, "to a land where ice and snow never come," and where a great abundance of fruits grew. It was left to Cartier's successor Champlain to explore this river and the route to which it led, which was destined to play so important a part in future history.

Cartier's party arrived back at the St. Charles river, near Stadacona, on October 11, and here they wintered. The winter was disastrous owing to an outbreak of scurvy, which caused many deaths. In view of the probable nature of their food there was nothing remarkable in this. Cartier states expressly that the Indians were very niggardly with their provisions, and in particular brought them very little fresh meat. On the other hand they were eager to trade "eels and other fish" for knives, beads and trinkets. He tells us elsewhere that these Indians were in the habit of laying up great stores of smoked fish during the summer months for winter use. Since

[1] Map Va.

they had no knowledge of the preservative qualities of salt, this fish would doubtless be in a more or less putrid condition when it was consumed, and Cartier says nothing of any attempts of the French to supplement the food supplied by the Indians by hunting or in any other way.

The disease prevailed among the Indians as well as among the French. But while the latter could do nothing to stay its course, Cartier one day encountered an Indian who some ten or twelve days before had shown advanced symptoms, but on the second occasion appeared in good health. In answer to an inquiry the Indian said he had been healed by the juice of the leaves of a tree, and sent two squaws to show Cartier how to collect and use the material. Some branches were gathered and the women indicated how the bark and leaves were to be pounded up and then boiled in water.

The infusion was to be drunk and the residue applied externally to the affected parts. With some difficulty certain of the patients were induced to give the remedy a trial. " As soon as they had drunk it, they felt better, which must clearly be ascribed to miraculous causes: for after drinking it two or three times, they recovered health and strength and were cured of all the diseases by which they were attacked. . . . When this became known there was such a press for the medicine that they almost killed each other to have it first; so that in less than eight days a whole tree as large and as tall as any I ever saw was used up, and produced such a result, that had all the doctors of Louvain and Montpellier been there, with all the drugs of Alexandria, they could not have done so much in a year as did this tree in eight days; for it benefited us so much that all who were

willing to use it, recovered health and strength, thanks be to God."

Many discussions have taken place as to the identification of Cartier's miraculous tree. It was certainly an evergreen, possibly the balsam fir, which yields the Canada balsam of commerce, formerly used to a limited extent in medicine. A beverage called spruce beer is still made in North America from the young shoots of spruce fir, and had at one time a certain reputation as an anti-scorbutic. It is now chiefly used as a mild stimulant in prohibitionist Canada, in default of stronger drinks. Cartier's allusion to the drugs of Alexandria, like his belief in the wealth of Saguenay, was no doubt due to his natural desire to prove that he had discovered a land of great wealth and importance. But the belief that Indian women had a knowledge of simples with virtues far greater than the drugs of doctors and chemists, to which he gave publicity, soon became widespread and still lingers in North America.

Apart from the calamity of the epidemic a certain amount of trouble arose during the winter through friction with the Indians, for which Cartier puts the blame on the malice of his former captives. It had, however, clearly some economic basis. The Indians, though this particular group had made great advances, were still virtually in the Stone Age, having no iron tools. Their initial friendliness and offer of gifts must be ascribed, at least in part, to the fact that the French had much to offer which was invaluable to them. When we remember, for example, that the complicated palisade round Hochelaga, some thirty feet or more in height—with galleries for throwing stones down on attackers, and ladders to give access to these—was made of wood,

obtained from trees probably cut down and trimmed with stone axes, we can well understand that a good hatchet was a prize for which bread, or fish, or furs " and whatever else they possessed " might well be exchanged. But Cartier, with his usual disarming simplicity, states expressly on several occasions that he offered only " wares of small value" in return. This naturally caused ill-feeling, more especially since, as the long winter went on, the shortage of foodstuffs caused them to rise in value, for the Indians " were themselves in need of provisions."

During the winter Cartier took some pains to collect information from the Indians—especially from Donnacona, the " lord of Canada," a much travelled old gentleman, " who had never ceased wandering about the country, by river, stream and land since his earliest recollection." Much of this information is useful and interesting, though the captain, as he is always called, had little idea of orderly and systematic arrangement of his material. We do learn, however, that the main cultivated crops were maize, beans and pumpkins and squashes, a fact which throws light on the affinities of these Indians. He gives also an entertaining account of the Indian use of tobacco—" a plant of which a large supply is collected in summer for the winter's consumption." The French " made a trial of this smoke," but found it little to their liking.

But all these things interested Cartier only moderately, and as time went on Donnacona's tales of the wealth of mysterious Saguenay absorbed him to the exclusion of all else. We can well believe that the old Indian was shrewd enough to perceive this, and that his stories became more and more marvellous as his auditor's interest grew ; about some of them even Cartier seems

to feel a doubt. It seems likely enough also that Donnacona, realising the drain upon the food supplies due to the continued presence of the French, was prompted by the thought that if he could induce them to start off into the wilderness on a fool's errand the pressure would be relieved. If so he miscalculated the caution of the Breton, to his own undoing.

The first point is to note the stages in the development of Cartier's notions in regard to the "land of the Saguenay." As we have seen, on his journey to Canada he anchored at the mouth of the River Saguenay, but then paid little attention to the Indian stories of the region to which it led. At Hochelaga the Indians there intimated to him by signs that the River Ottawa led to a land from which gold and silver were obtained, and he came to the conclusion that this land must be the Saguenay region. After his return to Canada the chief Donnacona told him that the river of the Saguenay was difficult to navigate after eight or ten days' journey from its mouth, and that the regular, direct and safer route to the country was by the Ottawa. The account reads as if Donnacona thought it prudent to confirm Cartier in his own opinion on the subject. As the long winter wore away Saguenay became more and more a land of marvels. "In that country the natives go clothed and dressed in woollens like ourselves," that is the French: there also "there are many towns and tribes composed of honest folk who possess great store of gold and copper." This was improved upon later, and Cartier learnt that there were "immense quantities of gold, rubies and other rich things," and "the men there are as white as in France." Donnacona even added that he had been there himself and seen these wonders.

The immediate result of all this was that Cartier, who had no mind to leave his own domain of the water, determined to seize Donnacona, his two former captives, and the headmen of the tribe, and carry them back to France, where Donnacona could tell the King of France "all he had seen in the west of the wonders of the world." Ten Indians were taken back to France on this occasion, one being a little girl and the remainder men of position. The only material proof of the wealth of Saguenay which they carried with them was "a large knife of red copper," presented to Donnacona, before his enforced departure for France, by some of his subjects who arrived from the River Saguenay in their canoes with bundles of beaver furs and sealskins. The fact is of importance as showing that there was some communication with the interior by means of the River Saguenay at this period.

All the Indians whom Cartier took back to France on this journey were destined to die there within a year or two, with the exception of the child, though not before they had seen and spoken to the King of France. They are disposed of in a few lines in the narrative of Cartier's Third Voyage, so that it is left to the imagination to fill in the details of this little tragedy.

So far as Cartier is concerned the rest of the story is soon told. Though he returned to France in the spring of 1536, no attempt was made to utilise his real and hypothetical discoveries till 1540. In that year Francis I of France created one François de la Rocque, Sieur de Roberval, his viceroy and lieutenant-general in New France, and Cartier captain-general and leader of the ships, the intention being to continue exploration, especially of the country of the Saguenay, and also to

establish a settlement. Cartier sailed in 1541, Roberval not until 1542. The expedition was a failure throughout. We need not trouble with details, for two incidents are symbolic of the whole.

Cartier sailed once again up the St. Lawrence and established a camp at the mouth of the river of Cap Rouge, which enters the St. Lawrence nine miles above Quebec. Here, among his other activities, he prepared some ground and sowed cabbage, turnip, lettuce and other seeds. These germinated and appeared at the surface at the end of eight days. But we hear no more of them, and it seems safe to assume that they disappeared speedily, as Roberval's settlement was destined to do.

In pursuit of the other aim of the expedition, the exploration of the kingdom of Saguenay, the St. Lawrence was ascended to the point where Hochelaga had previously been found. The fact that Cartier went upstream in search of Saguenay, not downstream to the river of that name, shows that he laid no stress on the fact that the copper knife had been brought from the mouth of the river. Evidently he still maintained his original belief that the kingdom was to be reached by the Ottawa. On this occasion he made an effort to pass up the Lachine Rapids in a boat and satisfied himself that this was impossible. Subsequently he landed, and finding a beaten track close to the water, followed it for some distance. The presence of the track shows that the Indians were in the habit of making a portage here. His own observations, and a primitive map made by the Indians with sticks on the ground, convinced him that there was no feasible waterway to the interior, and he returned to his camp at Cap Rouge.

The narrative, which is imperfect, ends soon afterwards, but we know from Roberval's narrative, which is also imperfect, that Cartier returned to France in the summer of 1542, with "certaine Diamonts and a quantitie of Golde ore, which was found in the Countrey." The "Diamonts" and the "Golde" were found near Cartier's Fort at Cap Rouge. The gold seems to have been pyrites, the diamonds were worthless crystals—so that "diamonds from Canada" became a proverbial phrase for anything which was not what it professed to be. Cabbages and turnips that did not get past the seedling stage, worthless if shining stones—these were the apparent material products of Cartier's series of voyages. The real results were, of course, something very different, for much precise topographical detail had been obtained, as well as valuable if incomplete notes on the life of the Indians.

In the part of the St. Lawrence valley explored by Cartier the two most important Indian settlements were first Hochelaga and second Stadacona. Montreal and Quebec to-day not only occupy the same sites, but have retained the same relative importance. It is true that man's ingenuity has solved—partially at least—the problem, insoluble for Cartier, presented by the Lachine Rapids. Yet the predominance of Montreal among the cities of Canada to-day is still essentially due to the fact that it stands at the point where unimpeded water transport stops, but on which at the same time routes from the interior converge.

Cartier's Canada, as we have already seen, was a strip of inhabited land stretching a short distance upstream and downstream from Stadacona. But we may conveniently extend his name to include also

Hochelaga, and it then becomes the riverine strip inhabited by cultivating Indians. The Indians were probably Hurons, certainly belonged to the Huron-Iroquois group, and because of their water front they were able to supplement the produce of their plots by fishing. The position of Stadacona in particular permitted its inhabitants to make free use both of the river proper and of the richer sea fisheries of the Gulf. They were also hunters, perhaps not very skilful ones, for the ease with which sea fish and marine mammals could be obtained in quantity made the chase of land animals of less importance.

In addition to having a very considerable knowledge of parts of the Gulf they were acquainted, as we have seen, with the River Richelieu as affording a route to the south. Even from Cartier's rather imaginative statements, it is clear that they knew that it led to a land differing notably from their own. If that land had not, as the Indians believed, a uniformly warm climate, yet its contrasts with their own territory were great enough to ensure for it a very different history. For the Richelieu-Lake Champlain—Hudson route leads, of course, to the site on which New York was destined to rise.

Of the Canadian Indians' relation to the country stretching westward from the left bank of the St. Lawrence, Cartier's "kingdom of Saguenay," we know less. But through the contradictions and obscurities of his story we can discern at least that they had some knowledge of its features, and that some intercourse with it was carried on. There are indications also that the sedentary agricultural Indians of Hochelaga feared and distrusted its inhabitants,[1] believed to have been migratory Algonquin hunters.

[1] p. 22.

Thus before the darkness closes down again with the definite failure of the Cartier-Roberval expedition of 1541-2, we have a glimpse of dangers threatening this first Canada, this initial attempt to establish stable, grain-producing communities on the shores of the great river.

THE COMING OF CHAMPLAIN



Map III. The Iroquois Country and its Relations

The "long house" of the Five Nations extended from the Lower Mohawk valley past Lake Oneida to beyond the south-western edge of the map. The names of the Nations are perpetuated in the River Mohawk, Lake Oneida and the three Finger Lakes shown south-west of that lake, these being, in order from east to west, Lake Onondaga, Lake Cayuga and Lake Seneca. The powerful tribes of the Mohawks and Senecas thus occupied the posts of honour at either end of the "long house," and in consequence played the greatest part in history. The forts and settlements shown are those which played an important part in later events.

CHAPTER III

The Coming of Champlain

FOR over sixty years after Cartier left the St Lawrence in 1542, until that is to say the year 1603 when Samuel Champlain paid his first visit to the region, there is practically a blank in the written story. To all appearance it would seem as though Cartier's discoveries had faded from men's minds, and "false as Canadian diamonds" summed up his results. In point of fact, however, this is appearance rather than reality. Just as Cabot's discoveries in the fifteenth century had been followed by the rapid development of the fisheries round Newfoundland by varied swarms of fishers, who contented themselves with summer journeys, so also were those of Cartier. He had shown that within the island guard, as without, there was sea water rich in marine life. He had made it clear also that not only was the Gulf proper easy to navigate, but that the lower part of the river itself could be reached without difficulty, and that here, in addition to the fisheries in the strict sense, whales, walruses and seals were abundant. A further development, due at first chiefly to the Basques, was the fur trade, the furs being obtained by barter with the Indians. The first point used on any scale as a summer fur station was the little bay at the mouth of the Saguenay, where Cartier had anchored on his Second Voyage.

Long before it was permanently occupied this convenient spot received the name of Tadoussac.[1] The fact that the Indians of the interior soon came to it regularly down the River Saguenay, in order to obtain goods from the Basque traders in exchange for their furs, proves that the Canadian Indians of Cartier's day were perfectly correct when they told him that the "country of the Saguenay" had important resources. Those resources did not as, perhaps at his prompting, they had stated, consist of the precious metals; but they were none the less valuable in European eyes.

It should be noticed further that the fisheries and the fur trade were a means of exploiting the more obvious resources of the newly-discovered region, while evading the risks of winter. The continuous cold and the heavy snowfall of the winter months, on the other hand, formed part of the reason why permanent settlements proved so difficult to establish. But it was not the absolute severity of the winters which had this effect; in the fulness of time towns were to grow up in regions where the cold is very much greater than in the St. Lawrence area. It was the element of unexpectedness which played the most important part.

In the rhetorical dedication prefixed to the narrative of Cartier's Second Voyage, written apparently by another hand than that responsible for the rest, there is a very confused argument about "the discovery of the lands in the west formerly unknown to you [King Francis I] and to us, lying in the same climates and parallels as your territories and kingdom." It seems fairly clear that the impression which the author wanted to convey was that the conditions in the St. Lawrence area were

[1] Map II

quite comparable to those prevailing in France. In point of fact, of course, not only the members of Cartier's expedition, but all the fishers, fur traders and prospective settlers came from just that part of Europe which presents the greatest climatic contrast to Eastern Canada. The winds which sweep westwards across the Atlantic, as is generally known, bring to the oceanic margin of Europe a softening of winter conditions, a cooling of the summer heat, to which there is nothing to correspond on the American side. Thus the summer warmth which Cartier met with in Chaleur Bay did nothing to prepare him for the deadly cold of his disastrous winter on the St. Charles river, and many of his successors seem to have regarded the Canadian winter much as we now regard that of the Antarctic area, in spite of the height at which the winter noontide sun stood in the sky.

Apart from the actual climate the danger of scurvy was another cause which led to the winters being greatly dreaded. The ravages of the disease, as some of the early leaders realised, were greatly increased by the want of regular active occupation, and the resultant depression of spirits. The long weary winters, the uncertainty as to when they would end, combined with home sickness, allowed the disease to rage unchecked, despite miraculous trees, which in any case could not always be found.

The difficulties were such that without some powerful motive, some ideal to distract the mind from painful realities, it almost seems as if settlement could never have been brought about. This compelling motive was supplied by the desire to convert the Indians, or, as Champlain puts it, to make the lily of France bloom in the New World in company with the unique religion

which is at once Catholic, Apostolic and Roman. Champlain himself had another motive, to him as compelling as the other, the passion for exploration. We may say broadly then that there were three main factors responsible for the development of Canada. In order of time these were—the search for a way to the East; the profits of the fisheries and the fur trade; missionary zeal combined with love of exploration.

The story of Champlain's first journey—a very entertaining one—may be read in English in one of the volumes of *Purchas His Pilgrimes*. As a preliminary we may note that he was accompanied by one Pont-Gravé, who had previously been engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to found a permanent settlement at Tadousaac in connection with a fur trading venture. The fact reminds us that by this time, the beginning of the seventeenth century, New France was fairly well known, and the mouth of the Saguenay at least had been often visited. This has its effect on the whole tone of the narrative. Champlain knew precisely what he wanted to be at, and got there promptly without loss of time. Curiously enough, however, at the date of his first journey he had not read Cartier's account of Hochelaga, and had apparently never heard of the place.

After entering the River of Canada he made for the port of Tadoussac, which he describes in some detail. At a league's distance was an Indian camp, which he visited the day after his arrival. These Indians were in the act of preparing a great feast to celebrate a victory obtained over their enemies the Iroquois at the mouth of the river of the Iroquois (the Richelieu).

Champlain gives a vivid picture of the scene at this

feast in the "Caban of their great Sagamo, which is called Anadabijou." The Indian interpreters who accompanied the French made an oration setting forth the intentions of the French and giving greetings on behalf of their King. The chief listened attentively, and then began to take tobacco, giving it also to Champlain and his friend, and to certain other Indian chiefs who were present. "After he had taken store of Tobacco, he began to make his Oration to all, speaking distinctly, resting sometimes a little and then speaking againe," all in the fashion of the true orator, confident of his power of swaying men's minds. To his statement that his auditors would doubtless gladly accept the proffered friendship of the King of France, "they answered all with one voyce, ho, ho, ho, which is to say, yea, yea, yea." The chief then intimated to Champlain "That he was very well content that his said Majestie should people their Countrey, and make warre against their enemies, and that there was no Nation in the world to which they wished more good than to the French."

The phrasing of this last sentence is very significant. It is clear that permission to the French to make settlements was granted on condition that the French would espouse their quarrels, and would in particular help them in their constant warfare with the Iroquois. Champlain says later— "The war which they make is altogether by surprises, for otherwise they would be out of hart; and they fear the said Irocois very much." It was fairly easy to put these Indians "out of hart," and their desire for the powerful aid of the French was proportionately great. The understanding thus reached was of the utmost importance in the future history of Canada.

After the ceremonial with Champlain and his party, the Indians returned to their feasting. The banquet is described in some detail. The dishes consisted wholly of meat, nothing being said of bread; no fish appears, but there was seal meat. Dogs, "whereof they have store to hunt with," were present, and played a curious part in the ceremonial dancing which accompanied the feast.

The day following the Indians broke up their camp, and trekked to the haven of Tadoussac, "where their good friends were." This gives Champlain an opportunity, of which he takes full advantage, to make observations on their dwellings, their canoes and their mode of travel. "Immediately every man in a trice tooke down his cabin, and the said grand Captain, first began to take his canoe, and carried it to the Sea, where he embarked his wife and children, and store of furs; and in like manner did well neere two hundred canowes, which goe strangely; for though our Shallop was well-manned, yet they went more swift than we. . . . Their Canowes . . . are very subject to overturning, if one know not how to guide them; for they are made of the barke of a Birch tree, and are so light, that one man will carry one of them easily; when they would pass over any land to goe to some River where they have business, they carry them with them. Their Cabins are low, made like Tents, covered with the said barke of a tree. . . ."

In addition to these facts obtained by direct observation, Champlain was able to communicate with these Indians and showed insatiable curiosity in regard to them. "All these people," he tells us, "sometimes endure so great extremity, that they are almost constrained to eate one another, through the great cold and snowes;

for the Beasts and Fowles whereof they live, retire themselves into more hot climates." "In winter when the Snowes are great, they make a kind of racket which is twice or thrice as bigge as one of ours in France, which they fasten to their feete, and so goe on the Snowe without sinking; for otherwise they could not hunt nor travaile in many places."

It would be hardly possible to give a more vivid account than this both of the life of these Indians, and, by implication, of the lands over which they roamed. Nor could the contrasts with the Indians encountered by Cartier be more strikingly brought out in so few words. Cartier's Indians dwelt on the river bank; those of his Hochelaga at least were sedentary, returning from their fishing and hunting expeditions to their fixed and fortified homes. For the time of winter scarcity they stored great stocks of maize, and because of their dependence on their crops could settle only on fertile lands.

But Champlain's "Mountainers," as he calls these Indians, known to us as belonging to the Algonquin group, were migratory hunters. The whole mechanism of their life, their light and swift birch-bark canoes, their winter snow-shoes, their portable wigwams, their stores of furs, all speak to us of their power of rapid movement, and of their skill as hunters.

Their peculiar means of communication tell us also much of the nature of the rugged upland which formed their main hunting-ground. It is remarkable for its enormous number of waterways, which not only interlace in a curiously complex fashion, but are separated from one another by very low water-partings. The birch-bark canoe, which could be carried over all the

minor interruptions of continuity, was peculiarly adapted to the area. One should note also Champlain's candid little touch about the way in which the canoes were apt to upset " if one know not how to guide them," a statement which certainly suggests personal experience. In point of fact the Indians might be " savages " from the French standpoint, but they had a kind of skill which Europeans find it very difficult to acquire. This was part of the reason why it was so necessary to obtain and keep their friendship ; without their aid the French, despite their superior civilisation, would have been tied for long enough to the great waterway of the St. Lawrence. Apart from it few of the other rivers could be traversed for any considerable distance in European craft.

From Tadoussac Champlain made an excursion up the River Saguenay, which gave him an opportunity of learning something, both directly and from the Indians, of the way in which the fur trade was carried out. It does not appear that he went far enough to reach Chicoutimi, where the first rapids occur, a distance of over seventy miles from the mouth. He was, however, told by the Indians of Lake St. John,[1] out of which the Saguenay flows, and of the three important rivers which enter that lake. The Indians told him that " On the side of the said Rivers are many lodgings, whither other Nacions come from the North, to trucke with the said Mountainers, for skins of Bevers and Marterns, for other Merchandises, which the French ships bring to the said Mountainers. The said Savages of the North say, that they see a Sea, which is salt."

From this it is clear that already, that is at the very

[1] Map VIII.

S. T. Hayward

THE CLIFFS OF THE SAGUENAY RIVER

beginning of the seventeenth century, the influence of the fur trade extended from the mouth of the Saguenay beyond the water-parting between the St. Lawrence basin and Hudson Bay ("a Sea, which is salt"). We have just seen that the Indians had indicated quite definitely that the continuance of this trade, the possibility of French settlement, and thus the carrying out of the journeys of exploration so dear to Champlain's heart, all depended on the French taking the part of the "Mountainers" against the Iroquois. On the other hand, the whole history of French Canada, and of the greater Canada which was to be, was profoundly influenced by the antagonism of those wonderfully intelligent and courageous warriors.

It is well also to recall the fact that the Algonquins of Tadoussac, when Champlain first came into contact with them, were in the act of celebrating a victory over the Iroquois obtained at the mouth of the Richelieu.[1] Already, that is to say, this river, called by Champlain the "River of the Irocois," which in Cartier's days was only a way to a mysterious southern land "where Cinnamon and Cloves are gathered," had become a route by which the peoples of the St. Lawrence valley could be attacked. For a prolonged period afterwards it was to see the ceaseless passage of armed men, and the quarrel of Alonquin and Iroquois had its sequel in the deadly conflicts between French and English.

After his journey up the Saguenay Champlain set out, in mid-June, to go to what he calls the Sault, that is the region of the Lachine Rapids. He gives a detailed description of his journey up the river, but we need only note the main points. There is now no word of Stada-

[1] p. 38.

cona, and Champlain "anchored at Quebec, which is a Strait of the said River, which is some three hundred pases broad." In point of fact the St. Lawrence is rather under a mile wide here, the actual narrowest point being at Cap Rouge, a few miles above.

There is no mention of Indians in the neighbourhood of the Narrows, but Champlain notes that the country here is "levell and goodly." The "Diamants" found by Cartier also reappear, but Champlain lays no particular stress upon them. Beyond the Strait, "where the River beginneth to grow broad," he says that "The Countrey groweth fairer and fairer, and are all low grounds, without Rockes, or very few." "The soyle is very soft, and if it were well manured it would yield great increase."

Further up the point which he calls "three Rivers" interested him greatly. This is the mouth of the River St. Maurice, which, owing to the presence of islands, is divided into three channels. The St. Maurice was of course the river which Cartier found "of no importance." [1] Champlain gives in detail his reasons for thinking that one of the islands at its mouth would be an excellent site for a "plantation"; the present town of Three Rivers owes its origin to a fort built in this region in 1634, that is not till more than thirty years after this first visit of Champlain's.

He went a short distance up the River St. Maurice, and obtained some information as to its course from the Indians. His account is not perfectly clear; but he learnt at least that from the river, by travelling overland, it was possible to reach Lake St. John, and then descend by the Saguenay to Tadoussac. He points out that the mouth of the St. Maurice commands the fairway of

[1] Map VA.

the St. Lawrence, and goes on to say—"Moreover, the planting of The three Rivers would be a benefit for the liberty of certaine Nations, which dare not come that way for feare of the said Irocois their enemies, which border upon all the said River of Canada."

The statement demonstrates once again his great acuteness, for the settlement of Three Rivers became, almost immediately after its somewhat belated foundation, a very important centre of the fur trade, even though it suffered severely from Iroquois attacks. It is clear that Champlain realised, even at this early date, that back from the north-western shore of the St. Lawrence lay a vast area containing fur-producing animals, and frequented by Indians very willing to barter these for European goods. If this trade was meantime limited to the mouth of the River Saguenay, he perceived that it could also be carried on where the other left-bank tributaries entered the main stream. The great obstacle to its development in the upper reaches of the St. Lawrence was the fear inspired by the Iroquois, who could reach that stream by means of the Richelieu, and menace the other tribes using it as a highway. The further development of the fur trade thus depended upon two factors—the checking of Iroquois raids along the line of the St. Lawrence, and the establishment of new posts at the mouths of the tributary streams, which would serve as centres of exchange between the Indians of the interior and the French traders.

It should be noticed that the great profits of that trade were due largely to the fact that all the problems and risks of internal transport were left to the Indians. They brought the furs down to the havens in which the sea-going ships lay, and carried away the trade goods.

Tadoussac was an excellent summer centre, being far down the river and thus very convenient for the voyage to Europe. But it had already been shown to be unsuitable as a site for a permanent settlement; there was no fertile land near at hand. Perhaps even more important, as the immediate future was to show, was the fact that it was already cosmopolitan and not purely French. It used to be said of Spitsbergen that it was not in reality "No Man's Land" but rather "Any Man's Land," and this statement was certainly true of Tadoussac. Three Rivers, on the other hand, was well up the St. Lawrence, in what was soon to be definitely claimed as the French zone, and was "a very fit place to inhabit," "very pleasant and fertile," with a much milder climate. It was particularly important that, as the Indians had explained to Champlain, the River St. Maurice communicated, if indirectly, with the region which already supplied furs to Tadoussac itself. Thus there was every prospect that a settlement here would be able to cut off the trade of Tadoussac at its source.

Even at this stage it is worth while to point out that there was another possible line of exit for the furs of the interior—to wit, Hudson Bay. Champlain surmised—and he was not often wrong in his surmises—that the Salt Sea was "some gulfe of this our Sea, which disgorgeth itself by the North part between the lands." Now Hudson Strait and Hudson Bay were discovered by the navigator whose name they bear in 1610, seven years after Champlain's first journey. In the year 1670, long after his death, a charter was given to "The Governor and Company of Adventurers of England trading into Hudson's Bay." This was the beginning of the English attempt to capture the fur trade of the

Canadian Shield by getting in behind the French of the St. Lawrence, and taking the furs out to the Atlantic *via* the Bay and Strait—a more difficult route than by the "River of Canada." So far then it is clear that the physical conditions favoured the French, but that from the start they had the Iroquois in front, and later the English in the rear, so that their difficulties were not to seek.

But these difficulties were in the future, and meantime we have left Champlain at the mouth of the St. Maurice. He travelled through Lake St. Peter without notable incident, and the next point of interest is the mouth of the river Richelieu, which enters the St. Lawrence on its right or south-eastern bank. At the mouth of this river he found a group of "savages," i.e., Algonquins, established in a "Fortresse." This structure, as he makes clear, was of a very temporary nature, constructed only "that they might flie way with speed, if by chance they should be surprised by the Irocois." He tells us also that they "were lodged and fortified" here, having come to "make warre" against the Iroquois. These statements must be taken in conjunction with what has been already said on page 38 as to the recent skirmish between the Algonquins and the Iroquois, in which the former had been victorious. Whatever their exultation at the moment we may be sure that the former had little real confidence in their own military skill as against their redoubtable foes.

With his customary energy, Champlain went up the Richelieu, at first in his "Pinnasse" and later in a "Skiffe," but was unable to make much progress. He learnt of the rapids above what is now called the Basin of Chambly, and also of the lake which was later

to bear his own name.[1] Afterwards, when he was in the vicinity of the Island of Montreal, he speaks of two rivers, one of which seems to have been the Little Montreal river, which enters Chambly Basin, and the other La Prairie River, which enters the St. Lawrence " neere unto the Sault," or in other words opposite the point on which the city of Montreal was to stand later.[2] The Algonquins told him that by the first river they sometimes invaded Iroquois territories. It may been have so ; but historically the process was commonly reversed. In their attacks on the town of Montreal in later years the Iroquois used often to descend the Richelieu to Chambly, ascend the Little Montreal river, portage over to the La Prairie, and on descending this stream had the French settlement immediately in front of them.

If, on the other hand, Three Rivers was their objective, they had only to descend the Richelieu to its mouth, traverse Lake St. Peter and continue a short distance downstream. Even though Three Rivers and Montreal were still in the future, it is important to grasp the relation of the great highway of the Richelieu to the sites on which they were to rise. It seems fairly clear that Champlain, summary though his inspection of the whole area was, appreciated the importance of the different lines of communication.

After returning to the mouth of the Richelieu he continued upstream to the " Sault or Fall of the great River of Canada." There is now no word of Hochelaga and its maize fields, and even Cartier's Mount Royal only becomes a " Mountaine neere the said Sault which discovereth farre into the Countrie." But the Rapids

[1] Map III. [2] Map Vb.

Photo by Miss M. Munro

NORTH SHORE OF THE GULF OF ST. LAWRENCE, THE SEAWARD EDGE OF THE CANADIAN SHIELD

Photo by Miss M. Munro

ONE OF THE THOUSAND ISLANDS OF THE RIVER ST. LAWRENCE, A FRAGMENT OF THE SOUTH-EASTERN EXTENSION OF THE SHIELD

impressed Champlain greatly—"I assure you, I never saw any streams of water to fall downe with such force as this doth; although it be not very high . . . in every place where it hath some small heigth, it maketh a strong boyling with the force and strength of the running of the water." But we have to remember that Champlain made his attempt in his "skiffe," a very unsuitable vessel, as he recognised, for "the Canoa of the Savages passed easily." It is indeed of great interest that he realised clearly that the friendship of the Algonquins was essential if voyages of exploration were to be made. "So that directing himselfe by the meanes of the said Savages and their Canoas, a man may see all that is to be seene, good and bad, within the space of a yeere or two."

After his failure to pass the rapids by boat, Champlain went on foot through the woods to see their end. Both at the time and later, by diligent questioning of the Indians, and getting them to draw rough maps, he learnt much about the course of the St. Lawrence above the rapids, and in regard to the Great Lakes. With an acute prevision of the future, however, he showed special interest in the Iroquois, and learnt much of their lands.

He was told that they lived in two separate areas. One was reached up the Richelieu, and was near its second lake (Lake George[1]); not far from the lake was "a River, which runneth unto the coast of Florida" (the Hudson). The other area could be reached by following up the River of Canada (St. Lawrence) to "an exceeding great Lake" (Lake Ontario), and then following up a river which entered that lake (the River Oswego). Not

[1] Map III.

till later did it become clear that these two Iroquois areas were parts of a single unit. For there is but a short portage from Lake George to the River Hudson, and that river has an important west-to-east tributary, the Mohawk. From the Mohawk again a portage leads to the small Lake Oneida, which is drained by the Oswego to Lake Ontario. The Algonquins, in other words, knew only the two ends, the eastern and the western, of Iroquois territory, not its heart.

They went on to tell Champlain that "the Countrie of the Irocois is somewhat mountainous, yet very fertile, where there is store of Indian Wheat, and other fruits, which they have not in their [the Algonquins'] Countrie." They spoke also of "good Irocois," who were eager to barter with the Algonquins for the "merchandises" brought by the French ships, and offered, among other things, copper bracelets in exchange. These were certainly the people later called Hurons.

We have now reached a point where we can reconcile, broadly speaking, the divergent statements of Cartier and Champlain on the subject of the Indians of the St. Lawrence. Cartier's Indians, as already stated, were probably Hurons, a tribe belonging to the same group as the Iroquois, though destined to be exterminated by the latter. Both Hurons and Iroquois were cultivators, and Cartier's Hurons were settled on the narrow lowland which fringes the St. Lawrence between Quebec and Montreal. On this left bank of the river the lowland is backed by the rugged, infertile tract of the Canadian Shield. Below Quebec this barren upland comes down to the water's edge, so that down-

stream from the neighbourhood of the narrows land capable of cultivation is absent.

We do not know precisely what happened to the Hurons of Stadacona and Hochelaga, though a number of more or less romantic tales are current. It seems likely that the Hurons of Hochelaga were first displaced by Senecas (an Iroquois tribe), and the Senecas then ousted by the Algonquins. In any case what is certain is that when the curtain lifts, in Champlain's time, for the next scene of the drama, Hurons and Iroquois alike are occupying areas rather better fitted for their particular crops and mode of life than the lowland bordering the St. Lawrence.

The Hurons were then settled in the area lying between the lake of the same name and Lake Ontario. The Iroquois had succeeded in forming a powerful confederation —the Five Nations—and were occupying an area of considerable fertility, which constitutes one of the most important highways of the North American continent. As against the Algonquins, their enemies, they had the advantage of the slope along two of the three arms of that complex highway. Lake George leads by a short and rapid stream down to Lake Champlain, and from that lake in its turn their canoes could shoot like arrows from a bow down the Richelieu River to the St. Lawrence. From the Mohawk they could, as we have seen, reach Lake Oneida and the Oswego River, which carried them downstream to Lake Ontario, whence they could reach the upper end of the St. Lawrence River. The third branch of their highway was the Hudson, which leads down to where New York was to stand. If then it is really true that the Algonquin hunters had displaced the Iroquois from the St. Lawrence, it is at least certain

that the latter, when Champlain arrived, were admirably placed both for offence and for defence. When Champlain agreed to take up the Algonquins' quarrel with them, he was committing himself and his successors to something much more serious than he realised.

THE FOUNDING OF QUEBEC: PROBLEMS OF EXPLORATION AND SETTLEMENT

Map IV. To Illustrate Champlain's Journey of 1615

CHAPTER IV

The Founding of Quebec : Problems of Exploration and Settlement

AFTER Champlain's return to France in September, 1603, at the close of the voyage described in the last chapter, there was another interlude in the history of the St. Lawrence ; but this time it was short. An attempt at colonisation was made in 1604, but its seat was not Canada but La Cadie or Acadia (in this particular case the name means what are now New Brunswick and Nova Scotia).

In June, 1608, that is after the lapse of five years, Champlain was back in the St. Lawrence, this time with the definite intention of founding a settlement. The enterprise was under the auspices of the Sieur de Monts, who, with the aid of Champlain, Pont-gravé and an advocate called Lescarbot, had carried out the previous attempt in Acadia. De Monts had been granted by the King a prolongation of a previous monoply of the fur trade for one year, and hoped to meet the expenses of the new project out of the profits. This was a method of financing colonisation which was very economcial so far as the French Exchequer was concerned, but involved the active agents in considerable difficulties. In this particular case Pont-gravé was entrusted with the

task of getting the furs, while "Monsieur Champlein, the Kings Geographer, very skilfull in Sea matters, and who delighteth marveilously in these enterprises, tooke upon him the charge of conducting, and governing this first Colonie, sent to Kebec."

Pont-gravé sailed some days before Champlain, making, as one would expect, straight for Tadoussac, the fur centre. Here one of the two obvious difficulties of the scheme at once presented itself. It was all very well for the King of France to grant a patent for exclusive trade, but the question was—did his writ hold good in "Any Man's Land"? The nature of the answer was soon apparent, for Pont-gravé found a party of Basques at Tadoussac busily engaged in bartering with the Indians for furs. He protested and showed the royal letters, but the Basques attacked him and definitely proved themselves to be the stronger party.

Shortly afterwards Champlain came on the scene, and found Pont-gravé helpless and wounded on shore. Champlain's arrival evidently alarmed the Basques, who consented finally to go back to their whaling—the fisheries being excluded from de Monts' patent—and abandon the fur trade. But that they remained sulky and recalcitrant is clear from a later incident. To Champlain at Quebec there was disclosed a plot, involving most of his little company, which aimed at killing him and handing over the new settlement to the Basques of Tadoussac. This question of trading rights was to be a constant source of trouble in French Canada.

The other difficulty, if it found less dramatic expression, was no less real. De Monts' Acadian scheme had involved him in loss, and it was hardly to be expected

that he would finance the new project on a generous scale, since the outlays had to be made before it was known what profits the sale of Pont-gravé's furs would bring. Lescarbot, the lively historian of New France, writing in 1609, says: "Monsieur Champlain is in another place, to wit, in the great River of Canada, neere the place where Capitaine James Quartier did winter, where hee hath fortified him selfe, having brought thither households, with Cattle and divers sorts of fruit-trees." We find, however, that Champlain was left to face his first winter with a party of twenty-eight men only—no households in the strict sense. That his supplies were far from abundant we may gather from the fact that the inevitable winter outbreak of scurvy was a very severe one, leading to no less than twenty deaths. Obviously the colony was a very weak one.

Purchas, from whose translation the above quotations are taken, is very contemptuous of these early French efforts alike in Acadia and Canada. "And let not Englishmen," he says, "feare want of roome for French plantations or Savage habitations; these [the latter] being very thin, the other scarse worthy the name of being, or plantation, having so many interruptions, and more frequented by the French in way of Trade with Savages than otherwise."

Pont-gravé had returned to France in the autumn with his furs, leaving Champlain and his little party to face the winter alone and wait longingly for the coming of spring and of succour from France. This need for easy communication with the homeland was certainly one of the reasons for the choice of Quebec as the site of this first settlement, as against Three Rivers, on

whose advantages Champlain had laid stress in his account of his First Voyage.

Quebec was in French times, and still is so far at least as the big passenger liners are concerned, the easiest outlet for summer traffic between the St. Lawrence and Europe ; for the navigation of the river above is not easy. Even to-day the fairway has to be re-surveyed and marked afresh every spring. The present-day traveller will note that the buoys which define it are made more conspicuous by young fir-trees tied to each. The green trees rising apparently from the depths of the stream are a curious feature of the landscape, and enable even the summer tourist to grasp something of the meaning of winter here.

But the motives given by Lescarbot as determining the choice of the Narrows are quite other. He says, somewhat obscurely at first sight: "For the desire that Monsieur de Monts hath to pierce through the Land to the Westerne Sea coast, to the end that he [Champlain] should not be an hindrance to him, and to be able to thereby reach one day to China, he determined to fortifie himselfe in a place of the River of Canada, which the Savages call Kebec, some fortie leagues above the River of Saguenay. There it is narrower, being no broader than a Canon will carry ; and so, by that reason, the place is commodious to command, through all that great River."

In other words, Champlain desired to place himself at such a point as to be able to control all river traffic, and to make it clear that the stream was claimed by France, and that further exploration of its basin was to be carried out by the Frenchmen holding the King's commission.

The position at the Narrows,[1] and the characters of the actual site, gave the town that was to grow out of Champlain's buildings—"a worke," says Lescarbot, "which (with the helpe of God) shall be the subject of many wonders"—great strategic importance. It was at once easily defended and "commodious" for blocking the fairway upstream; nor was it, like the later settlements of Three Rivers and Montreal, within the zone directly exposed to Iroquois attacks. Apart also from the fine haven, another advantage was the proximity of a certain amount of fertile land, particularly in the valley of the St. Charles River, Cartier's Holy Cross (St. Croix) River, and on the Island of Orleans.

One notable drawback there was, however, which was in the future to diminish the relative importance of Quebec among the cities of Greater Canada. Though on a great highway, it was not, like Montreal, or London, or Vienna, or many another riverside town, a point on which several routes converge. Nearly opposite Cap Rouge, a few miles above Quebec, it is true, is the mouth of the considerable stream of the Chaudière, which was connected by a short portage with the Kennebec (in the present state of Maine) and thus with the Atlantic Coast.[2] But this line was never of very great importance—it is in no way comparable to the Richelieu. The St. Charles is short, and does not afford a means of access to the interior behind Quebec. It is thus to the St. Lawrence and to it alone that Quebec owes its significance. So long as Canada was dependent on Europe for practically everything which made civilised life possible, Quebec predominated. Much of its attractiveness to-day, apart from the beauty of the site and the

[1] Map I. [2] Map XI.

historical associations, is due to the fact that it has been left behind in the race, is a fragment of an older world, standing sentinel at the gateway of the New.

A word or two must be added as to the actual site of Champlain's settlement. The great fortress-crowned rock rises in the angle between the St. Lawrence and the St. Charles, and on the side towards the former was what Parkman calls a "strand." This was where Champlain erected his buildings, and it is now covered by the lower part of Quebec city. But the strand is really part of one of those benches, covered with marine clay, which fringe the St. Lawrence and speak to oscillating movements of sea-level during and after the Ice Age. It is the presence of these benches with their covering of fertile soil which makes cultivation possible along the river. It is supposed that under the heavy load of ice the land here sank beneath the water, and was there covered with fine silt. As the ice melted, and the burden was thus lightened, the land rose once more, and the silt became surface soil.

As he steams up the river the traveller to-day may trace these benches along its course, and he will note that the towns and villages, the fields and the roads all occupy them, much as they do in those parts of Scotland where similar "raised beaches" occur. Since the abundant silt now spread over the benches must have been carried by the ice or meltwater from the ice-covered interior, one effect of the Ice Age was to make the river banks more suitable for man's purposes than they had been before, while at the same time it stripped the rugged interior of all the softer material that the endless wear of earlier ages had left. In other words, while the Canadian Shield owes its barrenness to the fact that it is one of

the oldest land-surfaces on the face of the earth, the St. Lawrence lowlands owe their fertility to their newness.

Champlain tested the fertility of the soil near his settlement shortly after his arrival, and this time, in contrast to Cartier's experiment, we are told definitely that "the ground did restore plentifuly the seedes received."

In regard to the winter which followed little need be added to what has been already said. We may suspect that the attitude of most of the survivors was identical with that of the little French girl who, when asked what she did at school, replied wistfully—"J'attends la sortie!" But if this were so the "King's Geographer" formed a notable exception. No sooner did spring bring the possibility of free movement and the return of Pont-gravé from France, than we find him planning a new journey into the wilds. His choice fell on the Richelieu—"because the Southerly Countries are more pleasant, for their milde temperature; he resolved himselfe, the first yeare, to visite the Iroquois." This suggests that the winter at Quebec had tried even his fortitude.

The next point was how to reach his goal. "But the difficulty consisted in the going thither; for we are not able of our selves to make those Voyages, without the assistance of the Savages." Only one motive could take the "Savages" into Iroquois lands, and it was understood in advance that the expedition was to be on a war basis.

Three separate groups of Indians were represented in the party—Algonquins of the lower St. Lawrence, who, as already seen, were purely hunters; Algonquins from the as yet unknown Ottawa country, who carried on some cultivation; Hurons from the region of the Great

Lakes, members of a better organised community and one standing at a higher stage of culture than the others. Thus already in this year of 1609 Champlain had fairly wide relations with friendly Indians : the influence of France was spreading west and south-west from the upper St. Lawrence. As against the friendship of these Indians this journey up the Richelieu was to lead definitely and permanently to the enmity of the Iroquois of the Hudson-Mohawk area. But again we have to recall the fact that Champlain's eyes were turned westwards ; he " promiseth us never to give over untill he have pierced as farre as to the Western Sea, or that of the North, to open the way of China." The visit to the Iroquois country was meant to confirm the amity of those Indians who could help him to reach his goal.

Its main incidents are soon told. Greatly to his disappointment Champlain learnt that the Indian story of uninterrupted navigation on the Richelieu was untrue, in the literal sense in which he had taken it. He found it impossible to ascend above the Basin of Chambly [1] in his own boat, and was obliged to send it back and continue in an Indian canoe which could be portaged past the rapids. It is probable that the Indians intentionally deceived him on this point ; he was obviously more under their control as a passenger in a canoe than in a boat of his own with a French escort.

In the canoe he succeeded in reaching what we know as Lake Champlain, and followed it throughout almost its whole length. Near its upper end an Iroquois party was encountered and, thanks to the alarm caused by the French guns, completely defeated. Having proved to his Indian friends that he was a valuable ally and thus

[1] Map VB.

paved the way for future journeys, Champlain promptly returned to Quebec, and then set sail for France, leaving a deputy in charge of the settlement.

In France there were difficulties enough demanding his attention. De Monts' monopoly had lapsed, and it was found impossible to get it renewed. It was decided, however, to continue the settlement scheme, and to attempt to raise the necessary funds by fur trading in open competition with the other traders.

The difficulties of this were so obvious, and displayed themselves so promptly, that one wonders how the plan could ever have been adopted. Champlain and Pont-gravé went out in the spring of 1610, and found, as they might have expected, that Tadoussac swarmed with fur traders, and these were already pushing up the river. If the Basques, who fell out with Pont-gravé in 1608, were among them, they must have felt not a little triumph at this turning of the tables.

As before, Pont-gravé was left to do the trading—with no success as it turned out—and Champlain set out up the St. Lawrence. He found that the winter had passed well at Quebec, supplies of fresh meat having preserved the health of the wintering party.

His idea was apparently to do some exploration, with Indian guidance, but the Indians intended that he should pay in advance, by helping in an attack on the Iroquois. At the mouth of the Richelieu, the Iroquois gate, a skirmish took place. The plan had been that the same three groups of friendly Indians as on the previous occasion should combine in the attack, but the Hurons were late, and the first Indian attack was repelled by the doughty Iroquois. Again, however, the French guns struck terror to their hearts, and complete defeat followed.

More important for our purpose than the details is the fact that fur traders, not of Champlain's party, were present at the fight, some of whom took part in it, while others declined to meddle in a quarrel that was not theirs. Both groups, it would seem—and one must admit, quite naturally—endeavoured to increase their stock of pelts after the fight, robbing even the dead Indians of their beaver robes. After all fur was what they had come to get. It was thus plain that the immediate result of any attempts by Champlain to open up new country would be the appearance of "free" traders in search of furs.

He did nothing more this year, returning to France for the winter. Next spring (1611) he was back again and went straight up to the Montreal region. The motive was quite clear. It had been proved abundantly that, under a system of open competition, nothing was to be hoped for at Tadoussac: at best, that is to say, trading there could not leave the necessary surplus for the expenses of exploration and settlement. As a fur centre Quebec was useless in the absence of a river giving direct access to the fur-producing lands. Up river the difficulty had previously been the danger of Iroquois attacks, but Champlain might well hope that the Iroquois had had a lesson which could keep them quiet for a while. He had already on two separate occasions come into contact with Ottawa Indians and with Hurons, whose lands could be reached from the region of the great "Sault." His relations with these formed an obvious reason why the vicinity of the Sault should be chosen as a trading post rather than Three Rivers.

If this was his line of argument, he was soon destined to be undeceived. Shortly after his arrival at the Sault a

string of boats containing fur traders followed him. Soon Indians from the interior arrived with their packets of beaver skins, and now, for the first time, Champlain seemed likely to gain something from his patient policy of preparing the way. So keen were the traders to get at once to business, so eager to compete against each other, that they alarmed the suspicious Indians, who retreated above the rapids to the mouth of the Ottawa, and informed Champlain privately that while they welcomed him and would sell him their furs, they had no desire to hold communication with the rival bands. This cementing of the earlier alliance was the chief result of this year's work.

One other point is, however, worth mention. The town of Montreal was not founded till 1641-2, thirty years after this visit of Champlain's, and thirty-three after the foundation of Quebec. The town has been described as owing its origin to heavenly visions; one of the visionaries in France is indeed said to have described the then desert island of Montreal "with an exactitude of detail which he could not have obtained from any printed document." But already in 1611 Champlain was not only impressed with the advantages of the position, but actually surveyed a site for a permanent post, cleared the ground of trees, and even built a brick wall with the object of testing the effect of the pressure of the ice-blocks in spring on the river bank. It is thus surely not cynicism to suggest the possibility that the devout visionaries may have had sub-conscious guidance, for what Champlain knew others must also have known.

After this visit to the island of Montreal there was another interlude, even though the colony at Quebec

continued to exist. Much wrangling and argument went on in France as to the fur trade, and it was not till 1613 that Champlain returned. This visit was due rather to a wonderful tale of easy access from the Ottawa to the sea which reached his ears in France than to a real solution of the financial difficulty. A compromise had, however, been arrived at, elaborated later, by which a company was formed with exclusive rights, but open to anyone who was willing to take shares.

The visit in 1613 was again something of a disappointment, though it prepared the way for the last and greatest journey. Champlain crossed the Atlantic, took the now familiar way up the St. Lawrence and stopped, not at the island of Montreal, but at the smaller one opposite, now called Helen's Isle, after Champlain's child-wife, and forming a much frequented public park.

From this island Champlain passed the Lachine Rapids —he had run down them in an Indian canoe on his previous visit—and proceeded to travel up the Ottawa. Once again the journey made it amply clear that without Indian guidance, and the adoption of Indian methods, exploration of the interior was impossible. Above the Lake of Two Mountains, is a long stretch of rapids, now avoided by canals, and as Champlain so far had but one Indian guide, he found the difficulties almost insurmountable, and nearly lost his life.

Still further up, but with more Indian help, he came to the point where the beautiful city of Ottawa now stands. Here the Rideau Falls, made by a tributary entering the main stream, attracted his attention, as they do that of all modern travellers. More fortunate than the latter, however, he saw the Chaudière Falls on the

[1] Map Vb.

main stream in their pristine beauty, undisfigured by mills and factories. The sight of the foaming water as it plunges into the cauldron (*chaudière* = big kettle) beneath and there boils up and flings its spray back in a white cloud, made a great impression, and he records that on both the upward and downward journey his Indian guides made offerings to the spirit of the fall. In default of wine with which to make a libation, they flung in tobacco, as a gift likely to be as acceptable to gods as to men.

From the Chaudière Falls the journey was continued upstream, with many difficulties, and ended at an island in the Ottawa River. Here he found that he had been deceived in regard to easy access to the sea, and that the Indians were unwilling to provide him with guides and canoes for further exploration. He dropped downstream to Montreal Island therefore, and, finding there many traders' ships, took passage in one of them for France.

He did not return till 1615, and brought with him three friars and a lay brother belonging to the Order of Recollets, a branch of the Order of the Franciscans. This marked the beginning of a new stage in the history of Canada, that in which missionary enterprise played a large part.

Though we must not cast any doubt on the absolute sincerity of the Recollet friars, or of Champlain himself, it must be noted that the influence of missionary priests had a very real bearing on the fur trade. The hunting for the furs, and the conveyance of these to the shores of the St. Lawrence, was purely the concern of the Indians, and thus anything which bridged the gap between Frenchman and Indian, or bound the two

together, was a gain to the French, for whom the furs were meantime the only resource of Canada. To make the friendly Indian at once Christian and Catholic, dependent upon Frenchmen for all those spiritual privileges which bulk so large in the eyes of the Catholic: this would not only save his soul, but would help the development of New France.

Of the three friars who accompanied Champlain one stayed at Quebec, and another devoted himself to the Indians who brought furs by the Saguenay to Tadoussac. The third, Le Caron by name, preceded Champlain and Pont-gravé to Montreal, and when they arrived for the fur season they found that he had already decided to go up the Ottawa with the returning Indians to begin his task of conversion in their villages.

For the moment at least the Indians were less concerned about "the drop of water" which, according to Le Caron, was all that was necessary to make them "children of God" than with their usual prepossession—the Iroquois. They wanted Champlain's help in a great raid into the heart of the enemy country, a raid which would give him the opportunity of seeing unknown lands. A bargain was soon struck and Champlain went downstream to Quebec to make preparations. On his return he found that the Indians, the friar and twelve other Frenchmen had gone off without him, and he, with two French companions and an Indian escort, had to make his own way up the Ottawa.

Without notable incident they reached and passed Champlain's previous terminus, and continued up the Ottawa till they arrived at the mouth of the Mattawa.[1] This is a right-bank tributary which has the same

[1] Map IV.

Photo by Miss Mary S. Johnston

THE TRENT CANAL NEAR LAKE SIMCOE (Kirkfield Lake)
This was the country of the Hurons, traversed by Champlain

direction as the Lower Ottawa, i.e., flows from west to east. The Upper Ottawa, on the other hand, comes in here from the north-west. Such changes of direction are very frequent in the rivers of the Shield, and are one of many signs of the way in which the former presence of an ice-sheet has interfered with the drainage.

From near the head of the Mattawa a short portage took the party to Lake Nipissing. The outlet of this lake, which came to be known as French River, leads to Georgian Bay, itself but a part of the great Lake Huron.

It is very important to realise the significance of this route, which was for long the main way to the west. It means the cutting out of the great circuit which has to be made if Lake Huron is reached by the St. Lawrence, Lakes Ontario and Erie (which are connected by the Niagara River with its great falls), and the subsequent passage, past the little Lake St. Clair, from the western end of Lake Erie to the southern extremity of Lake Huron.[1] It is the line of the proposed Georgian Bay Canal, and was the most direct canoe route both to Lake Huron and to Lake Superior.

The next stage of the journey was simple. The party travelled along the shore of Georgian Bay in a south-easterly direction, and finally landed in Matchedash Bay, north-west of the Lake Simcoe of our maps. Here Champlain was in Huron country, in a land which forms a continuation of the St. Lawrence lowlands. Compared with the barren Shield which he had left, it seemed to him a paradise. He went from village to village, everywhere welcomed by the Hurons, who were afraid he had abandoned them, and noting with pleasure the fields with maize, pumpkins and the sunflowers

[1] Map VII.

from whose seeds the Indians made hair-oil. In one of the "towns" he found Le Caron, who had not enjoyed his journey much, having been wholly dependent on Indian food, and greatly tormented by the flies and mosquitoes, which figure largely in these journeys.

Cheered by his arrival the Hurons began to make plans for the proposed raid, but were leisurely in their preparations, so that more than a month elapsed, and September had come before all was ready. The route to Lake Ontario adopted was again one destined to be much used in the future. Lake Simcoe drains by the River Severn into Matchedash Bay. East of the Lake, by the help of portages, a series of lakes and rivers can be traversed by which eventually the Trent River is attained, the drainage relations here being very complicated. The River Trent falls finally into the Bay of Quinté, itself an arm of Lake Ontario. On emerging from the bay into the lake, the party had only to journey south-east to arrive at the Iroquois shore.

The exact point at which they landed and left their canoes is uncertain, but the subsequent march took them across the River Oswego, and to a point south-east of Lake Oneida, in the heart of the Iroquois country.[1] Here they attacked a fortified town, but were driven off with loss, Champlain being wounded in the knee.

To us, with our fuller knowledge of the military skill of the Iroquois, the whole enterprise seems incredibly foolish. Of the two earlier successful skirmishes in which Champlain had taken part one had been with a party of Iroquois in the open, the other an attack on a rough temporary fort. In both cases the alarm caused by the firearms of the French had been the determining factor

[1] Map III.

in bringing victory. The present attack was against a permanent town, admirably placed for defence and well fortified ; situated also well within Iroquois territories. Champlain's plan of a set siege was wholly alien to the Indians who accompanied him, and they proved both unable and unwilling to carry out his instructions. Even if the attack had been successful, it is difficult to see what would have been gained, or what the next step would have been. As it was Champlain lost prestige, and one can well suppose that the Iroquois were confirmed in their opinion that only a war of extermination against the Hurons would give them security in the future.

It may be noted also that already the Dutch had trading posts on Manhattan Island, posts soon to be replaced by the settlement of New Amsterdam. The broad waters of the Hudson were as clear an indication to them that it was desirable to conciliate the Iroquois as were those of the St. Lawrence and its great tributaries to the French in relation to the Indians of Canada. Champlain was not, as he may well have thought, attacking savages lost in the backwoods, but a well-organised confederacy with an outlet to the sea, through which the firearms and tools of Europe were soon to be available in quantity. He did his Huron friends no kindness when he acceded to their request—itself based upon a belief in his almost supernatural power—to brave the lions in their lair.

The party did, however, succeed in withdrawing to the lake shore without molestation, and there found their hidden canoes and re-crossed the lake. The Hurons now flatly refused to carry out a previous promise to take Champlain by the St. Lawrence down to Montreal, and he was obliged to make up his mind to winter with them.

But autumn had now arrived, and with it the total impossibility of overland travel. The party spent some time in the neighbourhood of the present Kingston, hunting deer to obtain food supplies for the journey later. With the coming of December the lakes and marshes froze over, and falls of snow gave a smooth surface over which movement on snowshoes was possible. Even so it took them nearly three weeks to cross from the shore of Lake Ontario to the neighbourhood of Lake Simcoe and the Huron towns. Here Champlain spent the remainder of the winter, taking such minor journeys as the conditions made possible, and looking forward to a great journey north to Hudson Bay which he had planned for the spring. But this was found impossible of execution, and in May he retraced his journey of the previous year, going by French River, Lake Nipissing and the Mattawa to the Ottawa, and then descending to the St. Lawrence. It took him nearly eight weeks to reach Quebec, where he found Le Caron, who had come with an earlier party.

Champlain stayed but a short time at Quebec, sailing shortly afterwards for France. This was his last notable journey, the remainder of his life being absorbed in problems of settlement and administration. It thus marks definitely the end of an epoch.

YEARS OF TROUBLE



MAP VA. THE SITE OF THREE RIVERS

Note that the River Richelieu enters the St. Lawrence just above Lake St. Peter, flowing almost due north.



MAP VB. THE SITE OF MONTREAL

CHAPTER V

Years of Trouble

AT the time of Champlain's return to Quebec in the summer of 1616, after the journey described in the last chapter, his settlement, although it had been in existence for eight years, had shown little sign of growth. Tadoussac, Three Rivers and Montreal, although still only names for summer fur posts, were yet of more real importance than Quebec. In France the name Canada meant primarily the fur trade carried on at these points, not a land suitable for settlement.

The most notable event which had taken place at Quebec had been the arrival of the Recollet friars, and in itself this meant little. These friars belonged to a poor order, with but little influence at home, and their zeal was greater than their means. In addition to building in the Quebec area a church and a " convent," both of symbolic rather than of real importance, they had taken also another step. On the banks of the St. Charles River they had established a little farm, but this was furnished only with a pathetically meagre amount of livestock brought from France.

Of more real hope was the arrival in the year 1617 of a retired apothecary, Louis Hébert by name, who had previously attempted to settle in Acadia, and came now

with his wife and children to make a second attempt at Quebec. This was the first French household to establish itself in Canada and if Champlain was the father of the country, Louis Hébert may be described as the patriarch of the French population of the lower St. Lawrence. He betook himself to the cultivation of the soil with a fervour which knew no discouragement even in the blackest days, and soon proved that the land could be made to yield more than was required for the needs of the cultivator and his family. If personally he gained little from his arduous and long-continued labours, in his contentment with small things he was the progenitor of the later *habitants*. Even more important perhaps, he proved that children could be reared in New France without difficulty, and that there was ample room for them and for their children's children.

But one household could not make a colony, and for the next dozen years Champlain was engaged in the heart-breaking task of trying to reconcile the interests of the fur traders with those of his feeble settlement. The main events of this troubled period, in so far as they concern us, are soon told. The company of merchants which had been founded to carry on the fur trade included both Catholics and Huguenots, which gave rise to much quarrelling, and in addition the merchants of La Rochelle, who had refused to join the company, engaged in contraband trading. All the traders, whether Catholic or Huguenot, were hostile or at best indifferent to settlement on the river, and showed unwillingness to carry out their engagements in regard to colonists and supplies. Such independent settlers as the Héberts met with no encouragement, being obliged to sell their surplus to the company at a price fixed by the latter,

and to buy what they themselves needed on the same terms. The Indians of the neighbourhood, in some cases supplied with brandy and firearms by the traders, showed signs of demoralisation, and gave much trouble. In 1622 the Iroquois themselves boldly descended the river as far as Quebec, and though they did not venture upon an attack, their presence was a warning of dangers ahead. Attempted changes in the trading arrangements only brought more quarrelling and confusion, and the English attack which was soon to come was to be against a settlement weak in numbers, torn by internal dissension and incapable of supporting itself without the supplies brought from France in the traders' ships.

Before that attack took place, however, two other events have to be noted. In the year 1625 the first Jesuits came to Canada. Belonging to a wealthy order and one with much influence in France, they were to have a great and permanent effect on future history. They brought labourers to cultivate the ground, and prepared themselves by learning the Indian languages for their future work, which included both exploration and preaching.

Already there had been difficulties in regard to the Huguenots of Canada. Though they were expressly allowed to trade, Huguenot merchants, as just stated, being included in the company, they were not permitted to practise their religion, and, in particular, the singing of psalms was severely frowned upon, as likely to demoralise the Indians! A compromise had been arrived at, to the extent that the Huguenots were permitted to assemble for prayer, but not to sing; the coming of the Jesuits, however, meant that soon they were to be excluded entirely.

The next great change came in 1627, when Richelieu, now in power in France, granted a patent to a new company, known as the Company of New France, which was to have a perpetual monoply of the fur trade, was bound to promote settlement, and at the same time to see that every settler was a Frenchman and a Catholic. There was, however, an interlude before the new company was to have an opportunity for effective action. In 1628 ships were sent out by it to carry supplies and colonists to Quebec, which, with a population of under one hundred, and very little cultivated land, was then in a parlous state. These ships were intercepted by the English adventurer Kirke in the St. Lawrence. The winter at Quebec was terrible; even the toil and foresight of the Héberts could not provide for such an emergency, though their garden, says Parkman, "was ransacked for every root or seed that could afford nutriment."

In July, 1629, Kirke's ships appeared before Quebec, which was obliged to surrender. The Hébert family remained behind to re-stock their garden, and with them were a few others, but Champlain and the Jesuits were carried off, and until 1632 Quebec was English.

The signing of the treaty which restored New France to the French left the way open for the work of the Company of New France. As their representative, Champlain returned to Quebec in 1633, and ruled the colony till his death, but that was already near. He had been preceded by a small band of Jesuits, who arrived in 1632, while another party accompanied him; these Jesuits replaced the Recollet friars, who did not return after their expulsion at the time of the English attack.

The new Company, though there were changes in its

position, lasted for thirty years after this time, that is till 1663. During most of this period there were two separate sets of agents in Canada, the members of the Company, headed by the governor, and the Jesuits. So long as Champlain lived the two can hardly be regarded as distinct; for Champlain, who was now growing old, fell completely under Jesuit influence, and spent much of his time in the practice of his religion. Even so, however, he was at Quebec as the representative of a trading company, and his official activities must be regarded as distinct from his personal interest in the task of converting the Indians, the main object of the Jesuits.

The history of the Company, during its period of active existence, may be very briefly summarised, for in general terms it may be said to be a tale of failure. As we have already seen colonisation was one of the main objects of its foundation. It was definitely intended to remove the obstacles, which, as Champlain and his companions had pointed out, were preventing growth. By the articles of association it was bound to send out, year by year, a definite number of artisans and cultivators. By the year 1643 these were to number four thousand persons, men and women, who were to be maintained for a period at the charges of the Company, and then to be provided with cleared land to be cultivated. But in 1663 there were not two thousand five hundred settlers in Canada, so that it was clear that the Associates had not fulfilled their bond. Even their fur trading was not a great financial success.

There was more than one cause for the failure. In the first place the losses at the hands of Kirke and the other English Merchant Adventurers, with the resultant in-

terregnum, had been a heavy drain on the resources of the Company, so that it started its period of activity with very little capital. Then, as already seen, Huguenots were now excluded. This meant that it was not easy to find prospective settlers, for Huguenots might have had a motive for wishing to emigrate which did not exist in the case of Catholics. It meant also that artisans, who frequently belonged to the reformed religion, were not readily available, and artisans of various trades were very necessary in the new lands. Finally, whatever the articles of association might lay down, it was unlikely that a Company expecting to obtain its profits from fur trading would push settlement with any great enthusiasm. There is a direct antagonism, not to be obliterated by a document, between sedentary farmers and exploiters of a natural resource such as that supplied by fur-bearing animals. At a much later date, when the name Canada had a wider significance, this latent antagonism showed itself in a very acute form in the conflict between the North-west company and the Selkirk settlers.

But if the Associates failed alike to carry out the systematic colonisation which was supposed to be their main aim, and to make much of their trading, the Jesuits also, despite their zeal and heroism, had no very great success in their main object—the conversion of the Indians. The pursuit of that aim meant exploration, and that again resulted in involvement in Indian politics, which itself led to the stirring up of the hornet's nest of the Iroquois. When the Iroquois began to sweep like fire through the territories of the Hurons they wiped out not only mission stations, but also most of the converts obtained at such pains and risk.

But if the work of the Jesuits in this period had no very great effect, in the long run, on the Indian population, it did help to establish a tradition of great strength among the French Canadians, and one of much future importance.

When the first returning Jesuits landed at Quebec in 1632 they found there the Hébert family. Louis himself was now dead, but his widow had married again, and their daughter was also married and a mother. Thus three generations were already present in what had been the home of the patriarch, and the little farm had for some years been ploughed with an iron share and the help of oxen. During the years of English rule the family had been losing hope, and were even contemplating a return to France. With the coming of the Jesuits they took heart again, and one of the Jesuit Fathers went to the house, and there sang a *Te Deum* and celebrated mass. M. Georges Goyau, a recent French author who has described the birth of the Catholic Church in Canada, regards this service as of much symbolic importance. It shows, he says, how closely the evangelising work of the Jesuits was bound up with the other task of peopling the country, that is, with the aim which the Associates failed to carry out.

This particular Jesuit Father, Le Jeune by name, did certainly interest himself in the problem He says—" The soil of France is fruitful, and greatly blessed are Frenchwomen in that they are even more so." He goes on to argue that this being so it would be possible to people Canada without impoverishing the homeland. In a sentence which has an oddly familiar ring he says—" Would it not be better to let the overflow of the Old France discharge itself into the New, by sending colonists

there, rather than to people foreign lands ? " Again, he goes on—" Why need we give men to our enemies to make war upon us when we have so much land, at once beautiful and fertile, into which loyal colonists could be introduced ? "

It is of much interest to note in this connection that while the Frenchwoman of to-day, even in Normandy, from which most of the emigrants to Canada were to come later, have ceased to possess, or to prize, the blessing of which the celibate Father speaks so feelingly, his statement remains true of the French Canadians. As compared with the normal family of one or two in France, the quiver of the *habitant* is usually full, families of ten to fifteen being quite common. The duty of early marriage and of bringing up as large a family as possible is one constantly impressed upon their flocks by the priests in French Canada, and priestly influence there began in early Jesuit times, though it was to be deliberately fostered by the Crown at a later date.

It is sometimes made a matter of reproach against the Jesuits of Canada that, in the day of their power, those who went out to the country from France were chiefly priests and nuns, or devout laics more concerned with the heavenly kingdom than an earthly one. But, these quotations show that Le Jeune at least was quite aware of the needs of New France, even if he lacked the means of attracting colonists, or of providing for them on arrival.

Could the Jesuits also have foreseen the future they might quite legitimately have boasted that the mass celebrated on the Héberts' hearth was the first link in the chain which now binds the habitant to his church. That union in its turn has proved and is still proving

a factor of immense social importance. It has not only enabled the French Canadians to maintain their individuality within the Dominion despite the change in political allegiance, but is also permitting them to extend their range there. At the present time French Canadians are "colonising" the waste spaces of Canada east of the prairies with much success, a success which settlers of other nationalities, including English, find it difficult to attain. This is partly because the French practise group settlement, each group being accompanied by at least one priest, and the priests regard the building of the community church as of even greater importance than the construction of dwellings for the cultivators. In this way the French Canadians evade some of the difficulties which confront individual settlers in regions of moderate fertility, requiring to be cleared before they can be cultivated. That present-day colonisation may thus be said to derive directly from Jesuit times, and, whatever reserves we make, it must be admitted that to ensure the persistence of an ideal, through all the changes which intervene between the seventeenth century and the twentieth, was a great feat.

Turning next to the actual sequence of events, we find that Champlain, in the short span of activity which remained to him, divided his attention between secular and sacred affairs. He recommended that a fort should be established at the mouth of the Richelieu River, and made a disregarded appeal for six-score soldiers to keep the Iroquois in check. With a survival of his old interest in exploration he sent out a servant of the Company to investigate the region of the Great Lakes, and at the same time aided the Jesuits in their effort to establish permanent mission stations among the Hurons. Both

enterprises date from 1634, and at the same time a permanent settlement was established at Three Rivers, with a similar mingling of commercial and religious motives.

Three Rivers [1] was now an important fur centre. In addition to its direct access to the interior by the St. Maurice River, it communicated, by one of those indirect routes so common in this part of Canada, with the Ottawa River. That stream has a left-bank tributary, the Gatineau,[2] which enters near the site of the present city of Ottawa. It was possible to ascend the Gatineau, portage over to a feeder of the St. Maurice, and so reach Three Rivers without touching the St. Lawrence. This route was much used by the Indians of the Ottawa, as it enabled them to avoid the vicinity of the island of Montreal which, as events were soon to show, was well within the Iroquois danger zone. It also of course obviated the necessity for passing the mouth of the River of the Iroquois (Richelieu), where the fort recommended by Champlain had not yet been built.

Le Jeune was anxious to have a settlement at Three Rivers which he might use as a rallying point for the Algonquin Indians. In Goyau's words—"The Jesuits fixed themselves here, within reach of the Frenchmen who sought furs, and of the Algonquins whose souls they sought; this new 'fort,' where France and the cross took root together, was to serve as an advanced post to Quebec from the point of view of military defence, and as an advanced post to the missionaries for their spiritual offensive." It was, in point of fact, to become shortly little more than a shelter from the Iroquois. But before saying anything of the Iroquois and the Huron

[1] Map Va. [2] Map IV.

MONTREAL AND MOUNT ROYAL

From a drawing by Thomas Patten, 1762

Mission, two closely related subjects, we have to consider the foundation of the second important settlement of this period, the town of Montreal.

Although, as we have seen, Champlain had early appreciated the advantages offered by the island of Montreal as a site for a settlement, the idea of founding a town there is said to have presented itself to certain devout persons in France, independently of each other and of any external suggestion. Eventually six pious men grouped themselves together as the Society of Our Lady of Montreal to carry through the scheme. Their object was defined as the glory of God and the salvation of the savages, and it was to be carried out by clearing the forest on the island, and building there a fortified post which should contain a hospital and schools for Indian girls and boys. In addition to those engaged in these good works, the town was to include artisans and cultivators, and it was hoped that in course of time a settled population, including both French and Indians, would not only occupy the island but also spread up the river.

The first obstacle was that Montreal Island had already an owner in the person of one of the members of the Company, to whom it had been assigned. This owner was then at Grenoble in the Dauphiny, and with the help of Father Lalemant, a Jesuit in charge of the Canadian Missions, was induced to yield up his rights. The Company was also approached, the "gentlemen of Montreal," as they called themselves, undertaking that they would not trade in furs in competition with its officials. This, in point of fact, was not a matter of great importance, for a few years afterwards, in 1645, the monopoly of the fur trade, originally granted to the

Company of New France, passed from them to the actual inhabitants of Canada.

The next step was to find an agent to carry out the details of the scheme, and he had to be one who was both in sympathy with the aims of the Society and also, because of the risks involved, possessed of military skill and experience. The resourceful Father Lalemant again intervened and found the right man in Paul de Chomedey, Sieur de Maisonneuve. Maisonneuve had been a soldier since his early days, was very devout, and possessed of sufficient means and more than sufficient courage to undertake the task. He desired nothing, he said, save the opportunity of serving God and the King in the exercise of his profession.

By July, 1641, all was ready for the start, and two ships set out from La Rochelle and one from Dieppe with the colonising party, leaving a growing—though as it proved ineffective—society at home to provide for the needs of the future settlement. The ships arrived in the St. Lawrence too late for building operations to be begun that year. Maisonneuve made a brief preliminary visit to Montreal Island, and then returned to Quebec, where the winter was spent in making such preparations as were possible for the next spring's work.

During its course Montmagny, the governor who had succeeded Champlain, the latter having died at Quebec on Christmas day, 1635, made many attempts to induce Maisonneuve to change his plans, and adopt a site at once safer and within easier reach of Quebec. It was in reply to his arguments that Maisonneuve uttered the famous and often-quoted speech, ending "if all the trees of the island of Montreal were to be changed into

Iroquois, yet my duty and my honour demand that I go there to establish a colony." It was a retort in keeping with the courage and chivalry of the man ; yet one may reasonably doubt whether Maisonneuve realised how little of hyperbole there was in his phrasing. Only some two years were to pass before he and his little band of soldiers, marching recklessly out of their fort into the surrounding clearing, found that every tree of the surrounding forest sheltered an Iroquois warrior. His quickness of eye and wit saved Maisonneuve's own life on that occasion, but the losses of his band were considerable.

Maisonneuve's autumn visit to Montreal Island was too brief for him to have had any personal contact with the Iroquois, whom he can have only known by hearsay. But their doings must have been a great subject of conversation at Quebec, for this very summer of 1641 they had appeared before the recently founded post of Three Rivers, which had only been saved by timely help from Quebec. Thus the duty and honour of the governor, as representative of the State, were as much involved in the attempt to dissuade Maisonneuve from carrying out his project as were those of the latter in pushing on with it. But, like Champlain in his later days, Montmagny was much under Jesuit influence—the days of the quarrels between Church and State at Quebec having not yet come—and did not, perhaps could not, press his objection.

In the spring of 1642, therefore, Maisonneuve took his party upstream, and the site of Ville Marie, or Our Lady of Montreal, was solemnly dedicated. After the ceremony Maisonneuve inaugurated the work by himself felling the first tree, and within its stockade the beginnings of

the city of Montreal[1] arose. The same year Fort Richelieu was built at the mouth of the Richelieu River, on the site previously recommended by Champlain, a somewhat feeble attempt to hold the Iroquois in check. Those doughty warriors were but biding their time, and soon converted the little settlement of Ville Marie into something more like a prison for its inhabitants than the city of God of which its founders had dreamed.

We may, however, leave aside the details of these troublous early years for some more general points. Quebec (1608), Three Rivers (1634) and Montreal (1641-2) had now been successively founded, and for long were practically to constitute Canada. It is interesting to trace the varied motives which led to the origin of this series of riverside settlements. Quebec, as we have seen, was founded by Champlain for strategic reasons, as at once a symbol of sovereignty and a starting-point for further advance. Three Rivers owed its origin to a double motive, it was both a commercial and a missionary settlement. If Champlain built Quebec in his capacity as representative of France, that is of the State, he participated only in the building of Three Rivers, the Jesuits, as representing the Church, the other great source of authority, being also active. Montreal, though the initiative came, in appearance at least, from private individuals, was constructed *against* the will of the governor but *with* the powerful aid of the Church; we may note particularly what has just been said of the part played by the Jesuit Father Lalemant.

Of the three Montreal had by far the most favourable site, and was destined to become much the most

[1] Map Vb.

important. Those accustomed to the search for causes will, therefore, find it difficult to accept the view that it owes its origin either to accident or to miracle, and be disposed to look deeper. It seems at least possible that the establishment of a religious foundation here was part of an unacknowledged forward policy in which Church rather than State was the active agent, and that it was not unconnected with the Huron Mission. The story of that Mission has often been told, but the emphasis, naturally enough, has generally been laid on the heroism and the sufferings of the devoted missionaries. Leaving that side of the question out of account—though we must not forget its existence—we may take a somewhat broader view.

The main facts may be shortly summarised. The first missionary to the Hurons was the Franciscan, Le Caron, who, as already described, preceded Champlain in the journey of 1615. Thereafter, till the English occupation of Quebec brought an interruption, a certain amount of mission work was carried out, first by the Franciscans (Recollets) and then by the Jesuits. In 1634 the Jesuits took advantage of the new enthusiasm aroused by the re-occupation of Canada by the French to begin work on a greater scale. On the shores of Matchedash Bay they established, near the present town of Midland, a fortified central station, Sainte Marie of the Hurons.[1] Other subsidiary stations were established between this and Lake Simcoe. Here, after considerable initial difficulties, a large measure of success was obtained in evangelistic work.

Champlain's journey, now supplemented by later explorations, had shown that not only in this area, but

[1] Map IV.

also further south and west—in the whole belt of land bounded on the north-west by Lake Huron and its arm of Georgian Bay, and on the south-east by Lakes Ontario and Erie—the land is fertile, and the climate, especially in the peninsula between Lakes Huron and Erie, much milder than in the St. Lawrence valley. The peninsula is now often called the garden of Ontario, and is noted for its production of the more delicate kinds of fruit, such as peaches. It was then occupied by the powerful Neutral Nation, whose members, like the Hurons, were sedentary cultivators. The Neutrals extended along the north-western shore of Lake Erie, while its south-eastern bank was occupied by the Erie tribe, themselves contiguous with one of the Five Nations of the Iroquois. The Huron villages did not reach to the shores of Lake Ontario, but this was not because the land there was any less suitable for their crops, but because of their feud with the Iroquois whose war-parties frequented the lake waters. For the same reason, when travelling to Canada, they did not use the direct route of the St. Lawrence, which leaves Lake Ontario at its north-eastern end ; but took the circuitous route via Georgian Bay, French River, Lake Nipissing, and the Mattawa and Ottawa Rivers.

Canadian geographers to-day are in the habit of stating concisely that the St. Lawrence lowlands, the main agricultural lands of the provinces of Quebec and Ontario, extend from the neighbourhood of the city of Quebec to the international frontier at the south-western end of Lake Erie. They add that those lowlands are but a part of the great expanse of fertile plain country which, beyond the Great Lakes, extends westwards through the Mississippi Basin and southwards

Photo by Miss Mary S. Johnston

GRAND MANITOULIN ISLAND, GEORGIAN BAY

The Manitoulin Islands served as a temporary refuge for some of the Hurons at the time of the Iroquois attacks, before they fled westwards to Lake Superior

to the shores of the Gulf of Mexico. What a gorgeous prospect this opened to men of genius in the seventeenth century when as yet international boundaries were not ! The English and the Dutch were settled between the rugged Appalachian upland and the sea ; the area which was to become the New England States in particular was not fertile. The narrowing funnel of the St. Lawrence not only gave a line of access to the great plains of the interior, but from Quebec upwards it was fringed by narrow fertile plains, affording sites which could serve as stepping stones in the advance. Tadoussac, producing furs, that is capital ; Quebec, at once the symbol of the first advance, and a proof that permanent settlement was possible ; Three Rivers, the next step, commanding a fur-producing area greater even than that behind Tadoussac ; Montreal, the last stage in the lower valley, but symbolising the hope of a new advance into the almost limitless spaces beyond : such a sequence cannot be a matter of pure accident.

If the Huron Mission had been successful in establishing French influence in the interior lowlands ; *if* it could have been made to serve as a first stage in an advance, following the direction of the fertile plains, to the south-west ; *if* the direct route of the St. Lawrence could have been kept open between Montreal and Lake Ontario : then the possibilities were boundless.

There were physical obstacles ; but they were nothing at the moment as compared to the might of the Iroquois. They responded so promptly, so effectively to the double French menace, from their standpoint, of the Huron Mission and the foundation of Montreal, that we cannot doubt that they at least were firmly convinced that there

was a well-planned scheme behind the two, even if historically they seem to be unrelated.

If we try to take their point of view the relation seems fairly clear. The Huron Mission, whatever its motives, from 1634 onwards must have seemed to them but a continuation of the French attempt, initiated by Champlain, to give aid to that people against the confederacy of the Five Nations. The stockade of Montreal was an insolent attempt to claim a region which had, if the story told of Hochelaga be true, once been theirs, and which had in any case always been within their raiding sphere. The fort at the mouth of the Richelieu might well be the beginning of an attempt to make a flank attack on the Confederacy.

They made an unsuccessful attack on Fort Richelieu soon after its construction; they carried on against Ville Marie de Montréal an intermittent warfare which effectually prevented any developments and forced its inhabitants to remain in a state of constant alarm. Finally, against the Huron Mission and the Huron people they undertook a ruthless war of extermination. Not content with this, in pursuance of their usual policy of taking no needless risks, they proceeded to wipe out the Neutrals. These received their name from the fact that they had taken no part in the quarrels of Huron and Iroquois; but they had come into contact with the French and were thus suspect.

The Hurons made very little resistance to the onslaught. It seems fairly clear that during the residence of the Jesuits among them they had come to regard the latter as representatives of the might of France, able and willing to give full protection no less than spiritual guidance. The growth of this frame of mind was the

great danger behind a forward policy, conceived with intelligence and carried out with enthusiasm, but unsupported by the temporal power.

The first Iroquois attack on a Huron Mission station was in 1648. When it was renewed the following year, with fearful slaughter, accompanied by the death by torture of some of the Jesuit Fathers and the burning of many Huron villages, the rest of the Hurons lost heart completely. The surviving Jesuits gathered a remnant around them and spent the winter on an island, but in 1650 it was found necessary to retreat. As a nation the Hurons disappeared, though some survivors found a home in the Quebec area, others were incorporated with the victorious Iroquois, and still others lingered in the backwoods.

A few years later French Canada had a temporary respite from Iroquois attacks. The latter were busy completing their conquests by disposing of the Eries, and, true to their usual policy, wanted but one foe at a time. But peace did not last long, and when the charter of the Company of New France was revoked in 1663, conditions were very unfavourable to the French. Iroquois attacks even on Quebec were constant, and Montreal was only saved by the heroism of its defenders. The first attempt to advance into the interior had definitely failed and it seemed even doubtful whether France could keep her hold on the St. Lawrence.

THE ERA OF SETTLEMENT

Map VI. Hudson Bay and Strait

The Bay is a depression, flooded with sea-water, lying on the surface of the Canadian Shield. The number and length of the rivers which enter it should be noted. In the south-west corner of the map the interrupted water-route which leads from Lake Superior to Lake Winnipeg is indicated, the irregular lake lying south-east of Lake Winnipeg and draining into it being Lake of the Woods, cf. p. 3.

CHAPTER VI

The Era of Settlement

IN the period between 1663 and 1670 four events took place which in combination may be said to inaugurate a new era in the history of Canada. In order of time these were :—first, the withdrawal of the charter of the Company of New France in 1663, when Canada became a Royal Province, passing under the direct rule of the King of France ; secondly, the surrender by the Dutch in 1664 of New Amsterdam (New York) to the English ; thirdly, the arrival in Canada in 1666 of La Salle, who continued the line of the great French explorers ; fourthly, the appearance in Hudson Bay [1] in 1668 of the English ship *Nonsuch*, followed two years later by the founding of the Hudson Bay Company.

The first of these initiated notable changes within Canada, the other three led to developments in the surrounding area, with consequent reactions within. Together they meant that on the one hand the settled population of Canada increased greatly, and that on the other points of contact with the rival Power of England were multiplied. The agricultural community established in this period persists to this day, with only minor modifications. But its establishment helped to

[1] Map VI.

bring about that change of allegiance which was to come in 1763, exactly one hundred years after the King of France had taken matters into his own hands. It is, however, one of the most curious anomalies of history that while the English conquest of Canada was followed, after a brief interval, by the revolt of the English colonists and the resultant foundation of the United States, the French agricultural communities of the St. Lawrence formed one of the main bases on which the existing Dominion of Canada was reared. Clearly the French Royal agents did their work of settlement well, even though, from the political standpoint, they did it for another Power.

That successful colonisation within Canada meant inevitably the stirring up of strife outside its limits is perhaps obvious from our previous survey. The great obstacle to settlement up to 1663 was the Iroquois menace, which, in the absence of any attempt to face it boldly, had been steadily growing more and more serious. That attempt was made at once under the new régime.

But to the English on the Hudson River, a waterway which, like the St. Lawrence, gave a good line of access to the interior, the Iroquois had a significance similar to that which first the Algonquins and then the Hurons had had for Champlain. In other words, they were potential intermediaries in the development of a great trade in furs. For the English the value of Iroquois friendship was increased by the recent Iroquois conquest of the Hurons and other Indian groups ; for this left the first in possession of vast hunting-grounds. Again, any French attack on the Iroquois, if pushed home, led inevitably towards what had now become English

territory. La Salle's great series of journeys and the activities of the Hudson Bay Company increased the territorial points of contact, and the latter were in addition a menace to the northern fur trade. Canada could not exist without that trade to supplement the resources of its agriculture, but it could not develop it without conflict with the Iroquois and the English. It could not expand towards the south-west, the most favourable line of advance, without similar conflict.

Here then was the fundamental dilemma with which the rulers of Canada were confronted ; to stand still was to court collapse, to attempt action was to arouse a more dangerous foe behind the adjacent one. If in the period we are about to consider the initial attacks seemed to come from the French side, we have yet to remember these facts. Helpless, disunited, even incompetent the English colonists often seemed as against the unity and energy of the French, but the territorial basis of unity now existed on the English side, and even the divergence of outlook there meant only that the foundations of New France were being sapped from many points at once. In 1663, however, the conflict was still in the future, and in this chapter we have to consider the making of the Canada which was to engage in it.

We may note first that even under the new régime the days of chartered companies were not altogether past. In 1664 a new company, the Company of the West, was formed which was to have a trade monopoly not only in Canada but in all actual or potential French possessions in the western world. It only lasted ten years, and so far as Canada is concerned its charter was modified almost at once. For our purpose it is sufficient merely to

state that there, after the brief preliminary period, it possessed three main privileges. These were:—the right to levy duties on the whole of the furs exported from Canada; a monopoly of the fur trade of Tadoussac; the exclusive right of carrying the furs from Canada to France. In return it was required to pay the expenses of government, including the salaries of the governor and intendant, the two chief officials, who were appointed by the Crown. When the charter of the Company was revoked in 1674 these trading rights became Crown property, and were farmed out.

These facts are of interest because they show the basis of the statement just made that Canada was dependent on the fur trade. There were no direct taxes, and the belief that large profits were accruing successively to the Company and to the Crown was widespread. It led the colonists and the officials to indulge in shameless begging for all kinds of help, and retarded the growth of a spirit of independence, for which indeed there was little room in the carefully-fostered colony.

It is clear also that the regulations as to the fur trade in Canada explain both the danger of English competition on the Hudson River and in Hudson Bay, and indicate some of the reasons why that competition was so successful. One beaver skin in every four went to the Company or to the Crown. Loss of this duty meant diminution of the revenue of the colony, but payment of it meant loss to the merchant, who evaded it when and if he could.

The illicit trade in furs in Canada, that is the search for them in the wilds beyond the limits of the settlement, indeed soon attained great proportions, and was said to have involved many in high places. It led to the growth

of a special section of the population, the *Coureurs des bois*, or men of the woods, who travelled far into the forests to obtain furs from the Indians free from the restrictions which prevailed at the regular markets, and lived more or less in Indian fashion.

Having thus indicated the source of the funds which were to develop Canada and the difficulties encountered in preventing that source from drying up, we must consider the next step—that of ensuring the safety of the Royal settlement.

In 1665 there arrived at Quebec, not the six-score soldiers for which Champlain had asked in vain, but—in all its glory of seventeenth century regimentals—the famous regiment of Carignan-Salières, which had already seen much service in the Old World. No time was lost in getting to work. The fort previously built at the mouth of the Richelieu,[1] which had been abandoned, was reconstructed by an officer named Sorel, whose name is perpetuated in the present town.[2] Two others were built on the river, one below and one above the rapids near Chambly.

These were defensive measures completed before winter set in. It is, however, an indication how far the French attitude towards winter conditions had changed since Champlain's time that the first offensive was attempted in January, 1666. The party started from Quebec on the ice of the frozen St. Lawrence, carrying snowshoes, which somewhat hampered the newly-arrived soldiers, but had by now become quite familiar to the Canadians who accompanied the party. Under conditions of much hardship they found their way to Three Rivers, then travelled on to Fort Sorel

[1] p. 88. [2] Map VA.

and up the Richelieu to Lake Champlain. Both that lake and Lake George were ice-bound and the French followed them throughout their length, and crossed the divide between Lake George and the Hudson River.

From the banks of this river they struck out into the woods in search of the Indian towns of the Mohawk valley, the Mohawks being one of the most recalcitrant of the "nations" of the Iroquois confederation, and that naturally which used the Champlain-Richelieu route for raids on the St. Lawrence. But the Indian guides whom the French had taken with them proved unreliable and the party soon lost the trail, and found itself finally at Schenectady in the lower Mohawk valley.[1] To their dismay the French learnt that this, which had been a Dutch settlement, was now, like Albany on the Hudson and New Amsterdam itself, politically English. This was their first intimation of the transfer of territory, and only a formal protest against their intrusion was made by the English officials at Albany. No Mohawk towns having been found, all that the French could do was to turn round and go back to Canada.

Though no direct military result was obtained from this adventurous journey, yet it alarmed the Iroquois, as showing that they were not so safe from invasion as they thought, and also gave the French much useful information. A more ambitious and as it proved much more successful expedition was undertaken in the autumn of the same year, this time with boats and canoes instead of snowshoes. The journey by water took the party to the upper end of Lake George, and then a bold march through the woods carried them to the very heart of the Mohawk country. Here, though the Indians fled

[1] Maps III. and IX.

without offering battle, the French destroyed successively their fortified towns, burning the winter stores of maize and other food, except what they required for their own use. The effects of the trade with the Dutch were very obvious in these Mohawk towns, which contained many European tools and utensils. The English at New York, who were anxious to continue and develop this profitable trade, were much disturbed at this second French expedition ; but no actual military steps were taken, and the French returned to Quebec.

This second raid, for it was no more, produced a deep impression on all the Iroquois Indians, and in the following spring a deputation appeared at Quebec to beg for peace. They offered hostages and asked that Jesuit priests might be sent to their villages. A period of freedom from Iroquois raids followed for Canada, and indeed these two expeditions of 1666 may be said broadly to have ended the Iroquois attempts to prevent French settlement on the St. Lawrence between Montreal and Quebec. When trouble with the Indians began again later it was due to a new French advance into the lake region, the area regarded by the Iroquois as their own territory. We have thus arrived at the point when the way was clear for developments within Canada proper.

The success and the limitations of these developments were alike due to the way in which the problems involved were faced. Four elements have to be considered—the agents, the means, the human material and the method. In other words we have four questions to ask : who undertook the task ; how was the money obtained ; whence came the settlers and their wives ; on what plan was settlement carried out ?

The first two questions have been already briefly

answered. A few additional points may be noted. There were certain obvious advantages in the fact that an autocratic king was the prime agent, but the drawbacks were equally obvious. The first ardour of Louis XIV and his ministers was soon chilled. Canada after all was but a small item in the general policy of France at the time, and more important matters claimed attention. So early as 1672 we find that the despatch of emigrants, which was at first on a great scale, diminished suddenly and greatly—the new toy was losing its charm. Another great drawback was that the autocratic rule, which made the fiat that Canada was to be peopled possible and effective, checked local developments, and that in a land which was not only distant from France, but connected with it by a line of communication periodically interrupted by the severity of the winter climate. The governor and intendant had strictly limited powers, and there was no lawful way in which extra-official local opinion could find expression. Strong governors acted at times without Royal authority, weak ones tended to refrain from action, and the great mass of the inhabitants was completely passive, while the active minority escaped to the freedom of the woods.

The financial arrangements also were never satisfactory. In the days of the Company of the West the King was constantly called upon to supplement the funds derived from the duties levied by the Company, and after it ceased to function the money obtained by farming the privileges which reverted to the Crown was similarly found insufficient. The King, we are told, was required to disburse "immense sums every year." It was small wonder, therefore, that he showed signs of weariness.

Turning next to the colonists, we find that the immigra-

tion of families was at least infrequent, as was also purely voluntary immigration of any kind. The Héberts had few successors. Even before the end of the rule of the Company of New France a considerable number of men and some women had been brought over by the government, by owners of large estates, by those in charge of the religious settlement at Montreal, and by others. The special feature of the early period of Crown rule, however, was the systematic transport of large numbers of emigrants, brought over for the same purpose as the horses, cattle and sheep which accompanied them, and after their arrival with almost as little power of arranging their own lives.

Considerable numbers of male civilians, chiefly peasants, were sent, though the King soon began to fear for his armies at home. Another and more permanent source of supply was found in time-expired soldiers, who were established, especially along the Richelieu River and on the island of Montreal, with the object of forming a barrier to possible Iroquois attacks. The problem of finding wives for the settlers, military and civilian, was solved in a truly autocratic fashion. Shiploads of girls and young women, collected either from charitable institutions or, with the help of parish priests, from rural districts, were sent out from France, and pressure was brought to bear on the male colonists to induce them to marry as soon as brides were thus made available. Further, to diminish future drains on the Royal purse, it was decreed that the new generation as it arose should be forced into marriage almost as soon as this was possible, the girls at fourteen or fifteen and the youths at eighteen or nineteen. The father was to be held responsible for any neglect of this duty.

Parkman quotes several humorous accounts of the results of these drastic marriage regulations, which indeed lend themselves to some forms of wit. But one can hardly doubt that they led to many hidden tragedies, and they must have had much influence on the next generation. It is not in this fashion that an individualised and intelligent people can be bred.

On the other hand the actual settlement was carried out with much discretion, and attained a large measure of success. It was planned on a modified feudal system. Large estates (seigniories) already existed and others were created, being bestowed on retired army officers and on civilians. The land was a free grant from the Crown burdened by two conditions only, an oath of fealty and homage, and an obligation to clear it for cultivation and to live upon it. Since there was little local labour and the task of removing the primæval forest was particularly arduous, this meant in practice that the seignior was obliged to grant much of his land to vassals, the *habitants* or cultivators. These paid rent in money and in kind or in one or the other, but the total value in early days was necessarily very small; for much labour had to be expended before any return was obtained. There were in addition minor obligations to the overlord, but these were much less onerous than in the France of the period, and generally the *habitant* was well looked after by the government, and within the range of permitted activities had not much to complain of.

The actual arrangement of the holdings showed a peculiarly definite response to the natural conditions. They were laid out in long but narrow strips running backwards from the banks of the St. Lawrence and

Richelieu, each strip being normally about 260 yards in width and about 2,600 yards or a mile and a half in length.

There was an obvious reason for this arrangement. The rivers formed the main and for long the only thoroughfare both for civil and military traffic, and, in the case of the Richelieu and the St. Lawrence near Montreal, the soldier-settlements were designed, as just stated, to ensure the security of the main river from Indian raids. Everywhere the river frontage gave each household access to a highway without the heavy cost of road construction, and its narrowness was a device to promote dense and continuous settlement. When, as time went on, the holdings were divided among the members of the individual households, the division was usually longitudinal, so that each family retained an outlet to the river. The arrangement still persists and gives the St. Lawrence area a certain superficial resemblance to the Nile valley, though in the latter case it is the need for irrigation water that determines the lay-out.

In addition to the importance of the St. Lawrence as a highway another reason influenced the shape of the holdings. We have already discussed the general lie of the land here and have seen that a lowland strip, covered with marine clay, margins the river banks, or, as in the case of the island of Orleans, forms islands within it. On the north-west bank, that first settled, this strip is backed by the infertile Shield, and on the south-east bank by the generally infertile Appalachian upland. Now the seigniories, as contrasted with the holdings of the habitants, often extended far into the interior, that of Beaupré, for example, for some eighteen miles. The uncleared and uncultivated inland belt,

behind the tilled lands and pasturages near the river, formed the hunting grounds of the seigniors, while further beyond still were the Indian hunting grounds, which were prohibited areas to the Canadians, whether lords or vassals.

As contrasted with these normal conditions, we find that in the area drained by the Richelieu and the neighbouring rivers, such as the Yamaska and the St. Francis,[1] lands capable of cultivation and thus of settlement exist away from the river banks. Here the Appalachian upland takes the form of undulating country, traversed by ridges with intervening valleys and containing much rich land. It is a curious historical fact that of themselves the French either never learned that settlement was possible in the "back blocks" here or, if they knew, never attempted to act upon their knowledge. It was not till Canada became English that these lands were brought under the plough by English immigrants. Later most of the English sold their farms to the French and migrated elsewhere. Thus what are called to-day the Eastern townships of Quebec Province have a French population which is not "original," but has been substituted for an English one, after the latter had proved the value of the land. At this stage of our survey the point is only of interest as emphasising what has just been said of the effects of the French seventeenth century methods. Within their limits these were successful, but autocratic rule, even when benevolent, leads inevitably to suppression of initiative, and that is a quality which settlers in a new land need greatly. The habitants "stayed put," just as they accepted meekly the wives provided for them; but

[1] Map VA.

VALLEY OF THE RIVER ST. FRANCIS

there was something lacking which if it had been present would have helped to keep Canada politically French.

Just as the general similarity of the conditions along the banks of the St. Lawrence made a uniform plan of settlement possible there, so also it meant that the mode of life was everywhere broadly similar. In each holding the dwelling tended to be placed near the river bank, usually on one of those " benches " already described, and had around and behind it the arable area on which the crops for the use of the household were raised. Further back were the grazing lands for the stock animals, the pasturage increasing as the trees were progressively removed. Still further inland was the uncleared area which yielded fuel, building material and, to some extent at least, a money crop in the shape of timber. There was a considerable demand for this within the colony, and attempts were made to establish an export trade, though this did not become important till much later. The fish of the river, especially as in Indian times the eels, furnished another resource, the value of which is indicated by the regulation that one fish out of every eleven caught by the vassal was the property of the overlord. In view of the arrangement of the holdings one can hardly suppose that this regulation was easy to enforce, and indeed that arrangement tended to favour the *habitant* as against the seignior.

It is interesting to compare with this the type of feudalism which persisted in parts of the Balkans down to our own day. There the Turkish overlord saw to it that his serfs lived in crowded hovels round his own dwelling where all their activities could be supervised. Escape was only possible by the serfs taking to the woods

and starting cultivation on their own account. It was, of course, from such forest settlements that pre-war Serbia arose. In French Canada it was often the seigniors rather than the cultivators who "took to the woods," i.e., endeavoured to engage in the prohibited fur trade of the far interior, and encouraged their younger vassals to accompany them.

It was indeed one of the weaknesses of the French system that most of the seigniors had not the means of supporting the position which was nominally theirs. Their rents were insignificant, and they had neither the labour to work their lands nor the capital for developments. Either they had to fall to the economic level of their own vassals, or to find some way of increasing their wealth, and the prohibited fur trade was the most obvious way of doing this. Thus within the rigid framework of the French colony they could not fulfil their supposed function, that of leaders and defenders of the people and their unauthorised activities outside it were a hindrance rather than a help.

In this connection it is of interest to note that the arrangement of the houses in the military plantations, those carried out under direct Royal supervision as it were, was different from that adopted in the civilian areas. Here the officer who was the seignior had his own and his soldier-vassals' houses or huts built together within a defensive palisade, which meant that the vassals might have to go some distance to work in their holdings. This increased the ease of exerting control, whether by seignior over vassals, or by the King's representative over seigniors, who had charge of the forts within the villages. The superiority for purposes of government of this method was soon so apparent to the

King that he began early to urge that it should be practised everywhere in place of the system of *côtes*, the name given to the strung-out riverside dwellings. But this was, of course, impossible, once a start had been made, and the civilian seigniors can never have had over their vassals the authority which the military chief possessed over his soldiers.

This summary account of the colonising system in French Canada shows that it arose from the interaction of two sets of forces, the apparently unfettered will of the King and his Ministers, and the local conditions, with the human response to them. The edicts of Louis XIV were issued " in the fulness of our power and our certain knowledge." In point of fact, however, both his knowledge and his power were more limited than he realised and what happened was not altogether what he willed should happen.

The results have often been severely criticised in the light of future events, and we have indicated some of the more obvious weaknesses. At the same time, looked at as an attempt to establish a model community we have to admit that French Canada was largely successful. In all Utopias, ancient or modern, whether intended to be preserved as pure ideals or to be realised in fact, an indispensable antecedent condition is that either the world and the City of God should be synonymous terms, or that the latter can be permanently isolated. It was not Louis XIV's fault that the wilderness round his Canada proved to be neither impenetrable nor uninhabitable.

Again, in every Utopia it is essential that the majority should acquiesce in the way of life ordained for it by those who believe that to them the heavenly vision has

been vouchsafed. Difficulties arise in dealing with recalcitrants, and here one must admit that French Canada showed marked superiority over some recent attempts to realise an ideal. There was a way of escape for the rebels who found the path laid out for them too narrow for their energies. It is true that endeavours were made by endless edicts to block the outlet to the wild free life of the woods ; but men were too valuable to be shot down in batches. Prudence demanded that punitive measures against the *coureurs de bois* should not be pushed so far as to make it impossible for them to come back to the fold if advancing years or second thoughts aroused the desire. The real loss was that of the energy, physical and intellectual, of their youth ; but then by definition there is little room for restless energy in Utopia, which is the ideal attained, and is thus incapable of improvement.

From one point of view also Canada was fortunate in the qualities of its colonists. They were selected for their willingness to submit to authority, for meekness was indispensable to those who would inherit the new lands. Not only were Huguenots excluded as too prone to exercise the right of private judgment, but even devout Catholics were not to " be left at liberty to speak their minds." But in itself passivity, however convenient to the rulers, is hardly a sufficient equipment for life in a new land. There was certainly too much of it among the colonists ; but it seems clear that a more positive attribute—that real passion for the land which is so incomprehensible to those who do not share it—was also widespread. The girls exposed in what was, in a very literal sense, the marriage market of Quebec, we are told, generally put as a first question to a suitor

—have you a house and a farm? We may suppose, therefore, that many of them shared this emotion to the extent of regarding the husband as only an inevitable concomitant of more desired possessions.

Work on the uncleared land in Canada, as elsewhere, involved heavy toil, and here the material rewards were never great; but those who feel its charm rarely complain of the toil. To have land enough, to enjoy at once security of tenure and freedom from excessive burdens—these were great gains for emigrants from the crowded north-western part of France. Nor had the toil the continuity and monotony which press so hardly upon many urban workers to-day. The year's labours were punctuated by the seasons, and the feasts of the church, so closely linked to the events of the farmer's year, gave an element of pageantry which satisfied the deeper needs of the cultivators. In mid-winter, when the noontide sun stood still in the heavens before beginning its upward swing, they celebrated with timid joy the birth of a new Hope; the swelling gladness of the resurrection morn accompanied them as they cast their seed into ground just freed from the bonds of its winter death. The continuity and stability of the Church were at once a symbol and a promise that life would follow its old course throughout their own span of life and that of their children's children. In all that follows, and down to the present time, this largely unrecorded and unnoticed life of the cultivator went on, changing but little with the lapse of time, and forming an accompaniment to the more stirring events which took place on the wider stage of history.

But since it was these outside events which influenced the future fate of Canada, we may close this chapter by a

brief note on two types of those Canadians who found life within too narrow for them.

La Salle, who has been mentioned as a great explorer, obtained from the clerical overlords of the island of Montreal a grant of land at the head of the Lachine Rapids, then called Sault St. Louis. It was a " wilderness " grant, for the river was unnavigable, and there was only a trail to give access, and no other settlers. La Salle did some clearing, built a house, induced others to settle on his land ; but soon showed restlessness. The way was open upstream if not down, so he sold his improved property and, with the permission of the governor, started off on a journey of exploration. Some of those who had accompanied him deserted and returned to Montreal, and it is said that the name Lachine was given in mockery to the abandoned seigniory as well as to the rapids beside it, because La Salle was supposed to have adopted the ideas of the earlier explorers and gone off on a vain search for China.

Of his actual explorations we shall have to speak later ; at present we need only note that in 1675 he obtained a second seigniory at Fort Frontenac, the present Kingston, near the point where the St. Lawrence leaves Lake Ontario at the Thousand Islands.[1] The jump from Lachine to Kingston, a distance of some 180 miles, is significant. It is an indication that continuous expansion upstream from Montreal to Lake Ontario was at least not easy. Even now there is no town of any importance in this stretch of the river. La Salle's next attempt at settlement was even further afield, and both he and the governors of Canada with whom he worked have been censured for this dispersion

[1] Map III.

of strength, instead of the concentration so desirable in the early stages of growth. But part at least of the censure is unjust, for while the St. Lawrence between, roughly speaking, Quebec and Montreal, is a unit, the Lachine Rapids combined with the characteristics of the country above mark a physical break which made slow expansion impossible. If it was to occur it had to be by jumps.

The other piece of pioneer work which we have to note is of a quite different type. At Three Rivers there had lived since 1651 a family called Radisson, whose members were connected with the fur trade as interpreters and dealers. Pierre Esprit Radisson and his brother-in-law, Chouart, Sieur des Groseilliers, were men of great energy and initiative with a great taste for exploration, especially when it could be combined with profit in the shape of furs. The line between licensed *voyageur* and unlicensed *coureur de bois* was a narrow one, and these two combined the rôles, being disposed to disperse with official permission if it could only be obtained under conditions which they regarded as too onerous. According to the story, which is a little obscure and doubtful, they succeeded, after some adventurous exploring work, in reaching Hudson Bay in 1662, returning to Three Rivers the following year with a load of furs. They were then fined for illegal trading with the Indians, and their indignation, it is said, induced them to guide the English in the *Nonsuch* into Hudson Bay in 1668. In this case the governor, from whatever mixture of motives, tried to prevent local initiative from finding an outlet outside Canada, and the ultimate effects were as injurious as were those of La Salle's journeys, which were countenanced. Clearly then we cannot regard

subsequent events in Canada as wholly due to errors of judgment on the part of individuals ; for the physical conditions made the problems concerned very difficult of solution.

Before then we begin the story of French exploration and of the beginnings of the struggle with the English, we have to keep in mind the picture of late seventeenth century Canada just outlined. Between Quebec and Montreal were the strip-like settlements with their peasant cultivators, tilling their lands by slack and slovenly methods, having a somewhat low standard of life, finding in the Church the chief social tie and in its festivals their chief relaxation ; but in the main contented and increasing in numbers. Above them were the Royal officials, sometimes inefficient and corrupt, sometimes ambitious and capable ; but for the most part restless because they had neither incomes sufficient to reconcile them to exile nor the freedom to give scope to ambition. In addition there was a varying number of wanderers, clerical and lay, missionaries, explorers, traders and quasi-brigands, for whose energies there was no scope in the narrow river lowland. They it was who broke down the wilderness barrier and flung Canada into the turmoil of conflict.

FRENCH EXPANSION: ITS MOTIVES AND MEANING



Map VII. The Great Lakes and the Routes to the Mississippi

CHAPTER VII

French Expansion: Its Motives and Meaning

BEFORE we can grasp the motives which prompted French expansion, and the direction which it took, we have to be clear as to the physical setting of the Canada colonised by Louis XIV. Consisting as it did in essence of a strip between Quebec and Montreal, with a short and narrow extension up the Richelieu River, it was separated from the Atlantic on the east by a forested upland, inhabited by Indians largely under French influence. The seaward slope of that upland was divided between French and English colonists. To the northeast lay the somewhat ill-defined area known as Acadia,[1] of which so far we have said nothing. Its early history was complex and troubled; it is sufficient to note that such developments as had hitherto taken place had been chiefly in Acadia proper, or Nova Scotia, and that the treaty of Breda in 1667 had restored the whole area politically to France, after a period of confusion. South-west of Acadia lay New England,[2] which extended to the frontier of New York colony. The last area, as already stated, had been taken by the English from the Dutch in 1664, though there was an interval before it was confirmed to them by treaty in 1674. The Pilgrim

[1] Map X. [2] Map IX.

Fathers landed at Plymouth in 1620, which may be regarded as the date of the beginning of New England.

During the latter part of the seventeeenth century Acadia and New England may be said broadly to have been passive so far as continental politics were concerned. Acadia had an insignificant population; New England was engaged in minding its own business, an occupation which appealed strongly to the Puritan stock to which it owed its population. The problem of earning a living in these not very productive lands was indeed an absorbing one, and could hardly have been solved had it not been for the sea fisheries and the latent possibilities of sea trade. No great valley line invited advance into the interior, and that interior was a wooded, Indian-infested upland, offering no special attractions.

The population of New York colony was concentrated on the lower Hudson River and on the lowermost section of the Mohawk. So far as the farming element was concerned, no motive existed for an advance; there was meantime land enough. But from the lower Mohawk westward towards Lake Ontario stretched the Iroquois country, and beyond Lake Ontario, westwards and south-westwards, there extended out into the unknown a vast fur-producing country. A glance at Map VII will show that from New York and Montreal, as posts from which furs could be sent to Europe, three routes, easy so far as Indian methods of travel were concerned, led towards this fur-producing wilderness. These were:—The Mohawk valley, leading towards the eastern shore of Lake Ontario; the St. Lawrence, giving, except for its rapids, a direct waterway to the same lake; the Ottawa, forming an indirect route to Georgian Bay, and so to the vast waterways of the Great Lakes.

Now the Dutch had already established a considerable fur trade before the English took New York (New Amsterdam); we have already shown that Montreal was not only a fur centre, but that the finances of Canada depended chiefly upon the furs coming to it. At first sight then, it might seem as if it was perfectly clear what would happen. We might, that is to say, suppose that the French would strive promptly to develop their trade by the two routes converging on Montreal, that the English would similarly advance by the Mohawk valley route, and that a clash would come between the two in the region of Lake Ontario. It is then very curious to find that it was not till the early part of the eighteenth century that the English of New York showed any tendency to advance to the west, and then mainly by way of a reaction to French movement. They showed, that is to say, a very remarkable amount of passivity, as compared with French activity.

It is not difficult to explain this apparent anomaly. Bearing in mind that the fur trade, so far as the collection of the pelts was concerned, was in Indian hands, it is clear that for the Europeans the necessary conditions were access to Indians willing to barter these for western goods, and the maintenance of these in extensive hunting grounds as against rival tribes. So far as the different groups of Indians were concerned, we can hardly suppose that any of them had a deep-seated, genuine attachment either to the French or to the English—it was a case of Codlin and Short. The English looked at the matter purely from a commercial standpoint; their bid was based upon the value of the goods they gave in exchange. Incidentally, we may note that, from Cartier's time onwards, the French were never liberal in this respect.

But this was not a matter of pure accident. Even in the later seventeenth century, and much more markedly in the next one, the English people as a whole were beginning to develop the industries, and the resultant overseas trade, which were to form the economic basis of sea power. In addition, the numerous harbours of the Atlantic coast, and the greater ease of access of these to Europe and to each other as against the solitary French seaport of Quebec, made the transport of English goods cheaper than that of the less abundant French ones. It was thus not so much that the English were more generous than their rivals, but rather that furs would buy more English than French goods. As an example we may note that English rum came from the West Indian Islands to the harbours of the northern Atlantic colonies in exchange for fish or agricultural produce, while French brandy had to come from France to Quebec, and was much dearer.

But all this is only part of the story. As we have seen, from the moment of his landing at Tadoussac, Champlain took sides in an Indian quarrel, and that meant that from the first French dealings with the Indians were complicated by politics, and were not on a purely economic basis. To an English or Dutch trader, supplied with good and cheap axes, firearms and rum, one Indian was much the same as another; the only thing that mattered was whether or not he had beaver skins to barter. To the French, Indians were allies or enemies, the latter category including the Iroquois in bulk, even if attempts were made to detach individual Iroquois.

It may be said, however, that since the Iroquois had made their peace with the French, this old quarrel

might now die down. But here account has to be taken of the physical relation between Iroquois territories and those occupied by the New York traders. In the early encounters of Champlain's day with the Iroquois—which were unprovoked, be it noted—it was French firearms which turned the scale. The trade relations—for we cannot speak in this case of an alliance—between the Iroquois and the inhabitants of New York colony were due to the fact that only by the Hudson could the Five Nations obtain easily and cheaply the firearms both to defend themselves and to ensure continued supplies of furs. It was obvious then that they would not sell their furs to the French, and still more obvious that they would seek to extend their hunting grounds at the expense of the other tribes who were allied to the French.

This was indeed the crux of the matter and the reason why the French were compelled to advance into the interior. The Iroquois had massacred or driven westwards the Hurons and other friendly Indians of the region of the nearer lakes, and had appropriated their hunting grounds. In Champlain's day the region north of Lake Ontario was Huron territory ; after the Indian wars it was occupied by the Iroquois. When the French began to react to the Hudson Bay Company's founding of posts on that Bay, they discovered even in the remote regions near its shores evidences of earlier Iroquois visits, and it was the Iroquois who prevented a prior French occupation of the Bay area. An attempt had been made from Tadoussac in 1661 to reach and pass the Height of Land beyond Lake St. John,[1] but failed on account of the presence of Mohawk war-parties.

[1] Map VIII.

Thus, unless the French were to lose the fur trade altogether, they were constrained to push west and south-west to find friendly Indians behind the Iroquois screen. When they did this, however, their task of establishing new alliances was liable to be interrupted by the re-appearance of these ubiquitous warriors, or rendered more difficult by the fear which their name inspired.

The result is that in the latter part of the seventeenth century we can recognise three main trends of French policy. In the first place it was essential that their influence should be extended into the distant interior, where they might hope to get into touch with tribes unknown to the Iroquois, and outside even their range. Second, they had to strive to attach such tribes firmly to them. For this they relied both upon Jesuit and other missionaries and on the Indian susceptibility to ceremonial and displays of eloquence. Finally, they had to strive, by indirect rather than by direct methods, to weaken the Iroquois. The attempt had necessarily to be indirect, for there were good reasons why, save under very severe provocation, they should hesitate to attack the Five Nations within their homelands. The double exit which those lands possessed, by the Mohawk-Ontario and Hudson-Champlain lines, constituted a real menace. If a French force advanced by the latter route, there was always the danger that Iroquois raiding-parties might come down from Lake Ontario by the St. Lawrence to revenge themselves on Montreal. Similarly an attack from Lake Ontario left open the possibility of retaliation by the Richelieu.

For similar reasons, it was unwise to press too far the colony of New York, from which the Iroquois

obtained their supplies. If there was no real alliance between Iroquois and colonists, each found the other too useful for great divergence of policy. An attack on the colony would probably rouse the Five Nations to make raids on the French rear.

By this chain of reasoning we arrive at the cynical policy, frankly avowed by Frontenac, of making New England bear the brunt of French attacks when the Iroquois again became obstreperous. Those attacks were meant to weaken the Iroquois indirectly by diminishing English prestige. New England was much easier game than New York, and was equally inhabited by English colonists. Frontenac regarded the colonists as a unit, as he was perhaps entitled to do ; but in point of fact there was no real unity. The English of New York bore with considerable philosophy the sufferings of their fellow-countrymen in New Hampshire and Massachusetts.

In 1666, the year of the French attacks on the Mohawks, the English governor of New York had urged on the New Englanders the desirability of a joint attack on the French. The New Englanders refused for the fairly sufficient reason that the Indians on their own frontier were within the French sphere of influence, and they feared that an attack on the French might result in Indian reprisals on their scattered homesteads. When Frontenac, in 1690, with Indian allies, did attack New England it was without previous provocation ; but New York might have retorted that if the New Englanders had accepted the proposals of 1666 these raids might not have happened. When the English retaliated in their turn it was Acadia—unoffending, but more easily reached—which suffered.

The whole situation was curiously complex and, as so often happens, there were deeper trends of policy which belied surface appearances. Superficially it seemed as if the English showed remarkable passivity —cowardly or commendable, according to one's point of view—and for long submitted to French attacks without collective resentment or collective attempts at defence. Not only this, but New York in particular, a colony with a superb natural position, seemed oblivious of its own possibilities, while the great Frenchmen showed themselves fully alive to those of Canada. So early as 1670 the intendant Talon annexed, with suitable ceremonial, the vast lands round the western Great Lakes. Frontenac, one of the great governors of Canada, and his friend and collaborator, La Salle, not only visualised the dazzling scheme of a French empire extending from the St. Lawrence to the Gulf of Mexico, but took some steps to translate it into fact. Meantime the English colonists were buying and selling, or farming, or squabbling among themselves, apparently with the utmost short-sightedness. We can hardly say that they were biding their time and consolidating their position, for there is no evidence that they realised that there was anything to wait for.

When, however, we consider what actually happened, their muddling through takes on all the appearance of crafty policy. So long as the Five Nations were powerful they ensured for New York colony a large share of the fur trade, and also acted as a buffer state between that colony and Canada. When, in 1701, the Iroquois, dwindling in numbers and fallen from their earlier prowess, gave up the fruitless struggle and made a final peace with the French, they were induced at the same

R. C. A. F. photo

THE THOUSAND ISLANDS

The Canadian Shield extends here from Ontario into New York State, and has been cut through by the River St. Lawrence.

time to cede their hunting grounds to the English. In other words, when they had played their part in helping to block the French advance to the nearer lakes, and had been worn down in the struggle, they left the way open for an English advance.

One is tempted to seek an explanation of these facts in terms of the characteristics of the two nations involved —tempted to contrast the clear, cold logic and acute perceptions of the Frenchman with the Englishman's aversion to reasoning and long views, his desire "to get on with his job." But while there is little evidence to support this position, there is much to show that the land forms were exerting great influence.

If there had been no rapids on the Upper St. Lawrence; if there had been no barren strip where the present beautiful tourist resort of the Thousand Islands lies; if there had been no obstacles on the Niagara river; if even there had been no rugged plateau between the Ottawa valley and Georgian Bay: then Canada might have expanded slowly and continuously from Montreal to the plains of the Mississippi, and gathered strength to keep the English out. If even the Canadians had confined themselves to their own valley strip and consolidated their position there, instead of advancing into an area too extensive for effective occupation, the future might have been different. But they had no real choice. In December, 1671, there was held in London, before a distinguished assembly, a sale of the rich cargo of furs brought by the first ships of the recently-founded Hudson Bay Company. The fur trade of Canada was thus menaced from two sides, from the Hudson-Mohawk valley and from Hudson Bay. Under the influence of this twofold economic pressure, from the east and the

north, Canadian enterprise was, as it were, forced to find an outlet to the south-west. The lands there were not only too wide to hold, but the presence of the French formed a menace whose meaning the English were bound, sooner or later, to realise and to resent.

In order to realise how the conflict arose, we have to summarise the main facts of French expansion, which can be followed on Map VII. It is not necessary to describe the actual discovery of the relations of the three western lakes of Huron, Michigan and Superior. It is sufficient to say that, during the period 1658–62, Radisson and Groseilliers explored in canoes much of Lake Huron, entered Michigan by the Strait of Michilimackinac (the Mackinac of our atlases), and explored Green Bay and its neighbourhood. Later they passed into Lake Superior by the St. Mary river or strait, and voyaged along its southern shores, making extensive journeys into the interior. They were adventurers in all the senses of that word, and their travels are mainly of interest in that they remind us that a basis of broad knowledge was present before the later developments began.

Two facts about their travels, however, deserve emphasis. Like Champlain, and like the Jesuit Fathers of the Huron Mission, they entered Lake Huron by the Ottawa-Mattawa-Lake Nipissing-French river route.[1] Again, so far as is known they were the first Frenchmen to pass the Sault or rapids at the head of the St. Mary river, and so enter Lake Superior. These rapids, which keep their French name of Sault Sainte Marie, though the first word is locally called Soo, mark one of those breaks in navigation which are so conspicuous a feature

[1] Map IV.

of the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes waterway. The falls of the Niagara river and the series of rapids on the St. Lawrence, ending in those of Lachine, are of course other notable examples.

It should be noted, just because it helps one to picture the drainage relations, that as rendezvous Sault Sainte Marie and Montreal are much superior to any point on the Niagara river. If an Indian or a Frenchman wanted to be sure of meeting a friend or a foe, known to be travelling from the east to Lake Superior, he had only to wait at the Sault, and, sooner or later, he would see him stop to lift his canoe out of the water there, and could intercept him. Similarly, any traveller going westward from the Lower St. Lawrence had to leave the water for the land trail at Montreal because of the Lachine rapids. But it was no use waiting at Niagara for anyone coming eastward from Lake Huron, because such a traveller had the choice of two routes, the shorter by Lake Nipissing and the longer by the St. Clair river and lake, the Detroit river and Lake Erie, followed by the Niagara portage. There was even a third possibility, for the traveller might reach Lake Ontario direct from Lake Huron (Georgian Bay) by the Severn river, Lake Simcoe, and the Trent river, as did Champlain.[1] He could then pass Fort Frontenac (Kingston), reach the region of the Thousand Islands and descend the stretch of rapids on the St. Lawrence to Montreal. Thus while Fort Frontenac commanded all water traffic from Lake Ontario to Montreal, it did not command that of the more westerly lakes, and Fort Niagara, of which we shall have to speak later, was only of limited significance because of the choice of routes from Lake Huron. Of

[1] p. 69.

the two great strategic points, Montreal and Sault Sainte Marie, the former was much the more important, because it marked the virtual limit of settlement and civilisation. But Ste. Marie was a halfway house to the unknown west and south-west, and thus reappears constantly in the stories of the earlier journeys. It could be easily reached by a land trail from the shores of the strait of Michilimackinac, and thus in a sense commanded traffic on Lake Michigan, with its important arm of Green Bay, as well as on Lake Superior.

After Radisson and Groseilliers' light-hearted wanderings the next stage came with the attempts of the Jesuit Fathers to re-establish the missions shattered by the Iroquois' attacks on the Hurons and other Indians. The survivors of the groups who had felt the force of those attacks had fled westwards, and a group had taken refuge on the shores of Chequamegon Bay in south-western Lake Superior. This region had been previously visited by Radisson and Groseilliers, who had established a trading post. In 1666 the Jesuit mission station of Saint Esprit was founded here, near the site of the present town of Ashland. The immediate motive was the presence of refugee Hurons, but the fact that Radisson and Groseilliers had found the spot a good centre for their fur trading operations shows that it had some natural advantages. It was indeed a point on which many Indian routes converged.

Perhaps because of the fact that many groups of Indians foregathered here, it did not prove a favourable centre for missionary work. In 1669 its founder shook its dust from off his feet, and set forth to establish another mission at a point where he hoped to find more fruitful soil for the good seed. This time his choice

fell on the Fox river where it enters Green Bay, itself an arm of Lake Michigan. This was the mission of St. François Xavier, and it shows some analogies to Saint Esprit, with well-marked differences. The latter is separated by a portage from the St. Croix river (note the French name), one of the feeders of the Mississippi. The Fox river is a better line of advance towards the interior than the streams of Chequamegon Bay, and is separated by a very narrow portage, not much more than about a mile and a half wide, and now covered by the town of Portage, from the Wisconsin, another of the tributaries of the Mississippi. That was an invitation hardly to be resisted, and the pious founder of the mission went up to the portage during his first winter and saw the Wisconsin flowing on its way to " the great river called the Messi Sipi."

A third mission station was that of Sainte Marie at the Sault. We have already noted the advantages of this site and the post naturally formed the centre of the group of western missions, soon to be enlarged by the founding of St. Ignace on the Strait of Michilimackinac. It was at Sainte Marie in 1670, in the presence of representatives of many Indian tribes, that the whole region of the western lakes was taken over formally in the name of the King of France, with elaborate ceremonies, in which the Jesuit Fathers played a large part. Without reflecting in any way on their sincerity, we may note that they were naturally interested in the spread of French rule, and were thus agents of empire.

We must not overestimate the importance either of that proclamation or of the founding of the missions. There was no effective occupation and no settlement; but the missions meant that there was coming and going

between Canada and the west, and that knowledge of the area round the lakes was both increasing in amount and becoming diffused among a greater number of people. The proclamation again showed that the rulers of Canada, now temporarily free from the fear of Iroquois attacks, were ready to engage in a forward policy.

The next stage indeed is Frontenac's deliberate attempts to promote exploration, but before passing to the great journeys of Jolliet and Marquette on the one hand and La Salle on the other, we have to note a curious expedition, which was partly missionary and partly exploratory.

To understand its origin we have to go back a little. We saw [1] that Montreal was founded by a group of religious enthusiasts. Unfortunately religious fervour is not in itself a sufficient qualification for the founding and maintenance of a post in a distant and uncivilised land. Many difficulties arose and hard words were applied to some of the "gentlemen of Montreal." Eventually (1663) they made over their rights to the Seminary of St. Sulpice at Paris, and Sulpician priests played a large part in the future history of Montreal. There was no great love lost between them and the Jesuits, and they seem to have been roused to emulation —or rivalry—by the missionary zeal of the latter in the west. They started missions of their own on the north shore of Lake Ontario and became aware of the possibility of further developments from that lake. Put in another way this means that if the Ottawa and Lake Huron formed the Jesuit route to Lakes Michigan and Superior and the adjacent lands, there was no reason why

[1] p. 85.

the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario should not form a Sulpician route to the unknown. It was from the Sulpicians that La Salle received his first seigniory at Lachine, and we have seen that he found in the smooth water immediately above it an irresistible appeal.

In 1669, then, two Sulpician priests were despatched from Montreal to seek new fields for evangelising work. Because of the Lachine rapids the actual boat journey could only start from the region of La Salle's lands above. He was himself now ready to start out into the unknown, and was induced to combine with the priests, though there was no real unity of aim.

They all went up the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario, and crossed this to a point near the mouth of the Genesee river, that is near the present town of Rochester. Here they hoped to get Seneca (Iroquois) guides, apparently proposing to go through Seneca country to the Ohio. It may be noted here that few, if any, of these journeys were journeys of discovery in the strict sense; they followed well-known Indian routes, and were accomplished with Indian help. In this case the Senecas showed no enthusiastic desire to assist. Eventually, tired of waiting, the priests and La Salle crossed the lake to a point near the present site of Hamilton, where they found another Indian village.

At the village, very unexpectedly, they encountered two Frenchmen on their way back to Quebec. One of the two was Jolliet, a Canadian born at Quebec, who was returning home after an expedition in search of that copper mine on Lake Superior which had haunted men's minds since Cartier's days. Copper, it may be noted, is to-day mined extensively in the peninsula of Keweenaw. Jolliet had gone out by the usual Ottawa-

Georgian Bay route, but on his return had fallen in with an Iroquois who had guided him into Lake Erie by the St. Clair-Detroit river route : this was the first time this route was used by a Frenchman. His guide had refused to bring him by the Niagara portage, and he had come over to Lake Ontario from the Grand river.[1]

The priests were evidently thrilled with the story of his journey, and he told them also of Indians, speaking the Algonquin tongue, who had asked for missionaries. La Salle, on the other hand, as his future actions show, was not a man easily turned from his purpose. One may suppose also that the fact that the new route led eventually to the known, i.e., to Lake Superior, was not for him an attraction. It was hardly worth while to sell all he had merely to make a visit to the Jesuit stations of the west. In any case the party broke up. The priests went to Lake Erie by Jolliet's route, and La Salle disappeared. It is supposed that he re-crossed the lake, found Indian guides, and then portaged from the Genesee river to the Allegheny, one of the head-streams of the Ohio, and followed the main river some distance down ; but little is definitely known of his movements. For us the point is merely that the Ohio could be reached without great difficulty by this route. In other words, from the south shore of Lake Ontario, as from the south shore of Lake Superior and from the west shore of Lake Michigan, feeders of the Mississippi could be reached ; in no case did land of any notable elevation intervene.

The priests had various minor troubles and adventures. They followed Jolliet's route to the Grand river, wintered on Lake Erie, passed into Lake Huron in the

[1] Map VII.

spring, and eventually reached Sault Sainte Marie, whence they returned to Montreal with Indian guides by the Georgian Bay-Ottawa route. They had made no discoveries, but their journey showed that no special heroism and no elaborate preparation was necessary to accomplish this lengthy round trip.

What La Salle learnt he held his tongue about ; but it is clear that it was enough to stimulate him to further action. His future movements show that he realised that there was great scope for exploration on a fairly large scale, and that he believed that the expenses could be paid by the profits obtained by fur trading. But we must leave him for a moment and return to Jolliet, who was to do much.

At the end of 1672, Jolliet was back again in the west, on a definite and official mission of exploration. At the mission of St. Ignace, on the Strait of Michilimackinac, he met Father Marquette, a Jesuit priest who had already made fairly extensive journeys in the lake region. In the spring of 1673 the two started together with five companions for Green Bay. They made no stay at the mission of St. François Xavier on the Fox river, but pushed on up that river, portaged over to the Wisconsin, descended this stream to the Mississippi and followed that mighty waterway down to the entrance of the Arkansas, when it had become clear to them that it must lead to the Gulf of Mexico, and not, as had been supposed, to the coast of California. The return against the stream was difficult, but the main point of interest lies in the final part of their route. They were told by Indians that the Illinois was a better route than that by which they had come. They travelled up it, then up its tributory, the Des Plaines river. A short portage

then led them into the Chicago river, and they entered the south-western corner of Lake Michigan in the region where the great city of Chicago now stands. In this region the parting between the water which reaches the sea finally by the St. Lawrence and that which enters the Gulf of Mexico by the Mississippi is not only low, but in a wet season was all but non-existent. It has now been cut through by the Chicago Sanitary Canal, which carries lake water to the Mississippi. This, like the other outstanding peculiarities of drainage in the region of the Great Lakes, is a result of the Ice Age; for when a great mass of ice advanced from the north, and blocked the exit of all water to the north-east and east, drainage was necessarily towards the south, that is to the Gulf of Mexico.

This journey disclosed a number of important facts, but from our point of view was less significant than the subsequent one accomplished by La Salle. Just because he had wider ambitions than either of his predecessors he was compelled to proceed more slowly, and despite his patience and persistence those ambitions led to final disaster.

Frontenac built Fort Frontenac in 1673, but it was not till 1675 that La Salle obtained a seigniory there on condition of repaying the cost of construction of the fort. Some settlers established themselves, and a certain amount of fur trading was carried on on the lake, La Salle building boats for the purpose. Three years later he obtained permission to make a further advance, and induced the Iroquois to consent—reluctantly—to his building a fort on the Niagara river, and constructing a ship, above the obstacle of the falls, for traffic on Lake Erie. The jump from Fort Frontenac

(Kingston) to Niagara should be noticed as very characteristic.

His ship, the *Griffon*, was built and sailed into Lake Erie in August, 1679. Passing through the Detroit river and the St. Clair lake and river the party reached St. Ignace, and went on to Green Bay. La Salle had sent on an advance party to collect furs and had himself obtained others on the way. All were loaded on the *Griffon*, which was sent back. It was, however, wrecked *en route* with the loss of all hands and of the precious cargo by which La Salle hoped to recoup himself for his outlays. The last point is important, for it made clear the economic advantage—for the fur trader—of leaving the transport of furs to a station on or near the coast, with all its attendant risks, in the hands of the Indians. The time had not yet come when the Great Lakes could be used with impunity for vessels of the European type, Indian canoes being not only safer but, if wrecked, involving a smaller loss both of life and cargo. It was La Salle's misfortune that so many of his schemes were in advance of the times, and required also greater means than he had at his disposal. At this stage he was trying to do alone what the Hudson Bay Company, with much larger resources, did much later in the north.

After the departure of the *Griffon* on her tragic voyage, La Salle with a party went in canoes to the south of the lake. They passed the region of the Chicago portage, and found still another route to the Mississippi. This was by the St. Joseph river, from which a portage could be made to the Kankakee, another tributory of the Illinois.

This was at the end of 1679 and it was not until 1682

that La Salle succeeded in descending the Mississippi to its mouth in the Gulf of Mexico, the Chicago route being used in the final successful attempt. We need not follow in detail the reasons for the long delay. La Salle called one of his intermediate stations Heartbreak Fort, and his difficulties would have broken any heart less stout.

He had his moment of triumph, however. From the junction of the Ohio to the Gulf he claimed all the lands of the Mississippi for King Louis, under the name of Louisiana. He established a post, at which some attempt at settlement was made, on the Illinois, and met his death in 1687 as the result of an attempt to found a colony on the Gulf. It is clear that his idea was to take advantage of the low water-parting between the Mississippi and the waters reaching the St. Lawrence to establish a chain of posts, forming stepping-stones from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico.

It was a grandiose conception; but incapable of execution. Both statements are equally applicable to French policy in North America as a whole; the low water-parting in the centre was a snare and not the advantage which it seemed. The very slight break in physical continuity led to the explorers overlooking the vast differences in character and resources between the plains and the rugged upland from which the French had first obtained their furs; despite their forests the plains could not remain as mere hunting grounds, nor could they be reached effectively either from the St. Lawrence or from the Gulf of Mexico.

CANADA UNDER FRONTENAC'S FIRST GOVERNORSHIP



MAP VIII. FATHER ALBANEL'S ROUTE FROM TADOUSSAC TO JAMES BAY

CHAPTER VIII

Canada under Frontenac's First Governorship

AFTER our survey of the stages in French expansion to the west and south, we must return to the St. Lawrence area to see what was meantime happening there. Having already described the process by which Canada was settled, we may begin with the period of high hopes, when the preliminary stages were over, and the way seemed open for steady progress and prosperity.

In the year 1671 the intendant Talon wrote to France saying, "This part of the French monarchy is destined to a grand future. All that I see around me points to it; and the colonies of foreign nations, so long settled on the sea-board, are trembling with fright in view of what His Majesty has accomplished here within the last seven years." The following year saw the arrival at Quebec of the man who seemed peculiarly fitted by nature to make those dreams a reality. This was Count Frontenac, who came in 1672 to begin his first term as Governor of Canada. He himself was no less impressed than Talon. In his turn he says of Quebec, "I never saw anything more superb than the position of this town. It could not be better situated as the future capital of a great empire." From what we know of his character it is safe to add that he

felt also that no one was better fitted than the Comte de Frontenac to lay the foundations of that great empire and to guide its destinies. But it was part of the tragedy of French Canada that the brilliance of its great Frenchmen proved often more dangerous than the weaknesses and follies of the lesser.

Of Frontenac's greatness there can be no question; he was a man of boundless energy and great acuteness. As a matter of historical fact, however, we find that his first governorship, which lasted from 1672 to 1682, was essentially a period of rather sordid failure, though his second, which lasted from 1689 till his death in 1698, did at least show his superiority over those who had tried to fill his place. It is not sufficient to say that this was because he was above all a soldier, and, broadly speaking, the first period was one of peace and the second one of war; for there was much more than this. It is clear that he was characterised by what in modern pseudo-scientific jargon is called a "superiority complex." "He praised everything that belonged to himself," is the comment of a shrewd observer of his earlier days in France, and we can all recognise the type, whatever words we use to describe it. If circumstances gave him the opportunity of performing notable actions, he could rise to the occasion and find full satisfaction in doing them. But it was essential to his self-respect that he should be a prominent figure, and if he was forced to accept a more or less passive rôle, he must at least be surrounded by pomp and circumstance. If this could not be, if even the appearance of power and splendour was not forthcoming, he was apt to behave like a petulant child.

Before he came out to Canada first he had im-

poverished himself in his efforts to live up to his own conception of a *grand seigneur;* and thus had no private means to supplement his official salary. Pomp and circumstance also were singularly wanting in Canada.

Worse than all was the fact that the Governor of Canada had no real power ; it was never intended that he should. Not only were his actions fettered by the system of checks deliberately devised to prevent the growth of local solidarity or initiative, but from the first Frontenac's attempts, often sound ones, to promote the welfare of his adopted country brought upon him reprimands, steadily increasing in severity, from the King. The first reproof was the result of a tentative effort to give Canada some voice in its own government, and he was told that he was not to " give a corporate form to the inhabitants," the reason assigned being that, " it is well that each should speak for himself, and no one for all." The last phrase sounds as if it might well be meant as a hint to the Governor, who would doubtless have willingly made himself spokesman " for all."

Other rebukes, sometimes, it must be admitted, fully justified, followed that first one, until the recall came in 1682. What then was there for Frontenac to do save vent the spleen generated by his suppressed desires on those with whom he had to work, and make some private attempts to repair his fallen fortunes ? In the Canada to which he was sent in 1672, there was obviously no opportunity for him to play the part he had hoped for, that of founder of a great empire.

Of all the petty quarrels about precedence and dignities and rights which followed, we need say nothing ; but the assertion that he made money by " illicit "

trading in furs is of more general interest. In itself the accusation meant little ; it was one which it was common form at the time to make against an adversary. Frontenac himself said of the Jesuits—" They think more of beaver-skins than of souls." Often the accusation meant no more than that the person making the complaint thought he was not getting his fair share of the profits. The real interest rises from the fact that the possibility of extensive private trading showed that the fur trade had undergone a marked change.

Initially, as we have seen, it was necessarily in Indian hands because only the Indians were able to make full use of the internal waterways by which it had to be carried on. But by this time there were many French Canadians who had nearly as complete a mastery of the birch-bark canoe and of life in the woods as had the Indians themselves. We have just seen also over what a wide area in the interior the free-traders or " coureurs de bois " now ranged. The royal insistence that the furs should be bought and sold only in the great markets, especially that of Montreal, was an attempt to continue the original conditions, after their basis had disappeared. It was made for a very obvious financial reason. The furs again could only legally leave the country through Quebec where the custom house, with its heavy dues, was placed. In theory, that is, the whole trade was under royal control.

Obviously, the official position was based upon a number of assumptions which were no longer valid. It assumed that the Indians of the interior could only obtain European goods at the settlements on the St. Lawrence, and that their furs could only reach Europe by means of that waterway. But by this time the

French Canadians could carry trade goods into the interior, and get furs from the Indians there. Nor was it true that there was no exit save the St. Lawrence. The Hudson Bay Company had brought furs out by the northern route before Frontenac came to Canada, and had forts on the mouths of the great rivers draining into James Bay at the beginning of his first term. An even more important rival to Montreal was Albany on the Hudson River.

Perhaps even more fundamental was the fact that the French official position implied that the furs of an undefined interior were French property. In theory, of course, the conception was that all furs collected by Indians friendly to the French and more or less under their protection should be brought to the St. Lawrence, while furs collected by the Iroquois, who were more or less influenced by the English of New York, went to Albany. But the practical difficulties were considerable. In the first place the extension of French influence to the west, after the Huron wars, was due to individuals, sometimes with more or less countenance from the King as well as from the local authorities in Canada, and sometimes without the support of either. If these individuals took the risks, it would seem as if they were entitled to the profits. Secondly there was no definite line between the hunting-grounds of the different groups of Indians, the Iroquois, as we have seen, always tending to expand at the expense of the weaker tribes.

The King and his Ministers seemed to think that if there were no "coureurs de bois," no unauthorised wanderers in the wilderness, such problems would not arise, and the furs which reached the St. Lawrence

markets would be the only furs in question. A difficulty about this position was, however, that if the unauthorised energy of French Canada had not found scope in the wilderness, the fur trade would have ceased to exist, because of English competition.

The whole question of the varying degrees of honesty of the governors and other officials of Canada, a subject on which much has been written, is indeed chiefly of interest in that it shows that the position was an impossible one. The King and his Ministers had no real appreciation of the conditions on which trade, and particularly trade involving the exploitation of a natural resource, is based. They seemed to regard the beaver-skins which came to Montreal as an annual harvest, the friendly Indians who brought them being the equivalent of the tillers of the soil. It was not to be expected perhaps that they could understand that the rigid rules and regulations which ordered the whole life of the cultivator, and deprived him of freedom alike of movement and of opinion, were totally incompatible with the development of trade, where conditions were constantly changing, where swift decisions were necessary, and where eager competitors existed. Every official who came out therefore found that what was actually happening in the country was something very different from the conception which prevailed at Versailles. The smaller men quite simply grasped at the opportunities for profit-making which presented themselves. Even the greater, such as Frontenac, in view of the risks of royal displeasure incurred by the most necessary actions, could hardly be expected to adopt a very lofty view of the obligations of honour.

Against Frontenac himself, it may be noted, the

charges made were, comparatively speaking, minor ones. He was accused mainly of employing "coureurs de bois" to intercept Indians on their way to Montreal market in order to obtain furs from them in advance, and of taking "presents" in the market itself. His immediate successor certainly carried on illegal trading on a far greater scale. On the positive side, Frontenac, even during his unhappy first term, showed remarkable skill in dealing with the Iroquois, and the Iroquois problem had a very important bearing on the fur trade. Despite Frontenac's power of handling them, however, the Five Nations began to show signs of restlessness just before he was recalled. They were quick to perceive the menace of the French advance towards the Mississippi area, and though their outbreaks after he left are generally ascribed to the weakness and folly of his successors, that may not be the whole story.

Before dealing with this subject, however, we may interrupt the narrative for a moment to say something of the Hudson Bay area, for events there cast much light on the problems of the fur trade. We have already spoken on p. 115 of the founding of the Company and the causes which led to it. Before we can go further it is necessary to have some idea of the lands from which its supplies of furs came.

Hudson Bay is a depression flooded with sea-water lying on the great Canadian Shield.[1] It is in some ways comparable to an inverted Baltic Sea, for the exit to the ocean is towards the north. Southwards the Bay narrows and becomes shallower, this southern extension being called James Bay. A very remarkable feature of this is that it receives a number of large rivers which

[1] Map VI.

carry much of the water of the Shield to the sea. For our purpose the chief rivers here are three in numbers Rupert River to the east, Moose River to the south, west and Albany River to the west. The Albany is a long stream of very complicated course, but the important point is that it is separated by only a short portage from Lake Nipigon, a considerable lake draining directly to Lake Superior. The Moose can also be reached from Lake Superior, but the more important route to it was via the Ottawa, and then by Abitibi Lake and River. Finally the Rupert drains from Lake Misstassini, and from that lake it is easy to reach water entering Lake St. John from which, as we have seen, the Saguenay flows to the St. Lawrence.[1]

From this description it is clear that the three rivers named might serve as routes along which the furs of a large part of the eastern and southern parts of the Shield could be carried to James Bay, and so to the ocean direct. Since all three rivers could likewise be reached from the St. Lawrence or from Lake Superior, any developments on James Bay would tend to reduce the supplies draining to the St. Lawrence. Very soon after the founding of the Hudson Bay Company in 1670, "forts" were established at the mouth of the Rupert River (Fort Rupert), the Moose (Fort Hayes, later called Moose Factory) and the Albany (Fort Albany). At first at any rate these were merely summer posts, just as Tadoussac had been in early days. News of the arrival of the English in the Bay reached Quebec almost simultaneously from two sources, from Tadoussac and from Sault Ste. Marie on Lake Superior—a fact of much interest. Talon, the intendant at the time, immediately

[1] Map VIII.

TADOUSSAC: THE HAVEN AND THE MOUTH OF THE SAGUENAY

took alarm, and sent the Jesuit Father Albanel to the Bay via Tadoussac to see what was happening.

Father Albanel started in the summer of 1671 and reached Lake St. John via the Saguenay that season. He spent the winter there and did not cross the Height of Land till the following summer. On his way he met some Indians from the Mistassini area, and urged them to carry their furs to Tadoussac and not to the English at Fort Rupert, men "who did not pray to God." This and his subsequent proceedings afford some justification for Frontenac's gibe about the relative importance to the Jesuits of souls and beaver-skins. He found his way to Lake Mistassini, left it by Rupert River, and came down to James Bay at Fort Rupert. Here he found the houses of the English traders but did not meet any English. He occupied the houses, pulled down the English flag, and spent some time "instructing" the Indians. This was the first journey undertaken by a Frenchman from the shores of the St. Lawrence to those of James Bay, a point of much interest when we remember how long the French had been established at Tadoussac.

Next year he was back again, this time with a letter from Frontenac, but luck was against him. He was apparently captured by the English and sent to England. One of the charges against him was that he tried to conspire with Groseilliers and Radisson [1] to injure the Hudson Bay Company.

Those two gentlemen did not however require priestly aid to shift their allegiance, for, as has been said of them, they were "patriotic alone to the open sky and the fur market." They had quarrelled with the authorities in

[1] p. 115.

Canada and brought the English into the Bay, but about this time they changed their coats again and went back to the service of France. Later, in 1682, a French company, the *Compagnie du Nord*, was formed in Canada, and Radisson guided their ships into Hudson Bay. This time the destination was not any point on James Bay, but the south-west of the greater Bay. Here the Nelson River enters, its mouth being not far from that of the Hayes River, a smaller and less turbulent stream. The Nelson drains from Lake Winnipeg, though in point of fact the Hayes River, despite the necessity for a portage, is a better route to that lake than its own swift effluent. The whole of this region was destined to be of great importance in the future, and it would appear that the mouth of the Nelson had previously been visited by the agents of the Hudson Bay Company, though they had built no post there. By a very curious coincidence, when Radisson's ships arrived, they found there a vessel from Boston, and some days afterwards a party arrived from England with a commission from the Hudson Bay Company to build a fort. It is important to note that on this occasion Radisson had come by the sea route, not the overland one, and that the virtually simultaneous arrival of three different parties at this remote spot is a striking proof of the keenness of the competition in the fur trade at this time.

The three parties spent the winter in the appearance of amity. But Radisson was a very remarkable example of the pioneer of the wholly unscrupulous type. In the spring he got the upper hand, established a French fort, leaving a garrison there in charge of his nephew, took the leaders of the two other parties prisoner, and sent

their ships and crews home. The really humorous part of the story, however, is the sequel. Two years later Radisson turned his coat again, re-entered the service of the Hudson Bay Company, and actually led an expedition which captured the fort he had built, which now contained many furs collected on behalf of the Compagnie du Nord. The story says that the skins thus obtained numbered 20,000; but this is a nice round number which re-appears in more than one of the stories.

This action of Radisson's again led to reprisals, and in 1686 a party of French Canadians went up the Ottawa and found their way to the Moose River. Here they captured Fort Hayes and later Forts Rupert and Albany. Though there was at the time peace between France and England this expedition was carried out by order of the then Governor of Canada. The English recovered the forts, lost them again, and repeated the double process before their right of possession was finally recognised; but we need not trouble with the details. It is sufficient to have suggested by specific examples that the fur trade of Canada towards the close of the seventeenth century was not quite the simple matter that it seemed to the King at Versailles.

The sequence of events in Hudson Bay shows that the failure of the French to take advantage of the discoveries made by Radisson and Groseilliers resulted in the appearance of rivals there, with consequent loss of trade. On the other hand, the fact that they did take advantage of the discoveries made by the explorers in the region of the western lakes and the Mississippi had for its immediate effect the stirring up of the Iroquois; this meant a menace alike to the main source of the furs of

Canada and to the settlers of the St. Lawrence area. So far as the story of Canada is concerned the problem of finding a means of preserving and extending the trade centred at Montreal, without needlessly antagonising the Iroquois and the English behind them, was a far more serious one at the moment than that presented by the Hudson Bay posts. Here indeed we come to the real danger involved in the recall of Frontenac. If he had been allowed to remain, and given the measure of freedom which his dominating personality demanded, it is at least possible that he might have found a solution of the problem. As it was he was not sent back until the mischief had been done, and he was then constrained to adopt the drastic policy which helped to precipitate the final catastrophe.

The events which led to the renewal of Iroquois attacks on Canada were highly complicated; we shall limit ourselves to the essential ones. In 1680, at the time when La Salle, with Frontenac's support, was pursuing the journeys which led him finally to the Gulf of Mexico, the Iroquois swept through the Illinois country, attacking and massacring the Indians there. With those Illinois Indians La Salle had already established trading connections, and the Iroquois attack was no doubt prompted by the usual motive, the fear that the beaver-skins of the region would find their way to the St. Lawrence to the damage of their trade with Albany. A further motive—as one may assume from the effects of the raid—was to intimate to the Indians further afield that it was dangerous to adopt a policy of alliance with the French. It is at least certain that the friendly Indians took instant alarm, and appealed to Frontenac for protection. Just before he left he

parleyed with the Iroquois and believed that he had pacified them.

The new Governor, La Barre, who held his office for a period of three years only, was quite unable to deal with the Iroquois on equal terms. The connection with the Illinois Indians had been brought about by La Salle, who belonged to Frontenac's party, and Frontenac was now out of favour. La Barre therefore tried to bribe the Iroquois to leave the tribes of the Michilimackinac region alone by abandoning the Illinois Indians and La Salle's stations to them. The natural consequence was that the Iroquois became more and more arrogant.

At this time the governor of the colony of New York was a Col. Dongan, who had lofty ambitions of his own, and was prepared to give as much support to the Iroquois as the feeble Stuart kings of England would permit. La Barre made a futile attempt to attack the Iroquois, made a peace with them which settled nothing, and was recalled and replaced by Denonville in 1685.

By this time the situation was threatening in the extreme. The French had lost prestige, and in dealing with Indians prestige was all-important. The friendly Indians felt that no adequate protection would be given to them, and the wily Iroquois were not slow to suggest both by words and deeds the advantages to be gained by abandoning the French and consenting to trade with the English. Fear and interest indeed pointed in the same direction. "They like the manners of the French," said Denonville of some waverers at the Strait of Michilimackinac, "but they like the cheap goods of the English better." Since also Dongan was

as active as his master would allow—and London after all was far off—it seemed likely that even at Michilimackinac itself the western Indians might have the opportunity of getting English goods. For in 1685, by a very bold move, Dongan sent out a party of armed traders from Albany. The party was supplied with eleven canoes containing trade goods, and its members found their way to Lake Ontario, and across the Niagara portage to Lake Erie, and did some successful trading. Denonville attempted to have them stopped at Niagara, but failed, and in the autumn of 1686 Dongan, stimulated by his first success, planned another expedition on a larger scale.

Denonville countered this by having a "fort" constructed at the Strait of Detroit to block the way to the upper lakes, but this did not prevent the English party getting through, and the situation developed rapidly. Denonville prepared for war against the Iroquois, as clearly the only possible solution. Meantime fortune favoured the French. The English traders appeared at Michilimackinac, but with the help of French traders and "coureurs de bois," who saw their trade threatened, the Indians there were rallied to the side of the French, and the English were taken prisoner and their goods handed over to the Indians. It was a wholly lawless proceeding, but there was as little law at Michilimackinac at the time as on the shores of Hudson Bay. The incident meant that French stock rose among the Indians of the western lakes.

The same summer (1687) Denonville made an attack on the Senecas, going by the St. Lawrence and Fort Frontenac. It was "successful," but with only the measure of success that usually attended attacks on the

Five Nations within their own lands. That is, the towns and villages were destroyed, the stored corn burnt and the standing crops cut down ; the pigs which the Iroquois now kept in numbers were also slaughtered. The actual loss of life to the Seneca warriors was not however very great. Denonville followed up his victory by building a fort at Niagara on the site of La Salle's ruined station,[1] a fort which was directed against the English as much as against the Iroquois. After this he returned to Montreal, having really only roused and not crushed the Iroquois.

Dongan was naturally furious at these events, but he was soon afterwards recalled by James II. His successor was less enterprising but nevertheless showed few signs of a desire to make things easy for Denonville. The immediate effects of the latter's raid on the Senecas indeed soon wore off. The fort at Niagara was haunted by Seneca war parties, and was abandoned in the autumn of 1688. This retreat, for it was nothing less, merely encouraged the Iroquois who proceeded, by their customary methods, to make life in Canada intolerable. Their raids on the lines of communication prevented the furs coming down the Ottawa to Montreal and so cut off its main resource. They wandered also in small parties round the settlements on the St. Lawrence above Three Rivers so that the terrified inhabitants were afraid to till their fields. Denonville tried negotiation, but had not diplomacy enough to manage the Indians, the friendly groups in particular fearing that an official French peace with the Iroquois would result in the latter turning their attention upon them. They naturally preferred that the French should bear the brunt of the

[1] p. 136.

impending attack, especially as it was the latter, by Denonville's raid, who had stirred up the hornet's nest.

The crisis came in 1689. In August of that year a band of fifteen hundred Iroquois warriors attacked Lachine, where there was now a settlement, and massacred the helpless inhabitants, men, women and children. The raid was accompanied by all the horrors of Indian warfare, and though there were soldiers at Montreal, not many miles away, no real attempt was made at resistance. For some weeks the Iroquois war parties stayed in the neighbourhood, murdering, burning and destroying over a wide area, though they made no attack on the fortified town of Montreal itself. The impression made in Canada was tremendous, out of all proportion to the actual loss of life, which is given as something like four hundred, and was due to the horrible cruelty shown by the Indians. Fear raged up and down the colony, and another blow was that the English revolution of the same year deprived James II of his throne and substituted for him William of Orange, the enemy of France. The recall of Denonville had been already decided on, and October saw the arrival of Frontenac to take up the task of putting new heart into Canada.

His first act was characteristic. On arriving at Montreal, where Denonville had been at the time of the massacre and where he remained, Frontenac found that the former had sent a message to the commander at Fort Frontenac to blow up the fort and bring its garrison back to Montreal. The order sounds as if it had been given by a panic-stricken and shaken man. In any case it aroused Frontenac's wrath, which was

increased by the fact that the Iroquois had recently sent an envoy to insist upon the giving up of the fort, the existence of which they had always resented. Post-haste Frontenac collected a party which was to stop the process of destruction and re-stock the fort. But this relieving party had hardly gone before the commander of the fort appeared at Montreal with its garrison to say that Denonville's instructions had been carried out. They had not, as became apparent later, been accomplished with complete success, for the Iroquois, who took possession of the site, found there stores and munitions which were doubtless of great use to them. When Frontenac began, almost at once, to endeavour to assert his old ascendancy over the Five Nations, and to induce them to send a deputation from the general council of the confederacy to meet him at Fort Frontenac, they retorted by asking him if he did not know that "your council-fire there is put out," a clear enough intimation of the danger of Denonville's hasty action.

Frontenac had indeed need of all his skill and diplomacy, for not only were the Iroquois arrogant in council, and still carrying on raids, but the Indians of the west were again wavering in their allegiance. But Frontenac's measures and their sequel must be left to another chapter. Meantime, however, we may suggest some of the wider bearings of the facts just narrated.

It has been said that the struggle between France and England in North America was based on an ignoble quarrel over beaver-skins. But this is taking too narrow a view. It took the form of a conflict for the control of internal lines of communication, and at the moment furs formed the chief commodity carried by those lines; but fundamentally the struggle was due to European

man's attempts to adapt himself to a wholly anomalous drainage system. Both sets of combatants came from a part of Europe which had been at most on the margin of the area of glaciation during the Ice Age. Since the drainage there had been only slightly modified by the former ice sheet, both had a definite and similar conception of the normal course of a river. It seemed, that is to say, obvious to French and English alike that a great river must rise in a range of mountains or hills, which parts its head-streams from those flowing in the opposite direction, and that from its source the water would flow as directly as the land-forms permitted to the sea. Thus any Power which occupied first the lower course of a great river in the New World was tacitly believed to have a right of occupation up to the supposed mountain range in which it rose.

In point of fact, however, the great rivers of the part of North America under consideration do not rise in definite mountain ranges forming a natural boundary zone. The term Height of Land, now universally used for the indefinite region of origin, is due to this fact. The actual position of the water-parting, that is of the Height of Land, is very difficult to find on the ground, and can scarcely be represented on a small-scale map.

In itself this was bound to give rise to conflict ; but there was more than this. As we have said, Indians were almost always taken as guides in the earlier journeys of exploration, and the Indians had already adapted themselves to the natural conditions. Not only had they not, as the Europeans had, any preconception as to the normal course of a stream, but they knew from practical experience that portages between independent waterways

R. C. A. F. photo

FRENCH RIVER FROM THE AIR

A typical landscape in the area of the Canadian Shield ; note the thin soil, the forests, the interlacing waterways

often formed easier routes than those past obstructions on a single waterway.

The result was that the struggle for empire had two separate aspects. In the first place there was the struggle between the two Powers concerned to find natural lines of demarcation between their respective zones of influence. Such lines in the Old World sense simply do not exist, though it was long before this was realised. Second, and it is a problem not yet fully solved, was the question of the best line of exit to the sea for the products of the interior. Both were regarded at the time as questions to be solved by the controlling authorities in Paris and London, for trade was not then free to follow any channel at will. Wheat has now replaceed furs as the main export of Canada, though it does not come from the area which yielded beaver-skins but from a more remote west than the seventeenth century knew. The Canadian wheat to-day finds its way to Montreal or to New York impartially, the particular point of exit being determined by the season and by economic factors ; but this condition was quite foreign to earlier policy. What is now purely a peaceful economic struggle then involved actual warfare.

Montreal and New York are widely separated, but the two great rivers on which they stand respectively have feeders which approach one another. The real question at the time was—did the fact that the St. Lawrence drains from Lakes Ontario and Erie give Canada a natural right to the control of those lakes when the Mohawk valley made it easy for the dwellers on the Hudson also to reach their shores ? Politically the question has now been answered by giving the community to which the dwellers on the Hudson belong one

shore of both lakes, and that which owns the St. Lawrence the other. But that political division has not solved the economic problem. On p. 129 we pointed out the choice of routes which lay before a traveller coming east from Sault Ste. Marie. It is a very curious fact that, despite all the changes which canals and railways have wrought wheat passing that point to-day may be pulled *either* towards New York, *or* towards Montreal, along the routes for which the combatants in the 17th century struggled. The wheat boats may make for the shores of Georgian Bay, the old regular French route to and from Sault Ste. Marie. The main difference to-day is that instead of being carried, as the furs were, by the French River to Lake Nipissing and then over the portage to the Mattawa and the Ottawa, the wheat is now put direct on rail for Montreal. Again, the boats may traverse Lake Huron, enter Lake Erie past Detroit, but despite the Welland Canal which now avoids Niagara falls, the grain tends rather to go east from Buffalo to New York or to some other Atlantic port, than to pass by the direct route via Lake Ontario to the St. Lawrence. In other words the ridge which separates Lakes Erie and Ontario, through which the Niagara River has cut its way, even to-day tends to force trade towards New York, thus preventing it from flowing with the water to Montreal.

Let us look once again at the historical facts in the light of this discussion. The French, beginning with Champlain, went to the west by the Ottawa and Georgian Bay. Present conditions seem to suggest that this was the best way, as it was at the time the safest. But Frontenac and La Salle, both men of genius, were quick to perceive the possible advantages of the direct route

by the St. Lawrence ; Frontenac's intense desire to keep Fort Frontenac, which guarded the lower gateway, permanently French, should be noted in this connection. La Salle's motive—and probably this is true of Frontenac also—was not to develop a new route to Sault Ste. Marie. La Salle was not interested in that region. It was the Mississippi and the vast area which it drains that formed the goal of his ambitions.

Here again it may seem as if both these great men were wrong, for New York is much more important than New Orleans, and the Mississippi carries no vast amount of trade southward. But the economic causes which led to the main lines of communication in North America running east and west instead of north and south did not arise till after their day. It was a stroke of genius which led both men to realise that, while to the north and north-west of Lake Superior there lies only a continuation of that endless dreary waste which forms the dead heart of the eastern half of Canada, to the south of Lake Michigan there is a land of far greater possibilities. That land also had an outlet of its own to salt-water, to water navigable at all seasons, not periodically ice-choked like the lower St. Lawrence, or, to an even greater extent, Hudson Strait. Fortune was against both La Salle and Frontenac, and their reach was greater than their grasp, but one cannot doubt their acuteness. Nor should one miss in the story of their failures, the realities for which they were striving.

FRONTENAC AND THE IROQUOIS

Map IX. Illustrate Frontenac's Raids on New England and New York

The forts marked in the Upper Hudson area did not exist at the time of the raids.

CHAPTER IX

Frontenac and the Iroquois

WE have just seen that one of Frontenac's early actions after his return to Canada in the autumn of 1689 was to attempt to open up negotiations with the Five Nations. When we remember that the Lachine Massacre had taken place but a very short time before, and that Iroquois war-parties were still roaming over the upper part of the colony, this seems strange. It is a clear proof, if further proof is necessary in view of what has been already said, that the day was long past when the confederacy could be simply regarded as the enemy of Canada. Frontenac's problem was much more complicated than that which faced Champlain, and in it the Iroquois formed but one factor.

With the year of his return indeed there began the first of a series of four wars between France and England. For convenience of reference we may note that the first lasted from 1689 to 1697 and was closed by the peace of Ryswick. After a brief interval there followed, from 1702 to 1713, the war of the Spanish Succession, closed by the treaty of Utrecht. For thirty years afterwards Canada, at least nominally, enjoyed peace, till the war of the Austrian Succession broke out in 1744, to be ended by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. Finally, the

Seven Years' War, which lasted from 1756 to 1763, resulted in the Treaty of Paris, which closed, politically at least, the story of French Canada.

It is with the first of these wars that we are concerned at the moment, and one is apt to think of it in its Canadian aspect as carried on by four sets of combatants, arranged in two groups. That is, in view of what has been already said as to the Indians definitely under French protection, and as to the relation between the colony of New York and the Iroquois, one tends naturally to think of the French and their Indian allies on the one side as arrayed against the English and the Iroquois on the other. In reality the position was far less simple.

In the first place while Canada, alike from a political and a military standpoint, was France, it was by no means true that the English colonists similarly represented England. Not only was the bond between colonies and motherland far looser in the latter case, but there was as yet no unity, either in fact or in aim, between the different groups of colonists.

Again, the Indians under French protection were likewise not a unit, but were organised into tribes with little community of interest among them, and with varying degrees of attachment to the French. Without going into details of the different tribes, we may note that for our purpose these Indians may be regarded as falling into two main sets, the Micmacs and Abenakis who dwelt in Acadia and the hinterland of the New England colonies on the one hand, and the tribes of the western lakes and surrounding regions on the other. The former, who belonged to the Algonquin group, played a great part in the frontier wars, and their attachment

to the French was strong, and accentuated by their hostility to the English. As we have seen, the missionaries of the Catholic Church, particularly the Jesuits, were the great agents used by the French in extending their influence over the Indians. The missions were particularly successful among the Micmacs and the Abenakis. Since the English colonists were of Puritan stock, Indian antagonism to them could be, and was, stimulated by a religious motive. Raids on unprotected settlements could, that is to say, be given the aspect of a holy war on heretics. In this region therefore the Church and the Civil Power worked hand in hand and gave each other mutual support.

In the west matters were rather different. Here, as we have seen, the theoretical conception of Canada as a unit with a single policy determined from Paris broke down in practice as a result of the development of the fur trade. If to begin with the idea was that here also the Church was to be the sole intermediary between the Indians and the French, this became impossible as the western trading-posts grew and multiplied. The aims and interests of the missionary priests and of the fur-traders were too diverse for common action. At the time however, and under the given conditions, it was impossible for Frontenac, or any other governor, to face the issue squarely and bring about a re-adjustment. The Catholic Church was too powerful for even the appearance of opposing its influence to be a matter of practical politics. Frontenac limited himself to criticising the actions of the Jesuits, who supplied the missionaries to the western lakes. This attack on one element of the Church was a possible method of attaining his ends without incurring the odium which would have

resulted from a direct statement that relations with these western or "wild" Indians must be a matter for the Civil Power alone. His opponents retorted by accusing him of desiring to make private profits out of the fur trade, and tried by complaints to the King to prevent him carrying out his own policy. The basis of that policy was perfectly clear. He realised that in the west the Church was not strong enough to hold the Indians. Against its influence was the double motive of their fear of the Iroquois, and their appreciation of the superior advantages of the English market. Thus Frontenac's aim was to seize every opportunity—fair and foul—of stirring up strife between these Indians and the Iroquois on the one hand in order to prevent combination between them, and on the other by attacking the English to try to prove both to the Iroquois and to the western Indians that the French were the stronger party. Thus the Iroquois were the pivot of his policy; he was unwilling to attack them directly so long as it could be avoided, and hoped to control them by his personal ascendancy, or even to break up the confederacy by internal strife.

As against this his opponents within the colony had only the counsel of despair. Their view was that the French forest-traders should be recalled, the western Indians left to the missionaries as the agents of France, and the colony supplied with furs only through the Montreal market. Meantime, however, no furs were coming down to that town, as the Iroquois war-parties were haunting the routes. Put in another way, that meant that the permanent friendliness of the western Indians, on which the finances of Canada depended, was a matter of doubt.

We have still to consider the last element in the problem—the Iroquois themselves. In the first place we must note that the only English colony with which they had direct dealings was that of New York. Even so the relation was still purely a trading one. The inhabitants of this colony gave no military support to the Five Nations beyond supplying them with munitions, and this was merely a matter of trade. Conversely the Iroquois were loth to give to the colonists, when the latter attempted to organise retaliatory raids on Canada, the support that their Indian allies gave to the French. It is quite clear also that, being themselves warriors, the Iroquois had for such governors as Frontenac, and for the trained French troops, a respect which the Dutch and English traders failed to inspire. The latter were useful as supplying European goods which by this time had become necessities. But the English showed a reluctance to undertake actual warfare which earned for them the contempt of the Iroquois, and a willingness to take advantage of the Iroquois' readiness for war which those intelligent and haughty braves were as quick to perceive as to resent. It is clear indeed that the wise men of the confederacy were not wholly oblivious of the fact that the crushing of the French would be more likely to turn to the ultimate advantage of the English than to their own. They had no mind to be made catspaws, and while raids on Canada were an amusement for the younger men which it was difficult to check, the chiefs had no desire to press the French too far. As allies of the English, that is to say, they were distinctly a doubtful quantity.

There is still another point to be considered. Despite the general antagonism between French and Iroquois

which had prevailed since Champlain's time, frequent attempts had been made to establish missions within the lands of the confederacy. The motive was originally a religious one, though as time went on it tended to lose its idealism and often seemed little more than an effort to use the Church as a political agent. The missionaries failed in their prime object, that of converting the Iroquois in mass ; but they did make a considerable number of converts. Many of these were induced by their spiritual fathers to shake the dust of their heathen villages off their feet, and come to settle in Canada. One of the most important of these settlements of Catholics Iroquois (chiefly Mohawks) was that at St. Louis or Caughnawaga, a point on the right bank of the St. Lawrence, at the head of the Lachine Rapids and just opposite the French settlement of Lachine. Here there is still an Indian reservation, and the Caughnawaga Indians for long played a not unimportant part in the complex relations between the French, the English of New York and the confederacy of the Five Nations.

This summary account of the position about the time of Frontenac's return may serve to show how needful it was for him to walk warily. His policy was necessarily tortuous, as it was also brutal. He was a soldier and as such had to strive to obtain immediate results. He was an old man also, being in his seventieth year when he came back to Canada, and had no time to wait for the slow fruition of a far-seeing policy. The greater issues, in any case, were largely beyond his ken.

Before he left France, and before the news of the Lachine Massacre had reached Paris, a drastic plan for curing the troubles of Canada had been conceived

there. This involved an attempt to capture New York by a double attack from the sea and by land. It never materialised, but is of interest as indicating trends of policy.

In default of men and means for such an effort, Frontenac, soon after his arrival, began to make preparations for raids on the English colonies. It is necessary to be clear about the distinction between the two schemes. The proposal made in Paris was one of conquest, the intention being that the lands conquered should be held. Frontenac's raiding-parties, on the other hand, were wholly of the Indian type.

The Indian method of carrying on war, from which the French Canadians suffered so much, was a natural product of their stage of social development and of the characters of their lands. Its main features had been noted by Champlain at the time of his first contact with Algonquins.[1] By means of their snow-shoes in winter and their canoes in summer, the Indians could move swiftly and silently, but their weapons were not sufficiently elaborate either to make an attack on a defended position easy, or to inflict great damage when two armed parties opposed one another. Their aim therefore was always to attack by surprise, and, since wholesale slaughter of enemy warriors was rarely possible, to strive to diminish the supply of future warriors. This was achieved both by the massacre of the helpless and, quite frequently, by carrying off boys to be adopted into the victorious tribe in order to increase its strength. Even though the Indians soon became skilful in the use of firearms, their traditional methods persisted.

By this time the French Canadians, constantly exposed

[1] p. 39.

as they had been to Indian attack, were as adept as the Indians themselves in this mode of warfare, and had lost some of their earlier disgust at the cruelties it involved. To us the idea that the suffering inflicted at Lachine could be assuaged by deliberately subjecting other white women and children to similar agonies seems too horrible for words ; but there is no evidence that this aspect of the case struck anyone in Canada. Frontenac not only attacked undefended settlements, but attacked them with Indian auxiliaries, knowing as he must have done what this would mean. His attacks also were made with no idea of immediate conquest ; they were a deliberate return to methods which Europe was beginning to outgrow. Their advantages, from his standpoint, were clear. They required few men and little material ; they utilised the services of the " coureurs de bois," and this was a way of proving that these rebels against authority had a part to play in the economy of the colony. This was important to Frontenac who was so keenly interested in the western fur trade. The development and maintenance of that fur trade depended upon constant supplies of energetic and not too scrupulous wanderers, and the proof that these could be used as irregular troops was useful to him in his conflicts with his internal critics. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the raids impressed the Indians, which was their main motive.

On the other side, even if we leave out the question of humanity, the policy was a dangerous one, as Frontenac might have learnt from the Iroquois. Their rise to a dominating position was due to two main causes, acting together. In the first place the lands in which they dwelt formed a natural unit, and in the second the

five distinct "nations"—the Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas and Senecas—had formed a combination which could not be broken up by force or guile. The Iroquois were "the people of the long house"; the term, originally applied to the family dwellings because of their shape, came by extension to mean their territory. The fact is significant. It meant that if the Indians generally had arrived at the stage of organisation into tribes, the Iroquois alone had taken the further step and had become a people. He who attacked the Mohawks at one end of the "long house" was necessarily an enemy of the Senecas at the other. This was not as yet wholly true of the English colonists who, if the analogy be permitted, were still almost at the tribal stage. An attack on New York aroused no particular emotion in New Hampshire. But the lands of the English colonists formed a continuous strip, and it could not be doubted that adversity would speedily teach them both the need for combination and its advantages. Frontenac shrank from an attack on the Iroquois "long house," and thought that the scattered settlements of New England and New York, were easier game. A broader view would have shown him that this was likely to lead to the building of a wider and longer "house" than that which he hesitated to attack.

Three separate raiding-parties were organised at Montreal, Three Rivers and Quebec respectively. The fact is interesting as it reminds us that these were the three focal points of Canada. The Montreal party was ready first, and started in mid-winter. It consisted of some two hundred men, of whom nearly half were Catholic Iroquois from the mission villages near Montreal. The route was the usual one by the Richelieu,

Lake Champlain and the upper Hudson, and the attack was made on Schenectady.[1] Practically no resistance was offered, the settlement was burnt, and men, women and children massacred. Schenectady was but a short distance from Mohawk territory, and there were thirty Mohawks within the town when it was attacked. They were not harmed by the raiders, the French doubtless fearing for the loyalty of the Catholic Iroquois in their party if their kinsfolk were injured. The commanders indeed were careful to inform these Mohawks that the French had no quarrel with them, but only with the Dutch and English. This rather crude diplomacy failed of its purpose, however, for the Mohawk chiefs were very indignant at the raid on Schenectady, regarding it as a "breaking into their house." A band of Mohawk braves, with some young men from Albany, pursued the retiring French and inflicted some loss upon them before they reached Montreal. This was an indication that if attacks on the Hudson-Mohawk area were topographically easy, from a military standpoint they held risks. The New England colonists were safer game.

The second raiding party left Three Rivers towards the end of January, 1690. It was much smaller and included Frenchmen, Abenakis and a few Algonquins from the St. Lawrence area. The route taken is of interest. From Three Rivers the party crossed to the mouth of the St. Francis,[2] and followed this river till it was possible to cross the water-parting to the region at the head of the River Connecticut. That river flows in a valley parallel to the Champlain-Hudson trough but lying further to the east. From its headwaters it was possible to reach the shorter rivers flowing in an easterly

[1] Map IX. [2] Map Va.

direction through New Hampshire and what is now Maine. In winter of course the rivers were ice-bound, so that canoes could not be used, but Indian winter trails tended to follow the line of the summer routes. The raiding party wandered through the woods for some weeks and finally attacked the settlement of Salmon Falls, a few miles inland from the present town of Portsmouth. The attack was again "successful," and the usual slaughter of women and children, including infants, followed.

The third party left Quebec also in January and followed the River Chaudière and then the Kennebec.[1] It consisted of French Canadians and converted Akenabis, and, since its movements through the hill country were slow, its members joined with the group which had raided Salmon Falls before making any attack on their own account. The objective was Fort Loyal, corresponding to a part of the present city of Portland in Maine. Here some attempt at defence was made, but this was overcome, and, despite promises made to the commander of the fort, the women and children were abandoned to the Indians.

The English colonists were goaded into attempting reprisals, though the time to make these effective was not yet. New York, with help from the New England colonists and from the Iroquois, attempted to make an attack on Montreal, which failed. Massachusetts boldly sent Sir William Phips by sea to take Quebec, an expedition which ended in an ignominous retreat. Meantime Frontenac obtained a signal proof of the immediate effectiveness of his tactics. In July of this year of 1690 a large band of Indians, belonging to

[1] p. 59.

a number of tribes, arrived at Montreal from Michilimackinac, now the great western focus of the fur trade, with large supplies of furs. They were followed a few days later by more canoes, manned by French traders and also carrying furs. One of the Indian orators made a long speech to Frontenac, urging him to attack the Iroquois as well as the English and reminding him what good bargains the English and Dutch traders gave as compared with the French. He made it clear, that is to say, that these western Indians would trade with the French if they could not reach the English, but that they required to be protected against the Iroquois and that they expected to be rewarded for their "loyalty" to the French. Frontenac promised everything required of him, though he could not, in point of fact, even protect Canada from Iroquois raiding-parties that summer or for some years to come. He did however succeed in rousing great enthusiasm among all the Indians assembled at Montreal. The spirits of the Canadians were also raised, and the furs meant money, which was badly needed. This being so the fact that no real settlement had been arrived at was for the moment obscured.

After the first enthusiasm aroused by Frontenac's successes had died down, matters seemed to fall back into much their previous state. There was, however, the real difference that he had put new heart into Canada, and that supplies and troops were being sent out from France. The Iroquois continued to block the western fur route and constantly raided the colony itself. Now, however, they encountered resistance instead of passive endurance, and raiding as an amusement began to lose some of its charms. They reproached the English of New York with leaving them to bear the

brunt of the war, and stirred that colony up to do something on its own account. The something was an attempted raid on Canada in 1691, by the Lake Champlain route, which did not accomplish much. After it as before Iroquois war parties wandered through Canada and in 1693 Frontenac was provoked into sending a retaliatory expedition to attack the Mohawk towns. The usual "success"' was obtained, but it was followed by a terrible winter march back to Montreal. Generally it may be said that the proof that the Richelieu-Champlain-Hudson route was equally convenient as a line of attack for the peoples dwelling at either end of it soon tended to lead to a tacit agreement that each should let the other alone. Both French and English had Mohawk auxiliaries, and the odds were too even for Indian methods to be worth while.

Very different was the situation in New England. Here the English had no Indian helpers to guide them through the winter woods, and the French had more than one motive for hounding on the Abenakis to attack them. These Indians were the advance guard both of Acadia and of the lower St. Lawrence, and though the New Englanders had shown no great disposition to attack either area till they were roused by the unprovoked French raids, once the game of reprisals had begun it had to go on. Further, if Phips' expedition showed that it was no longer, as in Kirke's time, easy to take Quebec from the sea, yet Acadia presented less difficulty, as had indeed been already shown by Phips. On the principle that the best defence was attack, especially attack with cheap allies like the Indians, the French encouraged the Abenakis to burn, pillage and massacre. A further motive was that the Abenakis

showed some signs of coming to terms with the New Englanders, and it was necessary "to break the peace," a form of diplomacy which, at least in the way in which it was practised, the French learnt from their Indian allies. The Abenakis had two motives for wishing to agree with the English. The first was that the latter had lately shown by various signs that they were by no means always helpless before Indian attack. The second was the usual one that when it came to trade the English could supply the much desired European goods in greater quantities and at cheaper rates than the French.

The Abenaki attacks, with French aid and encouragement, went on for several years, and were often accompanied by great barbarity. Little real military success was obtained, but the New Englanders were roused to an intensity of hatred which was to have important future results. Denonville had been accused of stirring up a hornets' nest and letting the hornets escape, but Frontenac's policy turned communities originally peaceful into fierce enemies.

But New England was somewhat remote from Canada, and in the year 1693 an event took place there which showed that Frontenac was really achieving something. He did make a determined effort to give some measure of protection to the western Indians in whose hands the fur trade lay, in order to forestall possible fresh negotiations between them and the Iroquois. In the summer of the year named a large band of Indians, accompanied and protected by "coureurs de bois," arrived at Montreal with loads of beaver skins. These had been accumulating at Michilimackinac since 1690 owing to the way in which the Iroquois had beset the routes, and their arrival caused general rejoicing in Canada.

The incident had its effect on the Iroquois no less than on the Canadians. It was one of several indications that the former were unable to carry on continuous warfare against a civilised foe, and raised the question whether even the attempt was worth while. War, as it was now conducted, demanded constantly renewed supplies of munitions. These could only be obtained from the English in exchange for furs. The furs again had to be sought in the forest, or obtained from the Indians of the interior by barter, and either process demanded the services of the adult males. Thus the whole problem resolved itself into a question of economics. In the Iroquois social polity there was no distinction between hunter, trader and soldier, and if the men, who had to carry on all three functions, were to spend most of their time in fighting, supplies of furs, and thus of munitions of war, of the means for effective hunting, and of the other European goods which had now become necessities of life, were bound to diminish. The original Iroquois attacks on the Hurons, which in a sense started the whole cycle of events, were made from a desire to extend the hunting grounds of the confederation. But now the ownership of hunting grounds was in itself of less value than of old. The Iroquois would have been content enough to leave other Indians in possession of these provided the furs which they yielded passed through their hands. They had learnt, that is to say, the elementary economic fact that once trade is established the real power belongs to the middleman rather than to the producer. Why should they waste their strength on raids which accomplished nothing when they might gain more from peace ?

Negotiations were therefore opened up with Frontenac,

though the attempt to detach the western Indians from the French alliance was also continued. No immediate success was obtained, each party wanting more than the other would give. Frontenac also felt himself growing stronger, and in defiance of orders from Paris he proceeded to re-occupy ruined Fort Frontenac, as an indication that he was ready for a forward policy. This was followed, in 1696, by a great expedition against the Onondagas, the central tribe of the confederation. In spite of his age Frontenac took the field in person, and the attack, naturally, was made by the St. Lawrence, past the restored Fort Frontenac to Lake Ontario, and then by the Oswego River. Again most of the warriors escaped, and the attack was chiefly on crops and dwellings.

Very important, however, was the fact that the English of New York, who heard news of the expedition before it arrived, made no real attempt to support their nominal allies. After it had left they sent their sympathy and also supplies of corn to replace that destroyed by the French, but, in relation to the resources of the two parties, this was less than the Mohawks had done after the French attack on Schenectady.[1] The Five Nations would scarcely have merited their reputation for intelligence if they had failed to appreciate this fact.

Again they began to negotiate with the French, but Frontenac was near his end. The peace of Ryswick also was signed the following year, though the news did not reach Canada till 1698, shortly before Frontenac's death.

The removal of his personal influence retarded negotiations, and it was not till 1701 that peace was finally made between the Iroquois and the French. In the same year

[1] p. 174.

two other events took place, which showed that if the Iroquois had now lost for ever their proud position as an independent community prepared to contest the French right to settle Canada, many difficulties still remained. The first of these events was the establishment of a permanent French post at Detroit where, as we saw on p. 154 a fort had previously been built in 1686, to be abandoned later. This station as time went on steadily grew in importance and it meant that, with the wearing down of the Iroquois, the centres of the French fur trade in the interior were shifting to the east, and were thus being brought nearer to the English zone. The Jesuit station of Saint Esprit in the south-west of Lake Superior [1] had diminished in importance in favour of Sault Ste. Marie, and then Michilimackinac had become the great focus. Now the founding of Detroit, combined with the re-occupation of Fort Frontenac, meant that the route to the interior by the Ottawa was losing significance as compared with that by the upper St. Lawrence and Lakes Ontario and Erie. The stage was thus being set for the great conflict between the French and the English for control of North America. In this area that conflict, as we have seen, was based upon the struggle by the French to hold the longitudinal route defined by the St. Lawrence and the feeders of the Mississippi, as against the cross, or English, route of the Great Lakes and the Mohawk valley, leading to Albany and so to New York.

The second event was the English, and Iroquois, response to the menace of the new station at Detroit. The Iroquois, at Albany, put their totem marks to an agreement which admitted first that the lands in which

[1] p. 130.

they dwelt were under the control and protection of the English Crown. It was not till the signing of the treaty of Utrecht in 1713 that this part of the agreement received international sanction, but synchronising as it did with the Iroquois pact of peace with the French, it was significant enough. Secondly, the same document conveyed to the King of England a wide area claimed as the hunting grounds of the Iroquois confederation. The area so assigned definitely included the site of Detroit on which the French were already established, and extended to Lakes Michigan and Superior. The Iroquois retained for themselves the right of hunting over this wide tract, but made over a sovereignty which they did not in point of fact possess. It was tantamount to saying that the two European powers might fight out the question of the ownership of the interior between them, without calling on the Iroquois braves to assist either the one or the other. They, quite definitely, had had enough.

Thus the net result was that at the very beginning of the 18th century, thanks to Frontenac's energy, the Iroquois peril was practically disposed of, and the way seemed open for that permanent advance into the interior of the continent which was the aim nearest to Frontenac's heart. One small point is, however, worth notice here, because it reminds us once again of the danger of looking at historical events purely from the military standpoint and neglecting the economic background.

We have already spoken of the settlements of Catholic Iroquois within Canada, especially at Caughnawaga or St. Louis. For a very obvious reason these settlements were chiefly of Mohawks. The Iroquois tribes which abutted on Lake Ontario and the lower end of Lake

Erie came to be, to a greater or less extent, under French influence. They were near the French zone and direct contact was possible. The Mohawks on the other hand, from a like cause tended to turn towards the English. In consequence it was desirable, whenever converts were made among the latter by the French missionaries, that these should be removed from the influence of their heathen countrymen. In practice, however, even the separation in space did not break all ties between the two groups. One result was amusing. The Catholic or mission Mohawks had, from their position on the St. Lawrence highway, access to the furs brought down by the Indians of the interior. The heathen Mohawks —heathen because the attempts made in New York to send Protestant missionaries among them did not amount to much—had by Albany access to the cheap English trade goods which entered through New York. Albany wanted furs; Montreal wanted trade goods for carrying on its own commerce with the Far Indians, and the supplies which arrived through Quebec were often inadequate and always dear. Between Albany and Montreal also stretched what from the Indian standpoint was an excellent highway. What was likely to happen? Whether England and Canada were at war or at peace, the Caughnawaga Iroquois contentedly took furs down to Albany and brought back trade goods to be sold to the French fur traders. The trade was of course illicit, "Canadian" furs had no business to find their way to Albany, nor had English goods any right to enter Canada; but too many separate groups of individuals found profit in the interchange for it to be easily stopped. Once again, that is to say, it was proved that the conception of Canada as a water-tight compart-

ment, the conception which prevailed at Versailles, had little relation to the facts.

If also we return to our former analogy of trade as a fluid, we may say that the fact showed that, just as with water, when one outlet is stopped the current of trade swells till it finds a way out by another. When the furs from the west were prevented from entering the natural route made by the Mohawk valley they—like the flood water of an earlier geological period—poured seawards through the Champlain-Hudson furrow.

CANADA, NEW ENGLAND AND ACADIA: THE TWO COMBATANTS AND THE VICTIM

Map X. Acadia and the Lower St. Lawrence.

Acadia in the limited sense was the peninsula now forming Nova Scotia; in the larger it included an undefined area on the adjacent mainland.

CHAPTER X

Canada, New England and Acadia: The Two Combatants and the Victim

WE have just seen that, at the very beginning of the 18th century, the worst of Canada's troubles seemed over, and the way open for a steady advance. It is true that in 1702 war broke out once more between France and Britain, but the Home Government showed no particular desire to carry on warfare in North America, having its hands full elsewhere. The English colonies, also, asked only to be let alone, and the conflicts which speedily occurred were not of their seeking. But before we say anything of the renewed fighting and of its scene of action, we have to consider the reason why the French of Canada failed to take full advantage of the apparently favourable position in which they stood.

La Salle, it will be remembered, had not only reached the Gulf of Mexico down the Mississippi, but before losing his life (1687) in the first ill-fated attempt at settlement in the south, had claimed for France a vast area under the name of Louisiana. After his death the first real settlement on the Gulf was initiated in 1699 by Iberville. Thus at the beginning of the new century the dream which had vaguely haunted the minds of the great Frenchmen from early days seemed on the eve

of realisation. On the St. Lawrence the French were now firmly established; settlement was beginning near the mouth of the Mississippi; thanks also to the great French explorers, the easy lines of access from the Great Lakes—that is, from the water which flows to the St. Lawrence—to the feeders of the Mississippi were well-known. Not till 1727, when the Gulf settlements were nearly thirty years old, did the English of New York show signs of a desire to advance to the interior by the cross-route of the Mohawk. In that year a governor of New York supplied from his own pocket the funds for the building of Fort Oswego on the south shore of Lake Ontario. But the French had built a permanent post at Detroit in 1701, and had, at intervals at least, held the Niagara portage area since Denonville's attack on the Senecas in 1687.

It is all the more remarkable, then, that the French, when the field was their own—for Dongan's successors showed little of his energy—were so slow to establish themselves firmly. Not till 1718 was New Orleans established at the mouth of the Mississippi, and only a few scattered posts in the wilderness ensured the safety of the line of communication between the Gulf and Montreal. The middle of the 18th century had come before a governor of Canada thought it necessary (in 1749) to make a definite attempt to claim the line of the Ohio, the easiest and most direct route to the south.

Two separate problems thus present themselves. Why did the French not seize their chance when as yet there was no opposition? Why did the English not make an advance on their own account? The two are of course connected, for an English threat of an advance would have spurred the French to activity.

Royal Canadian Air Force

ENTRANCE TO ANNAPOLIS VALLEY

In the background the narrow channel leading from the Bay of Fundy, and the wide Basin. In the foreground the mouth of Bear River with the surrounding cultivated lands. The town of Annapolis lies in the main valley some miles to the right of the picture.

To the first question there are certain obvious answers. The holding of the longitudinal route, whether that be thought of as defined by the ways from Lake Michigan to the Illinois, or from Lake Erie to the Ohio, was not worth while so long as there was not much traffic along it, and there could not be much traffic while the Gulf settlements were small. There was not a little jealousy also between Canada and the young sister colony to the south. The former feared the loss of population, which might be drawn off by the hope of finding richer lands and a better climate ; it feared also the loss of its furs, which might similarly be pulled southwards. Again, the Gulf settlements grew very slowly. There was no spontaneous emigration from France ; the various trading companies had no interest in the growth of cultivating communities ; the emigrants sent out were not of the right stamp : these and similar reasons can be, and have often been, elaborated in much detail. But there was more than this.

It is easy for us, knowing as we do what was future history for the Canada of 1701, to say that, practically speaking, that year marked the end of the Iroquois menace. In Canada at the time this was by no means clear. Only twelve years had elapsed since the Lachine massacre, only nine since Madeleine de Verchères, a girl of fourteen, had for a week kept a party of Mohawk warriors at bay, and that at a post twenty miles downstream from Montreal. The reputation of the Iroquois long outlived their actual power of doing harm. If Lachine was helpless in 1689, if even the Seigniory of Verchères was not safe in 1692, no spread of settlement upstream from Montreal was likely to occur in the early years of the 18th century, and only the occupation of

the shores of the nearer lakes by a settled community could have kept them permanently French.

There is still another point. We have seen that the journeys which led to the opening up of the interior of the continent were due largely to extra-official action. La Salle had been regarded by his enemies as a mere *coureur de bois*; Frontenac had been accused of befriending these outlaws; he had re-occupied ruined Fort Frontenac in defiance of the royal command: these are but some of many signs that even exploration—much less occupation—of the interior was no part of Louis XIV's original plan. The reason is clear enough. An agricultural colony established and at first maintained by royal aid, and placed within direct reach of the ocean, could be ordered and controlled from France, was for all practical purposes a part of France. Men living in the wilderness and on its products could snap their fingers at royal orders. What could the King give and what could he take away which mattered much to them? How could he even reach them? Under these circumstances, and given Louis XIV's attitude to the problems of life and government, could he be expected to follow up the wanderers and attempt at the moment to hold what they had found largely in defiance of his will?

His action in endeavouring to hold in leading-strings the colonists whom he sent out has often been contrasted with the attitude of the British Government to the English colonies, much to his disadvantage. But there is something to be said on both sides. The descendants of his colonists continue to follow the lines he marked out for their forefathers. Between the British Government and the freer English colonies there was friction

nearly from the first, and when the former did finally make an effective attempt to aid the colonists in their struggle with the French of Canada, this was promptly followed by the revolt of the colonies. It might be said, with some show of justice, that the latter waited till the Mother Country had given them, at the cost of blood and treasure, freedom to expand, and then almost at once flung off the yoke, relatively light though it was. The possibility of the rise of an English Canada, again, from the ruins of Atlantic " England," was largely due to the presence of the French nucleus in what is now Quebec province. It hardly seems then as if it is for us to judge Louis XIV's actions too harshly.

Nor should we think of the absence of an effective French advance into the interior purely as a question of French royal policy. There was a considerable party in Canada who were of the same mind. Broadly speaking, all those interested in the fur trade wanted the interior kept as a preserve from which pelts could be obtained. This was indeed the real kernel of the matter. To us it seems absurd that anyone could think that the vast interior plains, with their wealth of resources, their fertile soil, could remain mere hunting grounds. But we have to remember that the conditions which were to make their development possible did not as yet exist. Vast changes had to take place both in modes of transport and in industrial methods before the value of those lands to the world became apparent.

This last fact helps to explain the apparent indifference of the English colonists in the early eighteenth century both to the trans-Appalachian lands, and to the French discoveries of the easy lines of communication within them. To the colony of New York, as to Canada, the

chief importance of the interior as yet lay in its furs, and meantime the traders at Albany were getting these through the Caughnawaga Indians as middlemen. The colonies south of New York had as yet land enough on the seaward side of the Appalachians, and were little concerned with what was happening in the interior.

The total result is that for nearly half a century after the Iroquois had made their peace with the French, there are few events to note in the region round the Great Lakes, which falls more or less into the background. The centre of interest shifts to the north-east, to the lands of small population and little apparent value where Canada, Acadia and northern New England abutted on one another.[1]

We have already seen that in the lakes region what seemed a mere squabble over beaver skins was in fact an effort on the part of European man to adapt himself to highly anomalous lines of inland communication. If we attempt to trace the quarrel between New France and New England to its source, we may feel at first disposed to say that it originated in a quarrel over fishing rights; for this question crops up constantly. If we look a little deeper, however, it becomes clear that just as furs meant access to land-routes so fisheries meant access to sea-ways. In this case indeed the importance of the control of the sea-ways is so obvious, and had so many direct and indirect bearings, that we are apt to overlook the fact that its value was first appreciated by the parties concerned in connection with access to the rich fishing grounds lying east and south of the island of Newfoundland. The importance of these fisheries again was increased by the relatively infertile nature of

[1] Map X.

the adjacent lands, which forced men's eyes seawards, the ocean yielding a richer and more certain harvest than the ground.

If one draws a line from the south shore of the St. Lawrence, opposite Three Rivers, to Portland in Maine there is cut off to the north-east a roughly rectangular block of land, of peninsular shape, its water-fronts being formed by the River St. Lawrence, the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Atlantic. The chief irregularities are due to Gaspé peninsula, with Cartier's Chaleur Bay at its base, the islands now called Prince Edward and Cape Breton, and the remarkable peninsula of Nova Scotia (Acadia), separated from the mainland by the Bay of Fundy. The whole of this great block is essentially upland, the areas of level and fertile land being small. Originally it was densely forested, and over much of it the forests still persist. Considerable sections, particularly the centre of Gaspé peninsula and parts of what is now New Brunswick, are still virtually devoid of population, and in the early 18th century such settlement as there was, and it was not of great importance, was chiefly confined to parts of the coastal belt. The Gulf coast, including Prince Edward Island and Cape Breton Island, may be said broadly to have had then hardly any white population at all.

On the Atlantic coast conditions were more complicated.

We may note first the physical features, which are uniform southwards till the coast changes in direction and character in the vicinity of Cape Cod. The region is one where natural harbours are frequent; that of Boston to the south may be particularly mentioned.[1]

[1] Map IX.

The rivers are swift-flowing, and so often broken by rapids and waterfalls in their lower reaches as to be of no real use as lines of access to the interior. Especially towards the south, however, patches of reasonably fertile land occur near them. Further, while the richest fishing grounds are formed by the Newfoundland Banks, there is good fishing off the coast of Massachusetts.

This combination of characters goes far to explain the rise of New England. A poor land, agriculturally speaking, and a harsh climate ; a rich sea, good harbours and abundant wood for boat-building ; water power available for driving mills ; a population inured to hardship and trained by adversity in self-reliance ; finally, and not less important, other colonies further south eager for fish, especially as a cheap food for their slaves, and too absorbed in their own wide lands to be greatly interested in sea-trading ; these factors made the New Englander what he was.

As compared with New England, of which the centre was Boston, Acadia was heavily handicapped. Acadia in the limited sense was Nova Scotia, and this peninsula has the peculiarity that its Atlantic Coast is, broadly speaking, barren. The New Englanders had difficulty enough in making a start, that is in finding a way of making the land yield the minimum of food necessary for the survival of the first groups of settlers ; but in the case of Atlantic Nova Scotia there were successive failures, both in the case of the earlier French settlers and the much later English loyalists. The French found that the coasts facing the Bay of Fundy offered better opportunities. The first successful—and for long the only—settlement was in the Annapolis valley, which can be reached by a narrow channel from the Bay.

Here Port Royal (Annapolis) was founded. The valley has certain obvious advantages, of which a relatively mild and sheltered climate is one. On the other hand the amount of agricultural land available was small.

Here, however, another factor intervenes. The tides rush up the narrowing Bay of Fundy with great force, and since on parts of its shores beds of soft rock are exposed, the tidal water is heavily laden with silt. There were originally extensive marsh lands, periodically flooded by sea-water. It was found that, by a somewhat slow and laborious process, these could be reclaimed for agriculture. Dykes were constructed to dam back the flood water till the silt settled, and it was then allowed to run off. The process was repeated till a sufficient thickness of the deposit had been obtained, and it was then necessary to prevent the further access of sea-water, and to wait till the rains had washed out the excess of salt. Such reclaimed lands were—and are—productive, and have the advantage that their fertility can be renewed, when necessary, by a repetition of the original flooding process.

This method of dyking was first practised in the Annapolis valley, but it was found later that it could be employed on a more extensive scale at the head of the Bay, in the Basin of Mines (now called Minas) and round Chignecto Bay, and this led both to an increase of population, and to a certain amount of migration from the Port Royal area.

At the moment, however, the point of interest is that under these circumstances there was no possibility of Acadia competing on equal terms with New England. The settlers of the latter area could subsist on their own lands, and, once the difficult initial stages were passed,

they could develop sea trade, the profits of which supplemented the very moderate yield of their fields, and prepared the way for further developments. In Acadia the small amount of fertile land was remote from that coast which had good harbours and direct access to fishing grounds ; the Acadians, that is to say, had no important supplementary source of wealth and only made slow progress.

Between Acadia and New England there was no definite line of demarcation. What is now New Brunswick formed part of Acadia, but there was a vague no man's land between it and the present state of Maine. There was no colony of Maine, but at the beginning of the eighteenth century there was a certain amount of English settlement in what is now the south-western corner of the state. These settlements were politically attached to Massachusetts, and their inhabitants were of the pioneer type. They were spreading within lands which had previously been occupied by Abenaki Indians, and we have already seen how Frontenac attacked them, without previous provocation, during his second governorship.

Soon after the outbreak of the war of the Spanish Succession, Vaudreuil, who began in 1703 a governorship which lasted more than twenty years, started, in imitation of Frontenac, upon a policy of attack of which the scattered villages and homesteads of New England had to bear the brunt. His motives, according to his own statements, were to prevent the Abenakis going over to the English. In the early part of 1704 he made what—in view of the time and place—may be said to be a full-dress attack on a Massachusetts hamlet. The place was Deerfield on the Upper Connecticut, and the French

raiding party was roughly equal in number to the total population of the village, and consisted of Canadians, Abenakis and Catholic Iroquois from Caughnawaga. Of about three hundred men, women and children in Deerfield less than one half escaped. Many were killed and a greater number carried off as prisoners, this part of the booty being divided between the Canadians and the Indians. We need say nothing of the harrowing details, but some general points are worth mention.

Of the adult prisoners some were later exchanged for French prisoners captured in Acadia or on the sea—this gave the New Englanders a very obvious motive for attacking Acadia in its turn. The French showed great unwillingness to give up those of the child captives who had survived the terrible winter journey, some of whom were the "property" of the Indians. Great efforts were made to convert these helpless children to Catholicism. Similar efforts were indeed made with the adults, but the French willingness to exchange them was largely due to the fact that in their case the priests were much less successful. Of the child converts some of the girls were married subsequently to Indians or to Canadians and some of the boys are known to have married fellow captives later and to have remained in Canada. This process of capture and forcible conversion of English children went on for many years. It will be noted that, like the method of raiding, it was a custom taken over by the French from the Indians [1] who constantly practised similar adoption as a means of making up for war wastage.

At the moment the New Englanders' attempts to defend themselves were not very successful, and they

[1] p. 171.

showed—for similar reasons—some of the helplessness which had characterised Canada in the days of Iroquois attacks. Men were kept under arms to defend the border, a great expense for a small community; but they were never in the right place when raids occurred. Negotiation was tried, but Vaudreuil was as arrogant as the Iroquois had been in earlier days. As one condition he insisted that the New Englanders should cease to fish in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the adjacent seas, a fact interesting as showing that he realised where the real strength of the colony lay. There were cross currents in New England itself also, as there had been in Canada in the days of Iroquois might. Merchants in Boston sent out privateers to intercept the French ships bringing supplies to Port Royal, and other—or perhaps the same—merchants sold necessities to the Acadians and their allied Indians in exchange for furs.

Meanwhile other New Englanders relieved their feelings by attacks on Acadia, as an easy prey. In 1704, after the raid on Deerfield, Church sailed into the Bay of Fundy, and among other actions broke down the dykes in the Basin of Mines so as to destroy the growing crops. In 1707 a futile attempt was made to take Port Royal. There was also fighting in Newfoundland where both the French and the English had fishing stations. All this was merely preliminary skirmishing.

A grandiose English scheme was soon formulated which, though it ended in failure, did at least show trends of policy. This was a plan to take both Canada and Acadia, with the help of the Home Government, then to throw in Newfoundland and eject the Spaniards from the Gulf of Mexico, and so make Queen Anne "sole empress of the vast North American continent." The

QUEBEC IN 1699

From a contemporary map by de Fonville

capture of Canada was to be attained by sending an army against Montreal by the Hudson-Champlain route, and simultaneously attacking Quebec from the sea with the help of ships from England. New York, which had not hitherto been involved in the renewed fighting, was induced to take part.

The actual story of the attempt is soon told. In 1709 the colonial land forces under Nicholson marched to Wood Creek [1] and established themselves there to wait till the news of the arrival of the Home Fleet justified the advance towards Montreal. Other forces assembled at Boston with stores and transports in readiness for the sea attack on Quebec. But the promised Home fleet did not come, and meanwhile Nicholson's force fretted in inaction and was wasted by disease. Finally, in October, word came to Boston that the English squadron had been diverted to Portugal, and the colonists found that all their efforts had come to nought.

New appeals for help were made and English ships were sent the following year. This time the attack on Quebec was abandoned in favour of the easier objective of Port Royal, and, in October, 1710, that fort was taken by Nicholson. This involved the capture of Acadia, though at the moment Acadia was not of very great importance either to France or to England.

One other English attempt to conquer Canada was made before the treaty of Utrecht in 1713 put an end to the war. This was Walker's attempt on Quebec in 1711 with an English fleet. The ships never even reached the vicinity of Quebec, a number of the transports being wrecked on the journey up the river, when the rest of the squadron ignominiously turned back.

[1] Map III.

On the surface the treaty of Utrecht seemed to give much in North America to England, but it left in reality all the essential problems there unsolved. France gave up the contested posts on Hudson Bay [1] which, with the exception of Fort Albany, had been assigned to her by the treaty of Ryswick. This meant less than it appeared to do, and that for two reasons. In the first place the area from which furs could drain to James Bay was small in comparison to the vast interior now known to the French, and inhabited by Indians more or less friendly to them. Secondly, Frenchmen were soon to push north-westwards from Lake Superior, and draw off to the Great Lakes the pelts which had been finding their way to Hudson Bay by the Nelson and Hayes Rivers.

Again, England retained Acadia, though its boundaries were not defined. This was a bitter blow to the French, even if Cape Breton Island (Île Royale) and the other islands at the mouth of the Gulf were left to them. They lost their fishing stations in Newfoundland but preserved certain fishing rights. The treaty also acknowledged that the Five Nations were subjects of England, which in effect gave New York its opportunity, even if this was not taken advantage of at once.

All this might sound very satisfactory to plenipotentiaries in Europe, but it meant little in North America. Did it for example mean that New England would get the needed protection for its frontiers? It was very soon shown that it did not. Then again, if in Europe the contemptuous abandonment of the barren, desolate island of Cape Breton, with Prince Edward Island and the rest, to the French, while Nova Scotia was kept,

[1] p. 151.

seemed diplomatic enough, to the peoples on the spot the matter took on a very different aspect.

Nova Scotia, with some two thousand poor settlers, had no particular value, and Cape Breton Island might well have seemed to have none. But the New Englanders' attacks on Nova Scotia, from the time of Phips onwards—he had himself incidentally taken Port Royal—had always been part of larger schemes involving Quebec. Its real importance to both parties lay not in its poverty-stricken settlements, but in its position as an intermediate station between Boston and Quebec. Could not Cape Breton Island be made to take over this function? An affirmative answer was speedily forthcoming. More than this, Acadia in the larger sense, no less than the French stations in Newfoundland, were, as we have seen, nearer the best fishing-grounds than New England, even if the New Englanders had worked the fisheries on a greater scale. Could a better centre not be found in Cape Breton Island than Acadia yielded from which these fishing-grounds could be reached? Again the answer was in the affirmative. Access to fishing-grounds also was not a matter purely of economics. It meant a more rapid growth of population than was possible in communities dependent on that slow process of reclaiming lands from the sea which prevailed in Nova Scotia. It meant also ship-building, and the growth of a sea-faring population. These factors had already given strength to Boston, a strength which could be used in time of war. They might similarly give an increase of strength to the French, and if they did it would certainly be used in an attempt to recapture Acadia and menace New England afresh.

Finally, in admitting English suzerainty over the

dwindling Five Nations the treaty raised, but did not solve, even more difficult questions. Who was to be the heir of the lands which the Confederation were losing their power to hold? If, as the treaty seemed to imply, it was to be the English, what were the real limits of those lands? Were they constituted by the area under actual occupation or had the Iroquois a real right to make over to England the vast hunting grounds over which their warriors had once roamed? [1]

Leaving aside at present this last problem, which was still in the future, we may note shortly the chief events in the north-east during the years which immediately followed the peace. As just hinted, France immediately concentrated her attention on Cape Breton Island, or Île Royale as it was named, building there the great fortress of Louisbourg. The harbour of Louisbourg, it may be noted, had previously been known as Havre aux Anglais, it had been, that is to say, formerly used by English fishers as a haven. Other inlets had been similarly used by fishers of other nationalities, Cape Breton Island having been a fishing centre for some time though there was no settlement in the strict sense. Means, material and soldiers were sent out to Louisbourg from France. The question of a civilian population was more difficult to solve, for the adjacent area was unproductive. A small number of fishers was transported from the former French settlement of Placentia in Newfoundland, and pressure was put, through the usual agency of the Catholic Church, on the Acadians to migrate voluntarily. This effort met with but small success, the Acadians preferring to remain in their own homes. The attempt made trouble, however, and the

[1] p. 182.

Acadians were encouraged to think that the English occupation of Nova Scotia was only temporary. England in point of fact for a long time took almost no notice of its new acquisition, while under the new régime the Acadians increased in numbers, and reclaimed more and more land.

But though the motherland took no particular interest in Nova Scotia, and though the delicate question as to the precise meaning of the "Acadia" of the treaty in terms of territory was left unsolved, in the hope of avoiding new disputes, the latter question at least was a very practical one to the New Englanders. If we leave out of account Nova Scotia and the narrow neck of land connecting it to the mainland, we may say broadly that the coastal strip from the vicinity of Boston to the Gulf shore of what is now New Brunswick is a physical unit. In particular there is no natural line of demarcation between the present state of Maine and the province of New Brunswick. It was, therefore, to be expected that once the New Englanders had established themselves firmly in the region round Boston, they would extend steadily to the north-east, colonising more and more lands as their power of adapting themselves to a not very favourable environment increased. This natural trend had been checked less by nature than by man, by both the Indians and the French.

As regards the Indians we have to note first a curious contrast between Canada and New England. We have seen that Cartier's Indians of the Huron-Iroquois group had disappeared from the shores of the St. Lawrence before Champlain arrived there. The Algonquin hunters of his time consented to allow the French to settle—at the price of aid against their enemies—because the pre-

existent fur trade had made clear to them the value of French friendship. In other words in Canada a limited amount of cultivation was superimposed after trading relations had been already established. Practically, conditions were reversed in New England. There the settlers were first cultivators and later traders. They had indeed to learn from the Indians how to grow maize ("Indian corn"), and how to maintain themselves in an area where the task was difficult enough. In essence this meant that colonists and Indians were competing against each other for the better lands, and that the success of the former meant the ousting of the latter. It is of course true that in the long run the same thing happened elsewhere; throughout the whole continent the Red Man went down before the White. But the point is merely that in New England, as contrasted with Canada, the conflict was early and acute; the English could not, as did the French, insinuate themselves into lands previously emptied, for all practical purposes, by Indian warfare.

The next point is the intervention of the French in the quarrel between the English and the Indian, and their persistent efforts to prevent it dying down. Here we have to be clear both as to the deeper motives which prompted French interference, and as to the trends of policy in which they became entangled.

Before Champlain laid the foundations of Quebec, but after his first visit to the St. Lawrence area[1] he was engaged with de Monts in an attempt to form a settlement in Acadia. A disastrous winter was spent by de Monts on an island at the mouth of the St. Croix River, the present international boundary between New Bruns-

[1] p. 55.

wick and Maine, which lies between the St. John and Penobscot rivers. This gave the French a prescriptive right to this area before the Pilgrim Fathers left England (1620) for the New World. We need not trouble with all the historical details, and must remember that everything in Acadia was on a small scale, and that its early history was involved. But there was during the later seventeenth century a more or less persistent attempt on the part of the French to develop Acadia in the larger sense. This attempt had a threefold basis. What is now New Brunswick yielded furs, a post on the St. Croix River being one not unimportant centre. The Gulf Coast from Cape Breton Island to Chaleur Bay had a few posts from which fishing was carried on, with accessory resources in the form of furs and some timber. We have already seen that agricultural settlement was practically limited to Nova Scotia, the people engaged in it being the Acadians of history. Throughout the whole region friendly relations with the Indians were carefully fostered, Catholic missionaries being as usual the agents employed.

If then with the loss of Nova Scotia the French on the one hand concentrated on Cape Breton Island and the Gulf Coast, it is clear that they would also wish to keep their hold in the undemarcated area between the St. Croix river and the most northerly English settlements. A very obvious motive was that Frontenac had used the Chaudière-Kennebec route to attack the English settlements, and there was always the fear that, if the English colonists were allowed to spread northwards unmolested, they might use that route for a land attack on Canada. In time of peace direct French attacks were impossible, but the Indians could be used as catspaws.

This was in point of fact what happened. Though Massachusetts made an independent peace with the Indians at the time of the treaty of Utrecht, and thereafter English settlers began once more to extend northeastwards along the coast of what is now Maine, the Indians were secretly encouraged to continue their attacks. A Jesuit missionary, Sebastien Râle or Rasle, was a particularly active agent in stirring up the Indians, doing this with Vaudreuil's sanction and countenance. Raids of the usual type went on till Râle was killed in 1724, but it was not till 1726 that a real peace was concluded between the English and the Indians. If then there was nominally peace between France and Britain from 1713 till 1744, for nearly half that period there was a kind of war in New England, while elsewhere the interval was largely spent in manœuvring for position. In North America at least, that is to say, it was clear to the parties concerned that stability had not been attained in 1713.

A NEW FRENCH POLICY AND AN INCONCLUSIVE WAR



MAP XI. EASTERN CAPE BRETON ISLAND, TO SHOW POSITION OF LOUISBOURG

A shows the site of the former French fortress, B is the terminus of the railway from Sydney, and the site of the small present-day settlement. Sydney owes its modern importance mainly to its coal mines. The fact that the site of Louisbourg is now unoccupied shows that its former importance was due entirely to the conflicting interests of the two Powers concerned. The site had no intrinsic value.

CHAPTER XI

A New French Policy and an Inconclusive War

WE have seen that the years immediately following the treaty of Utrecht showed that it had left all the four sets of people in the north-east corner of the continent dissatisfied and restless. The French of Canada were sore over the loss of Nova Scotia, the New Englanders aggrieved at the rise of Louisbourg, soon to become a centre of privateers who preyed on their commerce and threatened their livelihood. Though the Acadians multiplied steadily, and had no real cause of complaint against their new rulers, yet their position was obviously an awkward one. The Home Government, under whose control they were, was passive and indifferent, and their lands lay athwart the route between the French of Louisbourg and the New Englanders, each of whom was eager to attack the other. Finally, the Abenaki Indians had real enough grievances against the New Englanders, who had displaced them from their lands, and little cause to thank the French for making them the instruments of a tortuous policy.

If all this is the negative side of the treaty, it had one notable positive effect—it soon led the French to put into words a claim for wide dominion throughout the continent. Hitherto there had been a wide gap between

official French policy and the dreams of the great Frenchmen. So early as 1720, however, Father Bobé, priest of the Congregation of Missions, drew up a statement setting forth the view that the English in North America were intruders on what was in reality French territory, and had no right to remain there without French consent. Three years later a similar position was maintained in an official document. In both cases the gist of the actual proposals made was that Britain should give up voluntarily Nova Scotia with Port Royal (Annapolis), and that in return France should recognise the right of the English colonists to occupy a coastal strip from the River Kennebec to South Carolina, a strip to be limited westwards by the Appalachian Uplands. From about this time, therefore, the desire to shut the English definitely out of the interior began to influence official French policy. We must be clear what this policy meant in terms of actual territory, and also note why it was incapable of realisation, and the reason why so much fighting had to take place, and so many years to elapse, before that fact became clear to the French and to the world.

As regards territory the scheme meant that the French, despite their comparatively small numbers, proposed to hold against the more numerous English four separate areas, of varying size and importance. These were :—Settled Canada ; Acadia in the larger sense ; the whole region through which passed the portage routes from the Great Lakes to the Mississippi ; and, finally, the unknown or little known further west, up to the limits of the Spanish zone, and the distant north-west.

Of the first area, that is essentially Canada between

Montreal and Quebec, we may say that since Kirke's day French rights here had not been seriously contested by the English, and even the attempted attacks had been of the nature of reprisals for French raids. Acadia in the larger sense included Nova Scotia, the islands, New Brunswick and part of the present state of Maine. The French desire to hold this region had many different sources. There was the original right based on exploration and the early attempts at settlement. We may, however, note, without detail, that there had not been continuous French ownership since de Monts' day. In point of fact the treaty under which France held Nova Scotia in 1710, when Nicholson took Port Royal, only dated from 1667, and in the intervening period Phips had taken Port Royal in 1690, though it was not kept. The English colonists had always maintained that they had a prior right to Acadia. Apart from this disputed question of real ownership, Acadia had some value to Canada because of its resources, notably the reclaimed lands of Nova Scotia, the furs and timber of New Brunswick, the sea fisheries worked to some extent from the Gulf and Atlantic coasts, and, quite as important, the friendly Indians of the whole area, who constituted an important source of man power, even if it was usually injudiciously used. But by this time the question of the safety of the line of communication between Canada and France out-weighed all these points, as is shown by the energy and wealth lavished on Louisbourg, while Port Royal had been more or less neglected.

This point requires some detailed consideration. What made early agricultural settlement possible and, relatively speaking, easy between Montreal and Quebec was the fact that the great estuary of the St. Lawrence

provides a waterway by which the northern end of the Appalachian Upland can be rounded, and direct access thus obtained from the sea to the St. Lawrence Lowlands. Those Lowlands are only a narrow north-eastern extension of the vast fertile plains of the interior of the continent, but the point is that nowhere else can the latter be reached directly by water from the Atlantic. Even the access from the Gulf of Mexico, which looks so easy on a small-scale map, proved in practice difficult. If, indeed, there were such a thing as a " natural right," apart from the power to occupy and to hold, then one might say that the French had that right to the interior plains of North America ; for they had discovered them, settled a part of them and had held the north-eastern entrance to them from Champlain's founding of Quebec in 1608, and the southern one from the founding of New Orleans in 1718.

But if Quebec was the river gateway of Canada, the sea entrance was at the mouth of the Gulf, and Canada could not communicate with the motherland, or even with any part of the outside world, unless she were sure of holding the wide sea-door. Here two difficulties at once present themselves. First, there is a marked discontinuity, from the human standpoint, between the Canada of the St. Lawrence Lowlands and the oceanic margin. This is true both of the shorter land crossing from Quebec to the Bay of Fundy, and of the longer seaway from that town to the Atlantic coast of Nova Scotia. The lands which had to be traversed in the first case, the coasts skirted in the second, were quite unsuited for European occupation in early days, are still for the most part scantily peopled, and in some parts remain in almost their original wild state. There is no

VIEW ON THE LOWER ST. LAWRENCE, SHOWING ICE-SMOOTHED ROCKS

satisfactory natural land-route between Quebec and the Atlantic east of the Chaudière-Kennebec line, and, even if there had been, the main line of communication would necessarily have been the waterway. Owing to the characters of the intervening coasts, however, there was no centre of population between Cabot Strait and Quebec itself. Once past the sea-door, that is to say, there was nothing to stop an enemy ship—save as in Walker's case a leader's stupidity—from sailing right up to Quebec. Similarly an enemy fleet could lurk in the Gulf or the lowermost part of the river, and intercept ships coming to Quebec with supplies, without fear of molestation on its own account. On his way up the Gulf, Walker put into Gaspé Bay without interference, though nearly two hundred years had elapsed since Cartier erected his symbol of French sovereignty there.[1]

Given this fact, the second difficulty was to find a suitable point—or points—near the seaward entrance of the Gulf itself, by means of which the fairway could be kept open for French ships, and stopped for enemy ones. Here at first sight one might be disposed to say that the French showed a certain lack of foresight, for Louisbourg was not founded till 1713, apparently very late, while Halifax was an English fortress founded by the English Government in 1749. But the fact that Louisbourg and Halifax alike were artificial creations, owing their origin to military action on the part of the two Great Powers concerned, suggests some of the difficulties. It was not possible to find in the Gulf area any site offering advantages comparable to those of Quebec. That town has an admirable natural position for defence and was easily fortified; it commands the

[1] p. 16.

fairway of the St. Lawrence, and, till the days of railways, could only be easily reached by the river; it had around it fertile land which made it self-supporting, and allowed for the growth of a civilian population. Neither Louisbourg nor Halifax shows anything like the same combination of advantages.

In the case of Louisbourg the difficulty of feeding the population as the town grew was so great that attempts were made, not with very great success, to persuade some of the Acadians to migrate from Nova Scotia to Île St. Jean (Prince Edward Island) and start agriculture there. A colony was actually founded in the island in 1729, but it grew slowly. We have however to remember that Cape Breton Island is almost a part of Nova Scotia, for the Strait of Canso, which separates the two, is only three-quarters of a mile wide at its narrowest point. The influence of Louisbourg was strong among the Acadians, particularly those of the settlements in the Basin of Mines and in Chignecto Bay, and it drew a considerable part of its resources from those two areas. The steady growth of the Acadian settlements in both areas in the period 1713-1744, indeed, was largely due to the fact that their inhabitants found in Louisbourg a market for the corn and the meat which their fertile lands produced. The point is then, that if the leaving of Cape Breton Island to the French seemed on the surface to satisfy their need for keeping the fairway open, in point of fact Louisbourg was not self-supporting, and its foundation only made the French desire to get back Nova Scotia the stronger. That is to say, the causes which led to the permanent loss of Nova Scotia, the antagonism between the French and the New Englanders, resulted in making it more valuable to the

former than it had been in earlier days. Conversely, this antagonism increased the New Englanders' desire to keep it and to add Cape Breton Island, because of French intrigues among the Acadians, of the fishery question and of the actions of French privateers.

The gist of the argument may be summarised by saying that the apparent advantage of the lower St. Lawrence, the way in which it permitted an advance towards the interior to be made without the tedious crossing of the Upland, was in the sequel largely nullified from the French standpoint by the fact that the approach was as easy for a foe as for a friend. Cartier first showed that the waterway led to lands occupied by agricultural Indians. Champlain proved that the lands vacated by those first Indians could be cultivated by Frenchmen; but a combination of historical accidents led him to antagonise the Iroquois. Frontenac was led by a similar combination to antagonise the New Englanders, and the fatal continuation of his policy by others brought home first to New England, and later to the Mother Country, both the weakness of the outer defences of Canada—that is the opportunity—and also the need for overthrowing the authorities there before a permanent peace could be won for the dwellers on the Atlantic side of the Upland.

If we turn next to the third area claimed under the new official policy, that containing the lines of access to the Mississippi, we find again that what seem at first sight factors favouring the French scheme, were in reality obstacles in the way of its realisation. Superficially those favouring factors are two in number. There was first of all the water continuity from Quebec to the furthest extremities of the Great Lakes, and

second the low divide between Lakes Erie and Michigan and the feeders of the Mississippi. But, just as in the case of the lower St. Lawrence from Quebec to the outer margin of the Gulf, the physical continuity of the waterway from that town to the ends of Lakes Superior and Michigan masked a discontinuity from the point of view of occupation. There was here in addition an actual discontinuity from the point of view of water traffic.

The first point has been already emphasised, and without naming all the stations held, it is sufficient to recall that French occupation above the Montreal area was limited to widely separated posts, most of which had a chequered history. As examples we may note Fort Frontenac, built, abandoned, re-built; the fort at Niagara, first built in 1678, re-established in 1687, replaced by another fort in 1720; Detroit, where the first stockade dated from 1686, and the real fort from 1701; Michilimackinac, where the mission station established about 1670 was kept as a trading post till the building of Detroit seemed to deprive it of usefulness, and it was abandoned, to be hastily reconstructed in 1712.

As regards the interruptions in the waterway the most spectacular, that made by Niagara Falls, proved in some ways less important than those formed by the rapids between Fort Frontenac and Montreal. The real significance of Niagara lay in the fact that its presence made the French slow to realise the importance of the easy lines of access to the Ohio from Lake Erie. But the rapids on the upper St. Lawrence, combined with the Iroquois menace, meant, as we have already seen, that the region round Montreal marked in reality the upper end of French Canada.

Finally, the low divide between the lakes and the Mississippi, and the ease with which that river could be descended to the Gulf of Mexico, led to a diversion of French interest to a rival colony on the Gulf coast; and that just at the time when it seemed as if they might have been able to extend settlement from Montreal to the nearer lakes. Thus it may be said that while the French left the widely-open sea-door of Canada unprotected when they might have made it fast, they were so occupied in closing the land-door at Montreal against the Iroquois that they failed to notice that it opened on a route by which cultivators might have streamed into a productive region. Throughout the French period indeed it was only a postern gate through which small parties of traders, missionaries and explorers sallied forth, followed intermittently and reluctantly by officials and soldiers, always liable to be recalled on an alarm. Obviously the lands reached in this fashion could not be held once the antagonism of the English had been thoroughly roused.

Of the fourth area included in France's larger claims in the North America continent, the remoter west and the far north-west, we need say little beyond noting that the story of its exploration illustrates some of the worst features of the later French régime. The main journeys were carried out by the Verendrye family, though they had both predecessors and successors. In 1728 Pierre de Varennes de la Verendrye was in command of a small post on Lake Nipigon,[1] and heard from the Indians of the neighbourhood wonderful stories of the Western Sea and of the lines of advance towards it. Like Champlain and La Salle before him he was seized with a desire

[1] Maps VI and VII.

to test by personal experience the accuracy of the Indian accounts. He experienced the usual difficulty in obtaining permission to set out. Eventually it was granted to him on the customary condition that he should defray all expenses out of his own pocket, recouping himself, if he could, by fur trading in the areas visited. Since his own means were small he was obliged to supplement them by borrowing money from his friends, on the security of his expected profits.

A start was made in 1731, and the journeys of the elder Verendrye and of his sons were continued for more than a decade. We must not stop to consider the details of the route followed on the first journey, interesting though these details are, for their interest is derived from their bearing on much later history. It may be sufficient to say that Verendrye climbed the short but steep slope which leads from the shores of Lake Superior to the divide separating the waters which enter that lake from those flowing, by way of Lake of the Woods, to Lake Winnipeg and so to Hudson Bay. During the following years he established a number of posts on the rivers entering Lake Winnipeg, including one on the future site of the city of Winnipeg. By means of this series of posts he was able to tap the furs of a rich district from which the pelts had hitherto been going to the English on Hudson Bay,[1] and divert these towards the Great Lakes. With the aid of his sons also, extensive journeys were carried out far within what is now the western United States, though the original plan of reaching the Western Sea (Pacific) was not achieved, and it is even doubtful if the Verendryes really saw the Rocky Mountains.

[1] p. 150.

For us the point of importance about these journeys is simply that once the Verendryes had shown that the area round Lake Winnipeg was rich in furs, and had made clear the main features of the complex drainage relations, the usual results followed. They became objects of envy to rival traders, and the intendant Bigot, who was notoriously greedy and corrupt, appears to have robbed them shamelessly. Thus even when the energy of individual Frenchmen led to the discovery of new resources and new routes, neither they nor Canada benefited—the profits went to dishonest officials. It was but one more illustration of the fact that the two lines of French development, that occurring within the colony and that outside it, were too divergent to make common action possible, and without such common action the idea of French domination in the continent west of the Appalachian Upland was impracticable.

It may be said that this argument really proves too much. It seems to suggest that at the end of the second decade of the eighteenth century, when the French scheme of domination was definitely formulated, Canada was already ripe for a fall; and that fall was still remote. But one has to remember that as yet Canada had no organised and united foe in front of her. It is difficult to avoid the use of such terms as "the English colonists," but not only were the settlers on the Atlantic coastal area far from being all English, there was also no such unity as a general term seems to imply. The separate colonies had divergent interests, practised more than one form of religion, lived under different social and political conditions, and while adjacent colonies carried on more or less chronic feuds with each other, all had bones of contention

with the motherland. Not till Canada, by repeated blows, had hammered them into something resembling cohesion were they able to offer sustained opposition to her designs. As for the Home Government it may be said that it took only an intermittent interest in American affairs, and at times of crisis tended to regard them as of minor importance. The result was that, up to the date of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748)—which settled nothing—a consistent policy on the part of Canada was opposed only by more or less isolated actions on the part of the colonists.

We have already noted shortly what happened in the Acadian area in the years immediately following 1713. Till war broke out again in 1744, the other chief events took place in the areas where the colony of New York and Canada came into contact with each other, and among them the founding of the rival forts of Niagara (1720) and Oswego (1727) is significant.

The French object in establishing themselves firmly at the point where the Niagara River enters Lake Ontario [1] was, on the surface at least, the usual one of commanding the western fur trade, of which Detroit was becoming an important centre. The Iroquois resented the building of Fort Niagara as threatening to deprive them of freedom of movement and of choice of markets. But French influence with the Senecas finally wrung a reluctant consent from the confederation, more especially as the Governor of New York made no protest. The latter did, however, shortly do something more effective in constructing Fort Oswego where the Oswego river enters Lake Ontario.[2] In regard to this

[1] Map XII. [2] Map III.

station we have to note first that it was an outpost, much as Forts Frontenac and Niagara were outposts of Canada, and had no organic connection with New York colony. In position also it showed certain analogies to both. They were posts on the longitudinal waterway which—despite its interruptions—led from Lake Erie to Montreal. Fort Oswego was on the transverse route which leads from Albany to Lake Ontario and can be continued westwards by the Trent River—Lake Simcoe route to Georgian Bay,[1] and so to the further west. But Fort Oswego had the great advantage of lying opposite the point where the two routes intersected on Lake Ontario. Its apparent disadvantage, the fact that a portage was necessary between the headstream of the Mohawk and the small stream (Wood Creek) which leads to Lake Oneida, from which the Oswego River could be reached, was less important than it seems, for on the longitudinal route a portage was necessary at Niagara.

The immediate effect of the establishment of Fort Oswego was to divert part of the western fur trade to Albany. It was indeed primarily a trading-station, though a small garrison was maintained there at Crown expense, and was constructed with the consent of the Five Nations, just as Fort Niagara had been. On the surface then it would appear that the French had no real cause for complaint, for Niagara was nearer the area from which most of the furs were now coming, and would seem therefore to have had the advantage. A difficulty from their point of view was that the Indians, when a choice existed, preferred the better and cheaper English goods to the French ones, and showed a tendency to pass Fort Niagara with their loads and go on to Fort

[1] Map IV.

Oswego. Further, the Iroquois took part in this trade in their usual capacity of middlemen, and Fort Oswego thus tended to direct their wavering policy towards the English side.

But the French resentment of Fort Oswego, which was deep and lasting, had another source. Insignificant as the fort was, its presence was a possible menace to their command of Lake Ontario, which was now essential to them. Frontenac had, for all practical purposes, disposed of the Iroquois danger, and had in the process stirred up the wrath of the New Englanders, and thus indirectly brought about the loss of Acadia. Now it was clear that the virtual collapse of the Iroquois had led only to the appearance of a new and more serious rival on the shores of Lake Ontario, and this at a time when the lake had become a supremely important link in a long line of communication. The blow was indeed a heavy one.

At the time no direct action could be taken. At Quebec it was resolved to attack in force, but this would have meant war, and as the French Crown was not yet prepared for war, permission was refused. A message was sent to the English officer at Fort Oswego telling him that he must abandon and destroy the post; naturally no notice was taken. Then the French endeavoured to incite the Iroquois to drive the English out of their territory, and were met by the contemptuous retort that they could do the job themselves.

Meantime the inhabitants of New York colony grudged the money necessary for upkeep, and showed no consciousness of the larger designs with which they were credited by the French. It was the French misfortune that the next step which they took was one which, in

the sequel, was well fitted to drive home to the New Yorkers the need for a corporate policy to oppose that of the French.

This step was the building by the French, in 1731, of a massive fort—not a loop-holed trading station like Fort Oswego—at what the English called Crown Point [1] and the French Pointe à la Chevelure. This point marked the junction between the narrow, river-like upper part of Lake Champlain and its expanded lower part, and the fort was placed on the western bank on a site actually claimed by New York as lying within her frontier. The opposite shore of the lake here was claimed both by Massachusetts and New Hampshire. That is to say the French fort was definitely within English territory and remote from Montreal. In this case there was not even the pretence of trade, and the excuse that the fort was meant to protect Montreal could not stand in view of the fact that a fort had already been built at Chambly. Crown Point was indeed soon to be used as a raiding centre, and was never anything but a menace both to New England and to New York. No effective efforts were made however to prevent its construction, a very striking example of the lack of any sort of unity among the English colonies.

It is thus clear that when war began once more the French had two strongholds, both virtually within enemy territory, from which attacks could be made. These were Louisbourg and Crown Point, and their relative value, oddly enough at first sight, proved the precise reverse of what one would have expected.

The military governor at Louisbourg heard the news of the declaration of war in 1744 before it reached

[1] Map III.

Boston, and proceeded to act promptly, if with some ineptitude. He sent a large party against the little fishing village of Canso, obtained its surrender, and burned the houses to the ground, taking the inhabitants prisoners. Canso was a fishing hamlet on the Nova Scotian side of the Strait of Canso,[1] and at its Atlantic end. It was inhabited by a few Englishmen when it was taken, but had been for many years a considerable centre for the cod fishery, used first by the French and then by the English. The point is important, both generally, because it emphasises once again the way in which the question of sea-fisheries crops up constantly in connection with this area, and at the moment, because to interfere with the Atlantic fisheries was the surest way of arousing Boston to a tempest of wrath.

Duquesnel, the governor of Louisbourg, attempted to follow up this first easily-won success by an attack on Annapolis, with Indian auxiliaries, as a kind of warning as to what might be expected if the town surrendered after resistance. The attempt was an utter failure, though it seemed as if it ought to have succeeded, Annapolis being very inadequately defended.

By this time the blood of New England was up. Louisbourg seemed to its people an enemy which threatened, not like the Canadians and Abenaki Indians in earlier days, the lives of settlers in the backwoods, but the very existence of the colonies. The four New England colonies, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire and Rhode Island, but not, be it noted, New York nor Pennsylvania, combined to raise a force to attack the fortress, Massachusetts taking by far the largest part, and Rhode Island virtually backing out.

[1] Map X.

A merchant, William Pepperell by name, was chosen as commander, and after some initial delay a British naval squadron under Commodore Peter Warren joined forces with the colonial party. The rendezvous was Canso, which the French had made no attempt to hold.

The whole story of the expedition may be read in full, with not a few humorous details, in Parkman's "A Half-century of Conflict," and Sir Charles Lucas gives a briefer and more sober account ("History of Canada," Part I). Rash as the enterprise seemed it was crowned with success, and Louisbourg capitulated on July 17, 1745—"in truth a wonderful feat." It was garrisoned by New England troops for nearly a year, and then taken over by Crown forces, who remained for three years only. For, to the profound disappointment of New England, Cape Breton Island and its stronghold were given up by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), and the French re-entered in 1749.

During the course of the war the French made unsuccessful attempts to re-capture Louisbourg and to take Annapolis. These do not come into our story except in so far as they made it increasingly clear that the position of the Acadians was an impossible one. Nominally British subjects they were, particularly those of the settlements at the head of the Bay of Fundy, under French influence, and within reach of French raiding parties. The English had consented to their remaining "neutral," but neutrality was difficult under the circumstances, and no effective protection was given to them by their nominal rulers.

If we turn next to Crown Point we find that it served as a base from which French raiding parties could attack

English territory. The colonists showed in regard to it an ineptitude in marked contrast to the courage and energy displayed by the New Englanders in the siege of Louisbourg. The reason is fairly clear. Shirley, the governor of Massachusetts, could and did carry with him in the latter venture not only the powerful support of Boston, but, to a greater or lesser extent, that of all the other coastal settlements of New England. A threat to the Atlantic fisheries was one which furnished a motive powerful enough to render combination in New England possible, despite the minor squabbles which, in normal times, led to disunion.

But the colony most directly concerned with Crown Point was New York, and Clinton, its governor, had difficulties enough with the local Assembly, with the Dutch traders of Albany—who were still carrying on the contraband fur trade with Montreal—and with the Iroquois. The two other colonies within reach of raiders from Crown Point were Massachusetts and New Hampshire, and they both showed a certain languidness in regard to the effective protection of the small settlements on their inland borders, in marked contrast to their energy at Louisbourg. There had been disputes in regard to the precise territorial limits of the two, and after these were settled there were rather sordid squabbles as to which colony was to bear the expense of constructing and maintaining the necessary frontier forts. It was indeed one of the great disadvantages of the English method of settlement, that by which small parties pushed out into the apparently illimitable backwoods, that these frontiersmen had often no protection in time of war save that which they could afford themselves. There was nearly always an interval before the

colony claiming the land thus settled, appreciated its responsibilities towards the new settlements.

But if Massachusetts and New Hampshire showed themselves neglectful, conditions in New York, for the reasons we have given, were far worse. The danger to the important town of Albany was considerable, even if no real military operation was undertaken from Crown Point by the French, and the problem was complicated by the presence of the Mohawks, swift to recognise signs of weakness in their allies. The only defence of Albany towards the north was Fort Saratoga,[1] a small Dutch settlement lying 36 miles away, which formed the furthest outpost of New York colony in that direction. The " fort " consisted of a stockade, manned by a very small garrison, but early in the war it was reported to be incapable of effective defence. Neither the merchants of Albany nor the colonial Assembly would supply the funds necessary to put the post in proper condition, and Clinton ordered the withdrawal of the handful of soldiers.

In 1745 the helpless farmers were attacked by a party of Canadian and Indian raiders. The village was burnt, a number of the inhabitants killed, and a still larger number carried off as prisoners. After this attack the Assembly of New York consented to vote the funds necessary for re-building the fort. That their consent was reluctant, as well as tardy, may be concluded from the fact that the soldiers sent to the re-constructed post were not furnished with adequate supplies. Again, therefore, the governor intervened, and in 1747 the garrison was once more withdrawn and the fort burnt. The Mohawks, whose friendship was important, were highly disgusted at the apparent want of spirit shown,

[1] Map IX,

and the withdrawal made it possible for French and Indian raiders to seek scalps, booty and prisoners almost up to the confines of Albany.

To the French Indians indeed raiding the borders became a sport which combined excitement with profit, for a ransom could be obtained for prisoners. Abenakis, Catholic Iroquois from near Montreal, Algonquins from the Ottawa, all took part, and even the " wild " Indians of the remote west left their beaver-hunting to lend a hand. The " hunting-grounds " ranged from the northern part of New York right along the New England border to and beyond the Kennebec, and save that the Mohawks were occasionally induced to carry out retaliatory raids, and that now and again stalwart pioneers offered resistance, there was little risk involved.

This being so it is curious to find that the indefatigable Shirley had not only large schemes on hand for following up the taking of Louisbourg by the conquest of Canada, but that, on paper at least, a large measure of success was obtained in getting the much-to-be-desired combination between the different colonies. The attack was planned for 1746, while the enthusiasm roused by the capture of Louisbourg was still glowing brightly, the Home Government was to give important aid, and the attack as usual was to be a double one, by land and sea.

The really interesting point is the number of the colonies which expressed willingness to raise levies. Massachusetts as usual took the largest part, but, in addition to New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Connecticut, New York promised a substantial contingent, and New Jersey, Maryland and Virginia offered bands diminishing, naturally enough, with progressive distance from the scene of action. Pennsylvania found its

Quaker principles to be opposed to official action, but men were raised on private initiative. The contemplated attack on Canada never materialised, but it was resolved that Massachusetts and New York together should at least strive to take Crown Point. Fear of an attack on Boston by the French led, however, to the recall of the Massachusetts troops, and Clinton's intractable Assembly would neither allow him to make the attack, nor even to build the forts necessary to stop the raids. These went on till peace was declared in 1748, a peace which appeared to leave the parties where they had been at the outbreak of war. Emotions had been roused, however, and lessons learnt which were soon to have their effect on history.

THE BEGINNING OF THE FINAL STRUGGLE



MAP XII. TO ILLUSTRATE THE STRUGGLE FOR THE UPPER OHIO AREA

CHAPTER XII

The Beginning of the Final Struggle

IN the war discussed in the last chapter large-scale military operations had been confined to the Acadian area, and there only had the English achieved any notable success. Crown Point in the Hudson-Champlain trough had been used by the French as an advanced base from which to carry out raids, and in this region the English had shown marked inertia. Finally, though Fort Oswego had stood for many years on the shore of Lake Ontario as a silent threat to French control of its waters, no fighting had as yet taken place there. In the new war which was soon to come, a fourth zone of contact, that of the Upper Ohio, was to be added to these three, and, in addition to it and to Acadia, the shores of Lake Ontario and the Hudson-Champlain trough were to be scenes of activity. Before, however, we can say anything of the Ohio region and of the new war, we must be clear as to the position in the other three areas, and the motives influencing the antagonists in each.

As we have seen the French re-entered Louisbourg in 1749, and the same year saw the foundation of the English fortress of Halifax on the Atlantic coast of Nova Scotia. The giving-up of Louisbourg at the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was on the surface a mere matter of

exchange, the English receiving back in return Madras which had been taken by the French. That is, it appeared as though the capture of Louisbourg was regarded simply as an incident in a world-war, of no particular importance. One might, however, equally well maintain that its return was an admission that the French were entitled to ensure the safety of the sea-way to Quebec, and to take part in the rich cod-fisheries off the mouth of the Gulf. From that standpoint the foundation of Halifax was similarly an admission on the part of the Home Government that the New Englanders had likewise a right to have the safety of their fishing fleet and of their sea-trade guaranteed. It might reasonably be hoped, that is to say, that the relative position of the two strongholds would prevent either party from passing from defence to offence, while giving both a measure of security for their essential needs.

If, however, anyone did argue along these lines, events soon showed that such a view had no justification. Halifax [1] was on the otherwise uninhabited Atlantic coast of peninsular Acadia, Louisbourg on the otherwise almost uninhabited Atlantic coast of the most important of the Acadian islands. Behind both was inhabited Acadia, with its main centres of population at (1) Annapolis, (2) round the Basin of Mines, and at (3) the head of Chignecto Bay, that is within the narrow isthmus which connects Nova Scotia with the mainland. So far as ease of communication was concerned, the two latter centres of population were nearer to Louisbourg than they were to Halifax. The unfortunate Acadians themselves were largely passive, desiring only to be let alone and allowed to till their lands in peace. This the

[1] Map X.

English Government would have been content to leave them to do, at the price of an oath of allegiance.

But from the French standpoint the problem was complicated by another issue, which may best be appreciated by recalling the fact that to-day Halifax is the winter port of Canada. Obviously Louisbourg was the winter port of French Canada, even if the statement meant much less in the 18th century than it does to-day. If that is to say, Louisbourg was to play its part as an outpost of Quebec towards the danger zone of the Atlantic, then it must have means of communicating with Canada at all seasons of the year, and since sea communication is blocked by the ice of winter, a land connection had to be kept. An advance of New England settlement along the coast of what is now Maine towards the Bay of Fundy, a spread of effective English control throughout the Nova Scotian peninsula and then by the isthmus to New Brunswick, would separate Louisbourg completely from Quebec for a part of the year, and nullify largely its value. The actual frontier between English Acadia and French territory was left for settlement by commissioners at Paris, but after prolonged wrangling the commission broke up without coming to any decision, both parties making ridiculously large claims.

In point of fact, however, it was less actual territorial limits than the Acadian people which made the problem. A large part of Nova Scotia, practically the whole of New Brunswick, and almost the whole of the islands known to us as Cape Breton and Prince Edward were not only uninhabited wastes, but proved remarkably resistant to such attempts as were made to bring them under cultivation. The English at Halifax, and at the

later settlement of Lunenburg to the south-west, experienced the same difficulty in getting suitable settlers as the French had had previously at Louisbourg. In both cases it was easy for those in high places to say that a considerable town was to rise at a given spot; it was much more difficult to ensure the birth of a self-supporting population by an official decree. Without such a population, loyal to its rulers, the mere holding of land was of little importance, as had indeed been shown by the fact that the English had held Nova Scotia continuously since 1713 and had made practically no impression upon it.

By this time the Acadians numbered 12–13,000, and had not only solved the problem of self-support within certain particular areas, but could, as we have seen, produce an agricultural surplus. Thus they constituted an asset of some value to both parties, but particularly to the French, who were determined to hold fast to the wide area between the Bay of Fundy and the St. Lawrence, and had not lost hope of confining the English to a part only of the peninsula.

Further the French had at their disposal two powerful weapons with which to terrorise the unhappy Acadians. One of them was the Church, and Le Loutre, the vicar-general, had no scruple in using its spiritual power to coerce his flock. The other was formed by the Micmac Indians, who were strongly under French influence, and could be used both to attack the English, and as a menace to recalcitrant Acadians. Under this double pressure many of these were forced by the French to leave their cherished lands, and to attempt to settle anew in Île St. Jean (Prince Edward Island), or in Cape Breton Island, or on the mainland beyond the small

stream in the isthmus which marked provisionally the Franco-British frontier.

In the course of a few years this enforced emigration involved some 3–4,000 persons, who suffered great hardship in their exile, for their whole social policy was based on the dyked lands on which they had prospered, and they showed a great want of adaptability under other conditions. The majority, who remained within Nova Scotia, were kept in a state of unrest and uneasiness which stirred up the English against them, and was soon to lead to their final expulsion (1755). Meantime, however, it is sufficient to note that by the year 1750 two rival forts, French and English, faced each other across the narrow boundary stream in the isthmus. One was the fort of Beauséjour, the other, Fort Lawrence, was placed not far from the ruins of the Acadian hamlet of Beaubassin, which had been deliberately destroyed by Le Loutre in order to force its inhabitants to cross the stream to French territory. If then the official outbreak (1756) of the Seven Years' War was still six years off, it was fairly clear that trouble was brewing in this quarter. Louisbourg and Halifax, it is true, faced seawards and not towards each other, but between Halifax and Fort Lawrence lay the hostile Indians and the doubtful and hesitating Acadians, while by the Gulf coast Louisbourg could both stretch out a hand to Beauséjour, and carry on intrigues alike with the Indians and the Acadians within English territory. Except by sea Halifax was to all intents and purposes cut off.

Turning next to the two other areas where French and English had been in contact with one another before 1748, the shores of Lakes Ontario and Champlain, we

find that in both, so far at least as the English were concerned, little change took place immediately after that date. It is interesting to correlate this fact with the other that, when fighting began again, the English made little or no headway in either area, and this although the Iroquois had in earlier days for long kept the French at bay by attacks from the Hudson and Mohawk valleys. We cannot put this down to the military inferiority of the English to the Iroquois ; nor only to the fact that they had allowed the French to seize and fortify the strategic points unmolested, though this proved very important later. It was rather that, in sharp contrast to Acadia, no motive existed here strong enough to override the divergent interests represented in the English communities involved, and make preparation for the future possible. New England had taken a large part in the capture of Louisbourg, and had to undergo the mortification of seeing it handed back to the French. Despite the rise of Halifax they saw in it a perpetual menace to their command of the sea, and never faltered in their passionate desire to see it once more laid low. The foundation of Halifax, again, showed that the Old England and the New were at one in their response to a threat to sea power. But the colonists of New York as a whole were little interested in Fort Oswego, and saw no sufficient reason for responding to the threat of Crown Point when there was always the hope that other colonies might have to bear the brunt of French attacks from it. The Home Government also seemed to take no particular notice of border raids and border squabbles, which were the concern of the colonies.

There was more even than this. The chief persons

Photo by Miss M. Munro

THE NIAGARA GORGE

The Gorge, produced by the recession of the Falls, is about seven miles long, and it was this great stretch of rapids, rather than the Falls alone, which made the Niagara portage so formidable

interested in the lines which led from the Mohawk to Lake Ontario, and from the Hudson to Lake Champlain and so to the St. Lawrence, were the fur traders, particularly the Dutch traders of Albany, and both their interest and their inclination urged them to sit still. Despite the fort at Crown Point the "illicit" trade between the Caughnawaga Indians and Albany still went merrily on. The chief agents on the French side, humorously enough, were now two Canadian ladies and a Jesuit priest at the Caughnawaga Mission, though it was said that various influential persons in Canada were also involved. Under these circumstances any New England desire to prepare for a future land attack on Canada by constructing border forts in this region was likely to encounter much passive resistance in New York colony.

Similarly the rum and cheap goods obtainable at Fort Oswego were causing the western Indians to bring their furs there to the neglect of Fort Frontenac and the partial neglect of Fort Niagara. Furs were all that the area west and south-west of Lake Ontario had meantime to offer, so that action was more likely to take place from the French than from the English side. In 1749, indeed, the French built Fort Rouillé (Toronto)[1] in a further attempt to stop the Indians going to Fort Oswego. A little later they established also a trading post at the Niagara portage, above the Fort, with the same object in view.

As a further indication of French activity in the Lakes area we may note that they were now making strenuous efforts to convert the fort at Detroit into a settlement capable of supplying agricultural produce to the other

[1] Map VII.

stations. Emigrants were sent there at the King's expense, and were supplied with tools and some amount of livestock to enable them to make a start. In 1750 also a garrison was sent to Sault Ste. Marie, which thus became a fort in addition to a mission and trading station. More important, however, than either Detroit or Sault Ste. Marie was Fort Niagara, which controlled the access to Lake Erie, from which the Ohio could be reached by more than one route. To that area we must now turn.

In describing the journeys of Marquette and Jolliet and of La Salle we have noted the lines of access to the Mississippi from Lake Michigan. The fact that the shorter and easier routes from Lake Erie to the Ohio were so late in being utilised, or even claimed, by France was due primarily to the historical accident that the French in early days always went to the west by the Ottawa-Lake Nipissing-Georgian Bay route. That in its turn was, of course, due to Champlain espousing the quarrel of the Algonquins against the Iroquois. But the reason why the ways to the Ohio leapt suddenly into importance in the middle of the eighteenth century, and were the apparent cause of the new outbreak of hostilities between French and English, are much more complex.

We may begin with the essential topographical facts. West of the Appalachian Upland, within the present United States, there stretches westward to beyond the Mississippi a belt of level, forested lowland, now called the Central Low Plains [1] in contradistinction to the higher, drier, treeless Great Plains of the further west. In the centre of the Low Plains Lake Michigan pushes its long finger southwards, while Lake Erie lies slantwise

[1] Map XIII.

near their eastern margin. To the west of Lake Michigan the drainage of the plains is carried by various rivers to the Mississippi,[1] and we have already seen how low and how narrow is the waterparting that separates the streams flowing to the lake from those which enter the Wisconsin and the Illinois. Further eastward, but well south of the lakes, the great trunk-stream of the Ohio crosses the plains in, broadly speaking, a westerly direction on its way to the Mississippi. It is fed both by streams from the plains and by others from the western edge of the Upland. For us the points of importance are that it is easy to reach its right-bank plain tributaries from the shores of Lake Erie, and not very difficult to reach some of the hill tributaries from the Atlantic side of the Upland by means of passes.[2]

When we remember that the French held both ends of Lake Erie, at Niagara and at Detroit, and that the population in the English colonies of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia was not only already large, but was multiplying rapidly and pushing into the heart of the Upland, then it is clear that a clash in the region of the Upper Ohio was both physically possible and historically probable. Further, it is interesting to note that such a clash was but a repetition—with a difference —of an earlier one.

The French established themselves at Quebec, and first the Dutch and then the English at what is now New York City ; the two groups seemed remote enough from each other to render contact unlikely. But the St. Lawrence led the French in the long run to the shores of Lake Ontario, to Fort Frontenac and Fort Niagara, and the Hudson-Mohawk similarly drew the English to

[1] Map VII. [2] Map XII.

Fort Oswego. The last-named was but a distant outpost, for the very fact that the route from the Mohawk to the Oswego and so to the shores of the lake was so easy led to its occupation by a well-organised Indian community. It was to the interest of the New York colonists to use the Five Nations as middlemen, rather than to seek to displace them by force. Their presence again delayed the French advance to Lake Ontario, and therefore to Lake Erie ; thus they were not ready to take the further step to the feeders of the Ohio until the frontiersmen and fur traders of Pennsylvania and Virginia were also ready to push through the passes which could be reached from their own great Atlantic-flowing rivers. Just because in this case the routes from the coastal plain led to passes and not to a trough widely open at both ends, there was no room in this southern area for a compact grouping of Indians to form a buffer state between the two sets of advancing Europeans. The clash when it came was bound to be sudden and violent. Thus we arrive at the curiously interesting fact that the final conflict began not, as we might have expected from a physical map, on the shores of Lake Ontario, nor even within the other arm of the great central highway, but in a region where nature seemed to have set a barrier between the two rivals.[1]

In order that no element of drama should be wanting also, we find that the main English protest which started the chain of events was made by George Washington, who crossed the hill country on horseback from Virginia, and encountered the French on a streamlet forming one of those waterways by which all their pioneer journeys into the interior were carried out. Champlain made at

[1] Map XIII.

the mouth of the Saguenay his first attempt to use an Indian canoe,[1] and perceived its great advantages even while he lamented its instability in untrained hands. One hundred and fifty years afterwards canoes brought the French to the headstreams of the Ohio, to find themselves in an area which a gentleman of Virginia could reach on horseback from the Atlantic coast. That horseman was the forerunner of the multitudes who were to stream across the plains in horse-drawn waggons and to bring them under cultivation, while the canoe was to be relegated to areas too remote and too barren for cultivation to be possible.

Here then it was not purely a question of rivalry in the fur trade, as it had been in the case of the French and the colonists of New York. That problem was present ; but the fundamental one was whether the plains were to remain hunting grounds or were to be made to carry a settled, agricultural population. The English colonies, in contrast to Canada, could supply the settlers ; had the hill country formed an even more serious physical barrier than it did, yet they were bound to force it in the long run. Washington, a youth of one and twenty, rebuffed by the French, compelled to abandon his failing horse, stumbled on foot homewards ; but the future belonged to the side which he represented.

The first sign of a French advance here dates from 1749, when the governor of Canada sent an officer named Céleron de Bienville to the Upper Ohio valley to affirm French rights there. Bienville was accompanied by a considerable party of regular soldiers, Canadians and Indians, but established no stations, left no garrisons. Formal proclamation of French sovereignty was made

[1] p. 40.

at strategic points, and inscribed plates of lead were buried in the ground as material evidence of the fact; but for this sort of thing it was rather late. The chief practical measures taken were attempts alternately to bribe and to threaten the Indians met with, so as to dissuade them from trading with the English. But before saying anything of the possibility of such trade we have to note the route taken.

Bienville's party embarked in birch-bark canoes above the Lachine Rapids and, with some difficulty, passed the rapids further upstream and entered Lake Ontario. They avoided Niagara Falls by means of the portage road and so reached Lake Erie. Landing on its south-eastern shore they dragged canoes and baggage through the forest for some eight or nine miles to beautiful Lake Chautauqua[1] now best known for its "summer schools." Here they again launched their canoes, and paddled down the shallow brook which forms its effluent. This led them to the Allegheny River, which runs nearly due south to the point now occupied by the great city of Pittsburg. Here another important stream, the Monongahela, which flows south to north, joins the Allegheny, the river formed by their junction being the Ohio. The Monongahela has an easterly tributary, the Youghiogheny, which rises well within the Appalachian Upland.

For us the really important point is that two of the rivers flowing to the Atlantic have cut back so far into the Upland that the distance between their head-waters and the two streams which form the Ohio is short. These rivers are the Potomac, from which the Youghiogheny, and thus the Monongahela, is easily reached, and

[1] Map XII.

a tributary of the Susquehanna, from which it is similarly easy to attain the Allegheny. Under these circumstances it would be a reflection on the energy and enterprise of the inhabitants of Pennsylvania and of Virginia to imagine that trans-Appalachian traffic would not have been established before Bienville arrived on the scene. Traders, to the number it is said of about three hundred per annum, were indeed in the habit of crossing to the Ohio with goods loaded on pack horses, and returning with furs transported in the same fashion. It was said by the French that some of these traders had even journeyed westward to beyond the Mississippi. If this traffic were allowed to continue, and English influence became paramount, it would mean, as the French could not fail to realise, that every line of communication between Canada and Louisiana would be cut. The Central Low Plains, that is to say, are a unit, and once the Appalachian barrier is crossed no other natural line of demarcation exists.

There was another and more immediate danger. The Indians of the interior, always more or less migratory and tending to change in position with the fortunes of the constant internecine wars, had of late years been moving towards the Ohio valley. If the various groups were allowed to fall completely under English influence, the French fur trade would be ruined. In point of fact all the Indian villages passed by Bienville contained English traders, and it was clear that their influence over the Indians was already very strong. In his report indeed Bienville says concisely "the nations of these countries are very ill-disposed towards the French, and devoted entirely to the English."

Meantime, however, we have left Bienville at the

Ohio confluence. He travelled downstream as far as the entrance of the Miami tributary, and then left the Ohio to ascend that river. On its upper reaches he found an Indian village, recently established, and occupied by Indians who had lived formerly on the Maumee River, where the French had a fort. In other words, theoretically they were "French" Indians. Bienville tried—but failed—to induce them to return northwards, where they could be more easily controlled. It was evident that "Old Britain," as the English traders called their chief, was strongly pro-English. This village, called Pickawillany by the English, soon became a great centre for English traders and attracted more and more Indians.

From the Miami Bienville portaged over to the Maumee, and descended that stream to Lake Erie, whence he returned to Montreal. He had made a long round and had shown that immediate action was necessary if France was to maintain her claim to the Ohio country.

For the moment, however, French action was delayed, and the next incident illustrates English reaction to Bienville's journey. In Virginia an Ohio company was founded with the definite purpose of initiating settlement in the Ohio valley—a fact the importance of which can hardly be over-estimated. This was indeed the real danger from the French standpoint. In 1750, the year after Bienville's journey, the new company sent a trader called Christopher Gist to spy out the land. Gist crossed the hill country on horseback over an Indian trail to the Monongahela area, descended the Ohio, noted with disgust the presence of "reprobate" Pennsylvanian traders, for whom as a good Virginian he

had a natural contempt, and found his way eventually to Pickawillany. He crossed the Miami on a raft, with the horses swimming behind—rather an interesting point when we remember Bienville's three-and-twenty birch-bark canoes. In the Indian village he met with a very cordial reception, and he was delighted with the aspect of the lands he traversed, as he might well be in view of their future history. He came back to Virginia to make his report by a more difficult southern route, which led him across the Upland in the region of the Kanawha tributary of the Ohio. He had thus made a round trip comparable to that of Bienville's, except that his starting-point and terminus were in Virginia, while Bienville's tour began and ended at Montreal. The main points of contact of the two routes were the Monongahela area and the village of Pickawillany, and the next point was, which of the rivals would be the first to get to these in force ?

So far it has appeared as if the English had all the advantages on their side ; but their main asset—their greatly superior numbers—could not be realised in the immediate future, and the French may be said to have had more liquid capital. Pickawillany was remote from the English colonies, while it was near the French fort on the Maumee. There were other French stations on the Wabash, a right-bank tributary of the Lower Ohio which, like the Miami, could be reached by a portage from the Maumee.[1] Finally, not far away, there was the growing central station of Detroit, to which Bienville had been sent as commander after his Ohio journey. The strategic point at the Ohio Forks, again, was distant alike from French and from English centres of popula-

[1] Map XIII.

tion, but, in addition, the English had to face the same difficulties as those which had presented themselves previously in the case of Crown Point. The region of the Upper Ohio was claimed as English territory, despite Bienville's lead plates, but it was uncertain whether it fell within the boundary of Virginia or of Pennsylvania. Neither colony was going to take active steps at the risk of the other reaping the benefit. Further, those who held the purse-strings in the two colonies were not yet convinced that a distant and barren frontier, with passes frequented only by traders, was a serious problem. "A set of abandoned wretches," said Dinwiddie, the governor of Virginia, of these traders in 1753 to Hamilton, the governor of Pennsylvania. "A very licentious people," replied the latter. Even if we assume that each was thinking chiefly of those coming from the other colony, it is clear that neither would do more than he was compelled.

The result was that, though there was an interval of passivity on both sides, the French took action first. For a couple of years Old Britain continued to flourish, attracted to his village Indians from all the surrounding regions, and was accused by the French of stirring up all their allied tribes to attack them. Bienville at Detroit maintained that he could do nothing, because even the Indians within its precincts were lukewarm in their allegiance. That the statement was no mere excuse is suggested by the nature of the attack finally made on Old Britain's stronghold. This was carried out by a party of far western Indians, brought down in canoes from the Strait of Michilimackinac by a French trader living in the Green Bay area. Presumably the idea was that these Indians could not have been tampered with by

Old Britain's agents, and were thus reliable. This party came east in the summer of 1752, stopped for a while at Detroit, then travelled on to the mouth of the Maumee, ascended that river and portaged over to Pickawillany. The attack was successful and Old Britain was killed, as was also one of the few English traders present in the town at the time, while two others were taken prisoner and carried off.

Duquesne was now governor of Canada, and was greatly elated at this success. He decided to follow it up by garrisoning the Upper Ohio area and erecting forts at the passes. In the spring of 1753 he sent out an expedition some 1,500 strong, and this time the route by Lake Chautauqua was abandoned in favour of a much easier and better one a little to the south-west. The landing was made at Presqu' Île, where the town of Erie now stands, and a wooden fort was built to guard the excellent harbour there. From this post a road was driven through the forest for several leagues to the shores of a small stream now called French Creek, which flows to the Allegheny.[1] On the banks of the stream a second fort, Le Bœuf, was constructed.

All these measures took time, however, and though they had immediate effect on the Indians, any further notable advance that year was impossible. Most of the troops were sent back to Montreal, and a small garrison prepared to winter at Fort Le Bœuf. It was during this winter that Washington made his appearance with a message from Dinwiddie, demanding "the peaceable departure" of the French. He was received politely but of course obtained no satisfaction.

Leaving the French wintering party at Fort Le Bœuf,

[1] Map XII.

and Washington making his way homewards, we have next to turn to the English side. Dinwiddie had learnt of the French expedition almost as soon as it started, and communicated at once with England. He received instructions to erect forts on the frontier, at the expense of the colony, and to order the French to depart, using force if necessary, if they attempted to encroach upon Virginian territory. His immediate response was the despatch of his protest by the hands of Washington; but he found it very difficult to obtain either the funds for the building of the forts, or the necessary military forces for the advance. Precious time was wasted, and little was done till after Washington's return in January, 1754. His journey had convinced him that the Ohio Forks was the point which must be occupied at once, for there the horseman's trail coming westward from Virginia met the water-route by which the French could come south from the portages connecting with Lake Erie.

The Ohio Company had a storehouse (Fort Cumberland) on Wills Creek, a small stream flowing into the Potomac, and this was to be the English advanced base. From it a trader's path led over the mountains, and in February a small party of frontiersmen travelled west and north-west by this route. They not only arrived at the coveted spot, but had already begun to build a fort when, in April, 1754, the French, who had been reinforced with the coming of spring, appeared down the Allegheny. They trained their cannon on the unfinished structure and demanded its surrender. There was no possibility of effective resistance—the Virginians were obliged to retreat to Wills Creek, while their triumphant opponents destroyed their

rudimentary fort, and erected Fort Duquesne, a better and stronger structure. This was the first round of the conflict, and as yet no blood had been shed.

Washington was at Wills Creek with the small colonial forces, and took action as speedily as he could. A road had to be made through the forested hill country to permit his cannon and waggons to pass, and thus some weeks elapsed before he could advance. While he was feeling his way in the Monongahela region he encountered and defeated a French party, but was himself defeated in a later engagement, and had to retire on Wills Creek. This was the second round and in it lives had been lost on both sides, and those lives not of irresponsible traders but of men in uniform. Though there was still officially peace between England and France, this meant that England was bound to attempt to avenge a defeat sustained by colonists acting on official instructions, and that the fear of English action necessarily induced France also to prepare for war.

In January, 1755, the English Government sent Braddock out with two regiments, and orders to take Fort Duquesne. In February he arrived at Hampton, near the mouth of Chesapeake Bay, and went on by coach to Alexandria on the Lower Potomac, where a camp was to be established. This was his first mistake, for Delaware Bay and Philadelphia would have meant a shorter voyage, and a subsequent shorter land march, and that through a country richer in supplies and in means of transport. At Alexandria a great meeting was held with the colonial governors and a fourfold plan of campaign arranged amid general approval. It was simple, obvious—and, in bulk, totally impracticable.

Braddock was to attack and take Fort Duquesne, the

immediate bone of contention. Not long afterwards, at Philadelphia, Benjamin Franklin, then postmaster-general of Pennsylvania, was asked to subscribe to a fund for buying fireworks to celebrate its capture, and, being a prudent man, replied that he would rather wait to be sure. But in April at Alexandria there seemed to be no doubts.

Simultaneously with Braddock's advance two others were to be made from Albany, one westward to Fort Oswego, whence Fort Niagara was to be taken, and the other northwards to take Crown Point.[1] Both the latter strongholds had been in existence for a long period of time, both were connected with Canada by firmly-held converging lines; in neither case, moreover, had the colonies made any effective preparations for an advance in force. Only the fourth element in the scheme, which involved active measures in Acadia, had any reasonable chance of complete success, for there the ground was prepared. We may note also that, in responding to these four separate movements, the French, save in the case of Acadia, would have the advantage of fighting along inner lines, while their opponents were going to attack along divergent outer ones, and that at some distance from their bases.

We may leave Braddock for the moment trying vainly to collect sufficient waggons for his long journey, and turn to Acadia, where what was done was done quickly. Shirley, the energetic governor of Massachusetts, had taken immediate alarm at the news of French activity in the Ohio area. A report—erroneous as it turned out—that they were contemplating the erection of a fort at the Chaudière-Kennebec portage [2] had enabled him in

[1] Map III. [2] Map IX.

1754 to get money from his Assembly to build two forts on the latter river to protect New England. In contrasting this fresh proof of New England energy with the slackness in Virginia and Pennsylvania which had started the new trouble, we have to remember that the first had had many previous warnings of the danger of an unguarded frontier. Virginia and Pennsylvania had still that lesson to learn, though the time was near when they were also to know the horrors of Indian border raids.

We have already made the position in Acadia fairly clear.[1] The English were in force at Halifax; they held Annapolis, though as a fort it was weak, and also Fort Lawrence; but had no notable bodies of troops elsewhere. Louisbourg counterbalanced Halifax, Beauséjour was stronger than Fort Lawrence, and in addition the French had a post, Fort Gaspereau, on Baie Verte, that is on the Gulf side of the isthmus, and another at the mouth of the St. John River on the Bay of Fundy coast. Further, as potential allies, at least in English eyes, they had the 9,000 Acadians within the English zone, settled chiefly round Annapolis and the Basin of Mines, especially at the Great Meadow (Grand Pré) of Longfellow's poem.

Shirley was keen to anticipate possible French action, and by the end of May of the fateful year 1755 a colonial force sailed from Boston and made for the Chignecto Bay area. Fort Beauséjour was taken with little difficulty, and its capture was followed by the surrender of Fort Gaspereau and the French abandonment of Fort St. John. There remained only one possible danger, that due to the presence in Nova Scotia of the Acadians.

[1] Map X.

They were driven from their homes and transported far and wide over the continent, their green and fertile meadows being left waste and desolate. Despite all that can be, and has been, said in justification of the measure the story of its accomplishment cannot be read without sorrow.

Louisbourg remained untouched and unthreatened. But it was a Louisbourg isolated, a very different proposition from the same town with means of interfering in Acadian affairs. Even in this year of 1755 it was clear that it would remain free from attack only until the English had been sufficiently roused to undertake the enterprise ; we may note that the first attempted attack was made in 1757, the final capture by Amherst and Wolfe occurred in 1758. With Louisbourg isolated also part of the defences of Quebec had already fallen in 1755, which seemed a year of disaster to England.

For Braddock's defeat before Fort Duquesne was not only complete, but occurred at the hands of the Indians with the French forces rather than at those of the French, and was followed, after his death, by a retreat on the part of his second-in-command to Philadelphia. This not only left the frontier open, but, worse than all, the new road laboriously constructed from the station on Wills Creek, now converted into Fort Cumberland, formed an admirable line of advance into colonial settled territory. To the Indians, far and near, the chance of raiding and scalping was a godsend, and French encouragement was scarcely necessary to cause many parties to penetrate well into the zone of cultivation. Once again, that is to say, the French found the Indians economical and, for the moment at least, highly

effective allies, while no memories of former friendship with English traders restrained the eager Red Men. Meantime the excellent Quakers of Philadelphia, who enjoyed complete safety, announced their conviction—natural in the city of "brotherly love"—that the Indians must have been wronged to make them so unfriendly, and stated that their principles forbade them to supply money to defend the border settlements. Their assertion that the reports of murders there had been "greatly exaggerated," led some of the inhabitants to bring the dead and mutilated bodies of their friends and relatives in waggons to Philadelphia to furnish gruesome evidence of the facts. Though a compromise was later arrived at in the Assembly, raiding went on for some years.

It is perhaps needless to add that neither Fort Niagara nor Crown Point was taken. Shirley, with a colonial force, found his way, not without difficulty, to Fort Oswego. But news of the disaster to Braddock's army reached his party *en route* and some of its members were greatly depressed in consequence. The French also were aware of the proposed attack owing to the capture of Braddock's papers, and had taken measures accordingly. They had strong forces both at Fort Niagara and at Fort Frontenac, and even to an amateur soldier like Shirley it was clear than an attack was impossible. One wonders indeed that it had occurred to no one before that with a long and—for the means at his disposal—difficult route behind him, and two enemy strongholds in front, Shirley's plan was fundamentally unsound. In October he turned round and came home again, having left a considerable garrison to strengthen Fort Oswego, and built forts to guard the Great Carrying

Place between the Mohawk and the small stream (Wood Creek) which enters Lake Oneida.

The advance towards Crown Point was more fortunate in that it led to a " victory " of which much was made at the time, though it did not prevent the French being left in a stronger position in the critical area. When the campaigning season of the year 1755 closed indeed, not only was Crown Point still firmly held, but an advance fort had been established at Ticonderoga,[1] at the point where, in 1609, Champlain had won his fateful victory over the Iroquois.[2] At the same time the colonists had at last a post (Fort Edward) on the bend of the Hudson, where the portage route to Lake George began, and another (Fort William Henry) at the upper end of Lake George itself.

To explain how the two parties reached this position we have to go back a little. Braddock's departure from Cork in January, 1755, was known in Paris, and even while diplomatic conversations were being carried on, counter-preparations were made there. A larger force than Braddock's was assembled, commanded by Baron Dieskau ; that was easy, for France was strong on land. But to get that force across the Atlantic in face of British sea-power was a more difficult matter, and it was May before a start was made. Thanks in part to the presence of the outpost of Louisbourg, most of the French ships arrived safely, but two were taken by the English fleet sent to intercept the French one.

It had been intended to send Dieskau to take Fort Oswego, but when news arrived of the proposed attack on Crown Point, he was despatched instead by the Richelieu-Champlain route, with orders to chase the

[1] Map III. [2] p. 62.

provincial troops back to Albany. The latter were commanded by Johnson, a nephew of Admiral Warren, who for many years had been in charge of land belonging to the latter in the Mohawk valley. There he had obtained great influence over the Mohawk Indians, and succeeded in inducing many of them to join his forces Both parties in this case had therefore Indian auxiliaries but Dieskau, just out from France, did not know how to handle these, and found them an unmitigated nuisance while Johnson had nothing to learn in this respect.

The physical features which controlled the fighting are simple. The great Richelieu-Champlain trough forks at its upper (southern) end. The western arm is formed by Lake George, and the eastern by the river-like prolongation of Lake Champlain and the stream (Wood Creek) which enters it. Ticonderoga, to which Dieskau advanced from Crown Point, lies on Lake Champlain at the junction of the two arms of the Y, and if he had stopped there he was bound to encounter Johnson by whichever route the latter tried to advance to the north. But to wait would have offended his dignity as an European general faced with raw colonials He took the route by upper Lake Champlain and Wood Creek, therefore, hoping to trap Johnson at the south end of Lake George, where the latter had a camp, soon to become Fort William Henry. In the fighting which followed the losses were heavy on both sides, but Dieskau was wounded and taken prisoner. Though the remainder of his force got back to Ticonderoga without molestation, the capture of a French general soothed feelings deeply wounded by the defeat and death of Braddock.

Thus the year 1755 ended. Acadia in the larger sense was now thoroughly English, and the Acadians were

banished; but Louisbourg stood firm. The borders of Virginia and Pennsylvania were being ravaged by Indians, that is, the barrier of the Upland had been broken down, but from the inner, not the outer side. The position here was similar to that in New England more than half a century before, but the southern colonies had not New England's opportunities for making flank attacks. Again, while the English had the stronger position in the north and the French in the south, in the critical intermediate area nothing had been settled. Fort Oswego stood solitary, not yet attacked but certainly threatened; at either end of Lake George rose the rival forts of Ticonderoga and William Henry, and each party here had reason to fear the other.

THE CONQUEST OF CANADA



MAP XIII. THE CENTRAL LOW PLAINS OF THE UNITED STATES

The shading indicates generally the western part of the Appalachian Upland; the way in which it is dissected by the rivers should be noted.

CHAPTER XIII

The Conquest of Canada

BEFORE we proceed to tell the story of the final conquest of Canada, as it developed after the preliminary fighting in the year 1755, we may pause for a moment to say something of the effects of the differences between the modes of communication used by the two rivals. We have already hinted that the French use of the birch-bark canoe necessarily involved Indian help, while the English used Indians but rarely. This in turn had great influence on the attitude of the two towards the Red Man, a subject which was closely bound up with historical events.

The birch-bark canoe is a singularly beautiful example of a close adaptation of means to ends, the end in this case being summer travel over a forested area so markedly modified by recent glaciation that, if the phrase be permitted, the land in the warmer season is chiefly water. Not only are the water-surfaces so extensive and so numerous as to make movement by land almost impossible, but stretches of slack water, of areas where the flow is slight or uncertain, are so frequent that any craft which will float, however frail its structure, can be launched in safety. The utility of the typical canoe, therefore, depended on two main factors—a

certain type of country, widely distributed in what is now Canada, and access to the bark-yielding species of birch and to the resin by which the seams were caulked and patches applied to mend rents.

As regards the first point it must be noted that the birch-bark canoe was useless in a region where the rivers were of normal type. It was not used by the Indians of the Atlantic coastal area south of the Mohawk Gap. These, when they travelled by water, used " dug-outs," that is hollowed trunks of trees, which could stand the risks of travel on powerful streams better. Such dug-outs were used even by the Iroquois in the Lower Hudson area. Next, generally speaking, the distribution of the canoe was determined by the range of the particular species of birch yielding the bark, which is a northern form. Other kinds of bark, particularly that of the elm, much used by the Iroquois, could also be employed, but were less satisfactory.

The southern limit of the canoe birch is a line which runs from the mouth of the Hudson westward to Lake St. Clair, and then slightly to the south of Lake Michigan. In other words the Iroquois occupied the area where the tree was approaching its southern limit, hence their use of elm bark.

From what has been already said it is thus clear that the French explorers extended the use of the birch-bark canoe beyond what we may call its natural limits, and into a region for which it was not well suited. In Bienville's expedition [1] one of the difficulties encountered was that in dragging the canoes down the shallow, pebble-floored effluent of Lake Chautauqua the shingle tore off great slivers of bark from the canoes. When

[1] p. 243.

he got well down the Ohio, a stream too swift and powerful for this method of communication, he records mournfully that he had to go on because he had neither bark nor pitch to mend his damaged canoes, and thus could not turn back. Before starting on the Miami-Maumee portage trail he burnt his canoes, and obtained new wooden ones at the French fort on the latter river. He was now in a region where horses were regularly used by English traders, and the clinging to a mode of travel unsuited to the country traversed is striking, and very characteristic of the French in North America.

Before speaking of the reasons for this conservatism let us note some of the contrasts with the Atlantic colonists. Within the hinterland of New England and in Acadia in the larger sense the conditions were at least relatively favourable to the birch-bark canoe. But the New Englanders looked seawards, the boats they built were sea-going vessels, and in all this region it was chiefly the Indians and the Canadians who used the canoe, the latter relying on Indian aid.

The Mohawk Gap was on the margin of the area of distribution of the canoe, both because of the characters of the larger rivers, and because the birch was approaching its limit. Further, though the Iroquois used canoes freely in their expeditions there was, with rare exceptions, not that closeness of social contact between colonists and Indians which was characteristic of Canadians and Indians. Thus we find that when Shirley made his advance in force to Fort Oswego he used wooden boats as against canoes. Because of their weight these had to be dragged on sledges across the Great Carrying Place, and a certain amount of clearing was necessary to accomplish this. The land, in other

words, bore a print of the passage of his force, whereas French journeys left no mark.

Still further south, in Virginia, Braddock's advance involved elaborate road construction before his waggons could pass, and this, to a minor extent, was true of Washington's earlier expedition. The immediate effect of the difference is seen when we note that the French were able to come down the Allegheny in force while Washington was waiting to make his advance from Wills Creek. But here again the slower English advance resulted in a permanent or quasi-permanent modification of the land-surface. Braddock was killed and the remnants of his force retreated eastward, but the road along which he had passed remained till in course of time one better fitted for modern traffic replaced it.

The fact is important. From the River St. Lawrence the French wandered far and wide over the interior of North America. The waterways which they used still keep in many cases the names which they gave or had learned from the lips of their Indian guides. Towns have arisen on the sites of their forts and stations, sometimes also still known by their names. But, save in the St. Lawrence valley, on the actual surface of the land they made little impression ; when the period of their rule was over most of the lands over which they had roamed were still largely as they had always been, and it was newcomers who fitted them for occupation by civilised man. The canoe was well-fitted for the Indian summer type of warfare. It could be used also for goods like furs, valuable in relation to both bulk and weight ; but it could not carry settlers' effects. Further, as the new war was soon to show, it was a very unsuitable means of carrying on communication with fortified

posts as against an enemy supplied with horse-drawn transport, and was thus a not unimportant factor in the French defeat.

But the traditional use of the Indian canoe by the French was not a mere accident. It was due essentially to the intractable nature of the lands which bounded the narrow cultivated strip which was Canada. Only by Indian trail and by water, or over the winter snows, could the Canadians leave their valley, and in either case they were compelled to drop to the Indian level. Indian friendship was all-important, and that meant loss to the White man rather than gain to the Red.

Dieskau found his Indian allies intolerable, and met defeat at the hands of Johnson, who—as a notable exception on the English side—was familiar with Indian ways and unrepelled by them; he had indeed an Indian wife. Braddock was defeated even more completely then Dieskau as a result both of his ignorance of Indian warfare and of his contempt for their particular kind of skill. But if the Indian method of carrying on warfare was extraordinarily effective at the moment as against an unprepared foe, it had, and could have, no permanent effect. Provided that foe had time to recover from the first shock, and space within which the recovery could take place, an Indian victory resulted ultimately only in a more determined onslaught. It could not be pressed home by the white leaders without the loss of the Indian aid which had made it possible. Johnson could not prevent the French getting back to Ticonderoga and establishing themselves there; Braddock's defeat could only have been of real importance to the French if they had used it to establish themselves firmly in the Central Low Plains before the English had

time to recover. In point of fact it was followed only by the appearance of Indian raiding-parties in the colonies, a characteristically Indian and futile mode of evading the real point at issue. It made it clear that the French were not able to carry through the plan which was the only sound justification of their advance to the Ohio. They allowed the advantage gained by their swift advance to the Forks to be dissipated; instead of trying to show that the Appalachian Upland was a barrier they demonstrated to the world that it was breached by gaps. The Indian advance across it was purely destructive, and when the colonists were once fairly roused they were bound not only to sweep away Fort Duquesne, but to claim the Plains which the French had neglected to utilise.

The fatal and fundamental misfortune of the French was thus their dependence on their Indian allies. That dependence was in a sense inevitable, for it was based on the characters of the great Canadian Shield, an area too different from the lands from which they had come to make it possible for them to adapt themselves to it easily. Without Indian help Montreal would have marked the upward limit of their journeyings; Cartier, from his own standpoint, showed sound sense when he dropped downstream again immediately he saw with his own eyes the turbulent Lachine Rapids—the block to European modes of navigation. Not only Champlain's deliberate espousal of the Algonquin quarrel against the Iroquois, but, even more, the courage which led him to venture into an Indian canoe proved a calamity to his fellow-countrymen. Frontenac, an old man, seeking glory by the path of least resistance, made an even more disastrous mistake when he used Indians to make un-

provoked attacks on helpless English colonists. Not only was there no possibility of a stop once this line of action was entered upon, not only was a new and evil tradition created, but the fatally easy successes obtained concealed from the actors and from the world their utter futility.

From the beginning the colonists on the Atlantic slope and plain displaced Indians; they did not need their help and utilised them rarely. The Indians had little to teach or to give save a few cultivated plants. When the French sank deliberately to Indian methods of warfare, they became in English eyes but another kind of savage, to be ejected ruthlessly from lands of which they had failed to make effective use; because of their dependence on the canoe also, their ejection from the Plains was speedy and complete.

But, as we have already seen, French social polity, if not French rule, remains to-day on the banks of the St. Lawrence, though it disappeared from Nova Scotia in the mid-eighteenth century. If there was more than one cause for this twofold fact part at least of the reason is clear. Le Loutre in Nova Scotia used Acadians dressed and equipped like Indians to carry on guerilla warfare there, the idea being that this would save them from punishment as traitorous British subjects. In point of fact it brought the penalty of wholesale expulsion on their fellows, who were mostly innocent of armed treachery, if misguided and foolish. But Montcalm, the great French general sent out to Quebec in 1756, came fresh from Europe, and with European standards of conduct unimpaired by contact with the traditions of Canada. He could not save Canada; for that it was too late: but he could ensure a defeat with dignity. In his death

at Quebec he saved what was most worth saving, and if Champlain's settlement saw the end of a great conception, it witnessed also the preservation of the humbler ideal for which the Héberts had striven. If the lilies of France ceased to wave in the breeze, French-speaking peasants were still to be left to till their lands and tend their cattle on the shores of the great river.

But the fall of Quebec was still distant at the end of 1755, and the official outbreak of the Seven Years' War did not take place till the end of the spring of the following year. One of its two main causes was given by Burke as "the uncertain limits of the French and English territories in America." In more detail it might be said that it arose out of a struggle for lines of internal communication, complicated by an anomalous use of means of transport by one of the two parties. From Lake Erie access to the feeders of the Ohio is easy, because the flow of water had been southwards in an earlier period. By right of exploration and first use those lines of access were French, but by their employment of Indian canoes and Indian guides, with all that this implied, they had failed to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the topography. The ways from the Atlantic-flowing river to the hill tributaries of the Ohio were less easy, physically speaking, but the dwellers on the Atlantic side had better means of transport, greater numbers and, when their time came, advanced as Europeans and not in Indian fashion.

The events of the new war were complicated enough, and for a couple of years at least the balance of advantage seemed on the French side. But, for our purpose, most of the stirring incidents which bulked so large at the time, and occupy so much space in the history books,

are of minor importance. They do but emphasise once again the part played by the land-forms which we have already described in detail.

The main point was clearly that the English were already firmly established at the mouth of the Gulf and could threaten the overseas communications of Canada, and, to the end, Canada retained a large measure of dependence on Europe. The capture of Louisbourg would prepare the way for an attack on a Quebec weakened by separation from Europe, and Quebec to all intents and purposes was Canada. Fort Duquesne, which seemed so important, was connected to Canada only by a slender thread, and that thread could be cut at more than one intermediate point by an enemy prepared to mobilise all its forces and exert its full strength. The Indian raids on Virginia and Pennsylvania, which wounded so deeply Washington's feelings as a man and his self-respect as a leader, could be stopped as soon as those who had the means were prepared to use them effectively. On the French side the great assets were mobility and the fear inspired by their Indian auxiliaries; but their range of movement was limited and their power of defending their centre from an attack by sea small. Thus their victories merely stirred up their opponents' resolve to push home the main attack, and when that happened the scattered outlying stations lost all significance. In the sequel, therefore, we find the apparent anomaly that points like Fort Duquesne and Ticonderoga, the scenes of serious conflicts and notable French victories, were in the end abandoned rather than taken by assault. The history of French Canada was a story of ineffective advances into the surrounding wastes from a more or less static

centre, and its fall was the result of the attack on that centre by a power strong on the sea, the element to which Canada had such limited means of access.

The years 1756 and 1757, both disastrous for England, saw fighting mainly in the Hudson-Mohawk area. In other words the English authorities at home had not yet grasped the fact—so obvious once it was realised—that Canada could only be conquered by an effective use of sea-power. To the men on the spot the two gaps, the one leading from Albany by the Mohawk and the Great Carrying Place to Lake Ontario, and the other from the same point by the Upper Hudson and Lake Champlain to the St. Lawrence, exercised a fatal fascination. It took hard blows to drive home the fact that both routes were meantime commanded from Montreal, and had, moreover, very different military importance. Fort Oswego, the only English post on Lake Ontario, was flanked by the two French posts at either end of the lake—Fort Frontenac and Fort Niagara—and was connected to Albany only by a weakly-held line of communication. Its real importance lay in the fact that it was a potential threat to French command of Lake Ontario; if that threat could be made a real one, then French communications with the more distant stations would be cut, and these would have to be abandoned. On the other hand, till the English were strong on Lake Ontario, any attempt to advance by the Hudson-Champlain route was doubly futile. Futile, first, because the folly of the English colonists had allowed the French to establish strongly-held posts along that line up to Ticonderoga at the Champlain-George fork, and second, because any attempted advance along this line, while the Mohawk-Oswego line was

weakly held, left the flank of the attacking army exposed.

Montcalm, who was a great soldier, could scarcely fail to grasp these elementary points. Thus we find that, in August, 1756, by a rapid movement, he destroyed Fort Oswego. The English commander, Webb, who was on his way thither with reinforcements, promptly destroyed the forts at the portage and scuttled back to Albany as fast as he could travel. Next year Montcalm made an advance by the other arm of the Hudson-Mohawk Y, and destroyed Fort William Henry, while a Canadian raiding-party invaded the Mohawk valley from Lake Ontario, and attacked a small German settlement there. Not only, that is to say did the English fail to invade Canada; they could not even defend British territory.

The next year, 1758, with Pitt in power at home, brought the promise of better things. The main attack was on the fortress the capture of which would open the seaway to Quebec. A strong English fleet was sent out to besiege Louisbourg, and at the same time another English squadron blockaded the exit of the Mediterranean to prevent a French fleet from leaving Toulon. Louisbourg fell in July, 1758, and, as Cape Breton Island[1] contained no other stronghold, it thus passed wholly into English hands. Later Wolfe destroyed the small French fishing settlements on the Gulf coast of the mainland, though he would fain have attempted the nobler feat of capturing Quebec.

In the Hudson-Mohawk area a new defeat emphasised the folly of trying to break through the French defences on Lake Champlain, while an easy victory on Lake

[1] Map XI.

Ontario showed that Montcalm, despite his skill, could not save Canada. Abercromby's frontal attack on Ticonderoga was repulsed with heavy loss, Lord Howe, a young soldier of whom great things were hoped, having been killed by a chance shot in a preliminary skirmish. The same summer, however, Bradstreet, a capable New Englander, was permitted by Abercromby to make an attempt on Fort Frontenac. In August Bradstreet went up the Mohawk by boat, passed the Great Carrying Place, where a new fort was being built, and descended to the point where Fort Oswego had stood. He crossed the lake and had no difficulty in obtaining the surrender of Fort Frontenac, which had been apparently denuded of troops to reinforce Montcalm at Ticonderoga. The point of real importance, however, was that the Fort contained a large amount of stores intended for the southern and western stations, and that in its harbour lay the nine armed vessels which constituted the French "fleet" on Lake Ontario. The destruction of stores and vessels weakened all the French outlying stations, particularly Fort Duquesne, which depended for its supplies on the line of communication passing through Lake Ontario. Bradstreet's success thus meant that although Fort Oswego had gone, the threat to French supremacy on Lake Ontario, of which it had been a symbol, had become a reality.

Thus, though the capture of Fort Duquesne by assault had been part of Pitt's plan of campaign for the year, in the sequel such an assault proved unnecessary. Forbes had been sent to Philadelphia [1] in April to make the advance to that fort. An advanced base was established at a settlement on the site of the present

[1] Contrast Braddock's landing-place, p. 251.

town of Bedford,[1] which obtained its name from the fort built here by Forbes' party. Bedford is some thirty miles north-east of Fort Cumberland, and there was much discussion, complicated as usual by the jealousy between Virginia and Pennsylvania, as to whether a new road should be driven through the mountains, or a march made to Fort Cumberland, followed by the use of Braddock's route. Eventually the former course was decided on, and the usual elaborate clearing and road construction began, with resultant long delay. The delay in this case was, however, largely intentional, for the slow and steady preparations were intended to impress the Indians, and to induce them to abandon the French.

At first sight Forbes' willingness to negotiate with the Indians seems inexplicable. It was Indians who had been mainly responsible for Braddock's defeat; it was Indians who had ravaged the frontiers of Pennsylvania and Virginia. Only two years before, in 1756, George Washington had written, in language the stiffness of which cannot conceal the real feeling beneath, "The supplicating tears of the women and moving petitions of the men melt me into such deadly sorrow, that I solemnly declare, if I know my own mind, I could offer myself a willing sacrifice to the butchering enemy, provided that would contribute to the people's ease." But the English attitude towards the Indians, wholly untinged as it was by any of the idealism which at times at least had influenced the French, was as purely opportunist as was that of the Indians themselves. The cold fury of wrath aroused by the Indian raids was directed only against the French who had prompted them. Indian

[1] Map XII.

enmity was regarded by Forbes as an obstacle to be overcome, just as were those offered by the wooded mountains, and by the autumn rains which destroyed the new road almost as fast as it was made. The Indians, again, tended naturally to gravitate towards the stronger party; forlorn hopes had no place in their scheme of life.

In October the negotiations were crowned with success, and many of the Indians made their peace with the English. Meantime the French had great difficulty in keeping Fort Duquesne supplied with men and material, now that communications with Montreal were cut. Troops were sent from Fort Niagara, Detroit and the Illinois region, and Indians from the further west; but as autumn advanced the position became untenable. Thus when Forbes arrived on the scene in November he found that Fort Duquesne had been evacuated and burnt, and the French had retreated, the commander to Venango, that post at the point where French Creek joins the Allegheny which Washington had passed on his way to Fort Le Bœuf five years before. The wheel had come round full circle.

A stockade was built immediately to shelter the English troops to be left in garrison, and to this Forbes gave the name of Pittsburg, which the great city which now stands at this point bears. It was not till the next year that a new fort, Fort Pitt, was constructed.

It was now clear that the attempt to shut in the English between the Appalachian Upland and the sea had definitely failed, and that the best that could be hoped for Canada was to save something from the ruin of the larger ambition, and hold on till peace came. The final conquest was still delayed, though it was obvious

that it was impending, and this was due primarily to the difficulty of reaching Montreal from the landward side, despite the two possible lines of access. Even the taking of Quebec, owing both to its strong natural position and to Montcalm's military skill, proved far from an easy matter, although the enemy without was aided by the corruption now rampant within Canada, and by the ineptitude of Vaudreuil, the governor and son of the earlier governor of the same name, who was in a state of constant feud with Montcalm.

Of the romantic story of the siege of Quebec and of the English victory on the Plains of Abraham we need say little; for the tale has often been told. It is sufficient to note shortly that Wolfe left England in February, 1759, with a fleet commanded by Admiral Saunders. It was found impossible to enter Louisbourg harbour on account of ice—though the port is normally ice-free in winter—and shelter had to be sought in Halifax. It was May before the whole fleet was united at Louisbourg, and June before the ships, skilfully piloted up the St. Lawrence, arrived before Quebec. Montcalm's policy was to avoid risking his army, and Wolfe had almost lost hope when, in September, he discovered the possbility of ascending to the plateau from the river by the Anse au Foulon (Wolfe's Cove). On September 13, 1759, the battle of the Plains was fought, and was followed, after Montcalm's death, by the hasty retreat upstream of the defeated French army. On September 18, Quebec was surrendered.

"What makes Wolfe's consummate victory immortal," says Major William Wood, "was that it was directly based upon the British command of the sea, and hence both vitally important in itself and most far-

reaching in its results . . . it may be truly called the most pregnant single event in all America since Columbus."

Of the two leaders we learn that Wolfe, who expired on the actual battlefield, died " content " in the knowledge that victory was won. Montcalm, desperately wounded in the retreat towards the walls of Quebec, when told that death was imminent, replied, " So much the better. I am happy not to live to see the surrender of Quebec." Wolfe's body was carried home to England for burial ; a shell hole within the Chapel of the Ursuline Convent at Quebec served as sepulchre for Montcalm. Within that Chapel there burnt then, and burns still, a votive lamp, which has never been extinguished since it was lighted in 1717. Dedicated by a beautiful Canadian girl, Madeleine de Repentigny, who became a nun after the death of her soldier lover, its unfailing light is a fitting symbol of the victory which Montcalm gained in the moment of his defeat.

At that moment, however, the full consequences of the battle of the Plains were not apparent ; it was not even certain that Quebec could be held by the English with their depleted forces against a French counter-attack. We must, however, leave the St. Lawrence area to note what was meantime happening elsewhere.

Military operations were in progress in both the Lake Champlain and the Lake Ontario regions, and it is interesting to note that, till the end, the former retained its relative unimportance. It had been hoped that Ticonderoga and Crown Point would be taken in the spring of 1759, and thus allow an English army to advance and co-operate with Wolfe before Quebec, or at

least draw off French troops from that town. But the policy of the commander of the small French forces was to retreat slowly, and not to make a stand till the point where the Richelieu River leaves Lake Champlain. Thus when Amherst, the English commander, reached Ticonderoga—which was not till nearly the end of July—he found that it had been abandoned and blown up by the French. In early August Amherst arrived at Crown Point, only to find that it also had been destroyed. Fearful of the undefeated French army in front of him, he made no further advance and wintered at Crown Point.

More was done in the region of Lake Ontario. English troops advanced to the site of Fort Oswego, and while one section remained to reconstruct it, another party went on to attack Fort Niagara. The French commander there sent an appeal for help to Detroit and to the posts still held on the Presqu' Île—Allegheny route, but an English force intercepted and defeated the party of Canadians who had come down Lake Erie in response to the call. Fort Niagara was then surrendered and Canada was cut off from the Ohio area and from Louisiana, and could only keep in touch with the western posts by means of the old Ottawa route. Her enemies were closing in, though another season was necessary to complete the conquest.

For the English forces at Quebec under Murray the winter of 1759-60 was a trying one, and in many ways recalled that spent by Champlain at the same spot a century and a half before. In autumn the fleet sailed away, as de Monts' ships had done, and left the troops to adapt themselves as they might to conditions of which they had had no previous experience. They had

insufficient clothing to protect themselves from the cold; Quebec was largely in ruins owing to Wolfe's bombardment, and thus offered little protection; the necessary fuel had to be manhauled in sledges from the woods some miles away: fresh food was short: in brief pioneer conditions had returned.

Scurvy, that dread disease which had proved such an obstacle to early French settlement, and had attacked Cartier's and Champlain's men so severely, broke out. In view of what was said on p. 25 of Cartier's miraculous tree, it is worth note that among the English colonists spruce beer made with West Indian molasses was regarded as a sovereign remedy against the disease. The men of Amherst's army in the Lake George area, who were largely provincial troops, spent much of their leisure in 1759 in gathering spruce tops and were supplied with molasses at a cost of ½d. a quart. One can hardly suppose that spruce tops were difficult to get at Quebec though molasses doubtless were; it is a little curious to find that in spring the commander of the attacking French troops sent a present of spruce boughs to Murray, with a message that he had learnt that he was fond of spruce beer. Whether the apparent courtesy was genuine, or whether it was meant as an indication that the French were well aware of the ravages made by scurvy in Murray's forces, does not seem clear. We know at least that by spring more than half Murray's small army was unfit for duty, and the death-roll had mounted to ten per cent. of the total force.

There were minor French attacks during the winter, though in these for the most part the English had the advantage. But while Wolfe had devastated large

areas in the vicinity of Quebec, to the injury, as it turned out, of his own forces after his death, the upper part of the colony had still fairly ample supplies and Lévis at Montreal had large bodies of troops. In April, therefore, a considerable French force came downstream in ships and boats to attack Quebec. Murray's effective forces were less than one-third of those of his opponent, but, in a moment of over-confidence, he marched out of the city and offered battle on the Plains of Abraham, the scene of Wolfe's victory. He was compelled to retreat with a loss of over one thousand out of his force of three thousand, and the position of Quebec appeared highly critical. But Lévis made no attempt to push home his advantage, and both parties waited anxiously in the hope of ships with supplies from Europe. It was English ships which came, however, and in May the French retreated once more upstream.

The relief of Quebec made possible a scheme for a threefold advance on Montreal and the upper colony. Murray was to move up the St. Lawrence; the main force under Amherst was to embark at restored Fort Oswego and come down the upper St. Lawrence, while the third force, under Haviland, was to descend from Crown Point by Lake Champlain and the Richelieu and so unite with the other two in front of Montreal. Murray met with practically no opposition on his way up the river, and found the habitants willing to sell him supplies and ready to abandon the unequal struggle. Similarly no effective opposition was offered to Haviland, who arrived at the rendezvous without very notable adventures. Amherst showed his usual infinite leisureliness, and it was August before he made a start from Fort Oswego. The only interesting point about his advance

was that the running of the rapids on the St. Lawrence presented great difficulties to his party. Forty-six whaleboats were totally wrecked and another eighteen damaged; the loss of life was 84, a small figure as compared with his total force of 10,000, but striking as showing the significance of the rapids. Even so, it may be noted, the last and strongest rapid, that of Lachine, was not run, for the party disembarked above and marched to Montreal.

The French at Montreal, in face of overwhelming forces and with their own troops deserting daily, could offer no effective resistance, and on September 8, 1760, Montreal capitulated. With its surrender, and with Quebec firmly held, not only was Canada lost, but in America the war was over, though three years had still to elapse before peace was signed.

The French officers, the chief civil servants, and such of the regular troops as were willing to go, left the colony after the capitulation of Montreal, and they were followed by many of the seigniors and merchants; but the habitants remained unmolested on their lands. At the peace of Paris in 1763 the whole of Canada and all its dependencies passed to the English Crown, the boundary of English territory being given as the Mississippi. The town of New Orleans, with the small island on which it stands, was, however, left to France, but this, together with an undefined tract of land beyond the Mississippi, she ceded to Spain under the name of Louisiana and thus withdrew from the continent. Of her possessions there, she retained only the small islands of Miquelon and St. Pierre, with certain fishing rights in the Gulf of St. Lawrence area; she kept also certain West Indian islands, but these do not come into our story.

The withdrawal was at once an end and the possibility of a future beginning. It meant the definite failure of the attempt to make the cultivators of a narrow, isolated strip of land carry on their backs a vast dominion, connected with their fields only by imperfect lines of communication, left in their primitive state. The originators and supporters of that policy left for Europe, and the cultivators returned to their lands, the one object of permanent interest to them. The future was to see a new set of cultivators established in the lowlands which fringe the nearer lakes. The Greater Canada which was to be in a more distant future depended quite definitely on the development of a new method of land communication, on the building of the first slender string of rails which carried settlers and their property across the wide wastes of the Canadian Shield to the prairies beyond, and made easy contact possible with the ultimate west.

The story we have told in the preceding chapters covers—from Cartier's first journey in 1534 to the passing of French rule in 1763—a period of some two hundred and thirty years. Looking back at it in perspective, and neglecting the details which have bulked so large in the telling, we have to ask how far it fulfils the purpose set forth in the introductory chapter, that of showing how man and his physical setting act and react upon one another.

If we take the broadest possible survey of the story of French Canada we can distinguish four sets of events —discovery; settlement; expansion; conflict ending in the final conquest. Each had its historical and its geographical aspect, its time and space element. If

we take the purely historical standpoint we can make the story seem very simple. Cabot went to look for China and spices and found fish. There were adventurous fisherfolk on the western margin of Europe who utilised promptly the chance thus offered, and learnt incidentally much of harbours, currents and possibilities of navigation. Cartier, still looking for China, used this new knowledge in his turn, and pushing still further westward, found a land capable of yielding furs: the summer fur trade developed thereafter as speedily as the earlier fishing one had done. Champlain refused to accept Cartier's conclusion that the way to the ultimate east by the western route was blocked, and founded his first feeble settlement. When to this was added the colonisation of the riverine strip, expansion naturally followed, and that expansion brought the Canadians into collision with the English colonists spreading towards the interior from their settlements on the Atlantic coast. That the latter, with more land for agriculture, with a seaboard well-supplied with harbours, were more numerous and wealthier than the former may seem to account for their success.

But even told in this summary fashion the story leaves much unexplained. All the purely historical reasons which can be advanced to explain the collapse of Canada seem inadequate; only when we supplement them by a study of the land-forms do we appear to get nearer the heart of the matter. Thus emphasis is often laid—and with justice—on the significance of the greater freedom which the English colonists enjoyed as compared with the Canadians. But we have to note that the persistence of rigid autocratic rule in Canada was rendered possible by the shape of the river; the narrowing at Quebec,

the only link with the outer seas, enabled the rulers to control all the activities of the settlers. Here was no long seaboard with harbours innumerable, but a bottle-neck, forming the physical basis of the constant supervision exercised. Again, Champlain saw in the Narrows a possibility both of establishing a permanent base, and of maintaining a claim to the lands beyond; the Sault at Montreal was for him but an invitation to adopt another mode of travel. Thus the Narrows and the Sault, the strait sea gate and the wider land one, were the two essential facts which influenced the whole history of French Canada. The ordered lives of the settlers centred on Quebec, but Montreal marked the point where the wilderness trails of the voyageur diverged from the highway used by the habitant. Champlain, at once explorer and settler, was the originator of both trends of policy—but each had its roots in the topography.

Further, such fundamental physical facts exerted a cumulative effect, in which historical and geographical factors appear to blend. Each new experience established a new tradition, and this was carried on into the next stage, influencing if not determining the fresh reaction. Thus we find those who say, apparently with equal truth, and according to the point of view, that this or that happened because of what had been or because of the land-forms. One person, that is to say, may be tempted to assert that Montreal marked the upward limit of effective settlement because of the break in the waterway, the physical fact, while another finds an adequate explanation in the early quarrel with the Iroquois, the historical one—and so with the other great events.

The position that we have tried to maintain here combines the two points of view. It is suggested, that is to say, that while to some extent, and one, moreover, varying at every stage of his development, man can modify the lands in which he dwells ; in other respects he must follow where nature leads. From this there rises the practical deduction that for any community a knowledge of its own physical setting is as essential as is that of its past—since without this knowledge it may be drawn into the path which leads to the abyss.

EPILOGUE
THE LATER HISTORY OF CANADA

MAP XIV. THE PROVINCES OF THE DOMINION AND THE INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER

EPILOGUE

The Later History of Canada

WHILE it is impossible even to summarise the whole history of Canada between 1763 and the present day, it seems desirable to indicate broadly some of the ways in which later events were influenced by the facts on which we have already dwelt in detail. At the date of the Peace there was a settled French population between Quebec and Montreal, and a handful of traders in the wilderness, scattered for the most part in strung-out posts. Roughly speaking, however, it may be said that French settlement stopped just above Montreal, and that the Appalachian Upland was still the limit of English expansion on the west, so that all the interior of the continent was, from the human standpoint, an undifferentiated wild. It had yielded furs for more than a century; pioneers on both the French and English side had made it clear that settlement was possible within it; much was known of lines of access to and from it. There had been also continuous conflict over the problem whether it could be most easily attached economically to the Mississippi system, which drains the greater part of it; or to the Great Lakes, whose drainage basin is separated from the Mississippi by so low a water-parting; or to the Atlantic coastal plain,

from which it could readily be reached by gaps: but the method of trial and error had not yet been carried far enough for any decision to have been attained.

As regards the area of French settlement on the St. Lawrence it was already abundantly clear that its double raison d'être was first the access to the ocean and so to Europe by the river, and second the presence of fertile land within the valley. If Canada was to continue to exist, therefore, and to be able to expand, two conditions must be fulfilled. In the first place free access to the sea must be maintained at all costs, and in the second expansion could only take place with safety into an area whose products would find a natural outlet by the St. Lawrence. The whole subsequent history of the country is summed up in these two problems, and they form indispensable guiding-lines in tracing out its complications. With the first was bound up the question of Nova Scotia, and it is fundamental that the beginnings of Modern Canada date only from 1867 when, by the British North America Act, the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were confederated to form the Dominion. Far more difficult and complicated was the problem of determining how far the influence of the St. Lawrence waterway extended into the interior, and it is there that it becomes difficult to disentangle the prime causes from the historical accidents.

On the first problem we have already dwelt at some length[1] in connection with French Canada. It may be added that even before the Peace of Paris there had been a considerable immigration, mostly from New England, into the lands left vacant by the expulsion of the

[1] p. 212.

Acadians, and it was not without importance for the future that the gateway of the gulf was from the beginning of the new era English and not French.

The difficulty as to the status of the vast undemarcated interior was at once recognised, and much discussion took place in regard to it. Eventually it was set aside as a great native reserve and hunting ground, apart alike from Canada and from the Atlantic Colonies, and settlement or purchase of lands from the Indians was forbidden within it without a licence. The limits of Canada upstream were defined by a line running from Lake Nipissing[1] to strike the St. Lawrence where the 45th parallel crosses the river, and then continued along the parallel to beyond the outlet of Lake Champlain, the latter section forming part of the present international boundary.

But the advantages or otherwise of this separation of the inner plains had little time to show themselves, for the Indians had been becoming steadily more and more restless since the withdrawal of the French garrisons from the wilderness posts, and what is called Pontiac's war broke out in the late spring of 1763. Pontiac was an Indian chief of the Ottawa group and a man of great force of character. He showed remarkable skill in his conduct of operations, and though Detroit was not taken, many of the other former French forts, including that at Michilimackinac, and those of Le Boeuf, Venango and Presqu' Île fell to the Indians. The motive of the war, which lasted three full years, was largely fear and dislike of the English colonists, and it was hoped that aid would be forthcoming from the French. In this Pontiac was disappointed, but the English

[1] Map VII.

colonists gave relatively little help to the Royal commanders in the conflict, the incidents of which played a part in exacerbating feeling between the colonies and the representatives of the motherland, and thus helped to bring about the War of Independence. Further, during its course, as after Braddock's defeat, the borders of Pennsylvania and Virginia were once more raided by Indians, making it certain that in the near future the colonies would lay claim at least to the nearer parts of the undemarcated lands.

The next event of interest was the passing of the Quebec Act in 1774. For us the only important provision of this Act was that it attached the interior plains to Canada. The original boundary, as we have seen, ran from Lake Nipissing, parallel to the River Ottawa till it struck the St. Lawrence at lat. 45° N. The position of the new line may be readily grasped if we regard the crossing of the St. Lawrence as a pivot round which the boundary was swung south-eastwards. In other words by the Quebec Act the new line ran along the eastern bank of the St. Lawrence River to Lake Ontario, followed the eastern and southern shores of that lake to the Niagara River, and was continued from the north-east corner of Lake Erie to the Ohio, which it followed to the junction of that river with the Mississippi. Thus the water-parting between Lake Erie and the factors of the Ohio [1] was ignored, and it was assumed that the influence of the St. Lawrence extended as far south as the Ohio-Mississippi confluence.

The motives determining the arrangement from the standpoint of the British Government are fairly clear. It was essential that some kind of administration should

[1] Map XII.

THE ROCHE PERCÉE, GASPÉ PENINSULA

Small fishing and farming settlements occur on the shores of Gaspé, but the interior is still uninhabited

be established in the interior plains. It was difficult to see how a new unit—with no obvious centre, no direct outlet to the sea—could be set up. The motherland had been left to take the lion's share in putting down the Indian revolt and establishing peace, and this might be regarded as a tacit admission that the area was not yet of vital importance to the Atlantic colonies. It would have been difficult also to assign the whole area to any one colony, and there was meantime no union among them. There was also already much friction between the motherland and the colonies, and to those with no detailed, first-hand knowledge of the topography the solution adopted might well seem a convenient compromise. The other provisions of the Act, which we need not discuss, made it on the whole, as the future was to show, generally acceptable to the French Canadians.

The colonists, as we, with fuller knowledge of the facts and of the future, can see was inevitable, were furious. Two lines of action were open—to attempt to detach Canada from her new allegiance and induce her to combine with them in an attack upon the motherland, or to regard her as part of the motherland and invade her territories. Since the French Canadians did not respond to blandishments, soon after the outbreak of the War of Independence in 1775 Canada was invaded, not without hope that the appearance of an army of invasion would lead the Canadians to rise against their new rulers, a hope which was disappointed. The invasion was at first successful, Montreal had to be abandoned, and Quebec, in the winter of 1775–6, underwent yet another siege. The commander was saved, as Murray had been, by the appearance of English ships in the spring, a new proof of the importance of the sea-access,

and the whole of the Canada of the St. Lawrence was speedily freed from the invader. The rest of the long war had little direct importance for the old Canada, though the Champlain-Hudson line once more saw desperate fighting. More important from our standpoint was the fact that as the war went on the colonials advanced further and further into the plains, which passed completely and for ever out of English hands.

Peace was signed in 1783, and Canada received a new boundary, corresponding broadly to that which still exists. From the point where the parallel of 45° crosses the St. Lawrence the line was declared to lie along the middle of the river channel, and then to pass through the middle of Lakes Ontario, Erie, Huron, Superior and to cross Lake of the Woods. Once again, that is to say, the parting between the drainage basin of the Great Lakes and that of the Ohio-Mississippi was ignored, but this time in favour of what were now the United States. So far as Lakes Ontario and Erie are concerned, this definite advance of the Americans into the interior was associated with the final displacement of the Five Nations, now known as the Six Nations owing to the admission of the Tuscaroras into the confederacy. The final displacement took place in two stages.

In 1763, as we have seen, Indian rights were carefully guarded, the interior plains being recognised as their territory. But, during the conflict for Canada much fighting had taken place in the Mohawk-Oswego valley, and it was necessary to define in this region the boundary between true Indian territory and that open to white settlement. By an arrangement made in 1765, and confirmed in 1768, a line was drawn from the Allegheny

to that Wood Creek which enters Lake Oneida, the area between the line and Lakes Erie and Ontario being recognised as the absolute property of the Six Nation Indians. But in 1779, as a reprisal for border raids by the Indians, an American general "completed the entire destruction of the country of the Six Nations," all the inhabitants, men, women and children, being driven out of it. A number of the surviving Indians after the war crossed to the Canadian side of the lakes, where lands were set apart for them. The point of importance, however, is that the disappearance of the formidable confederacy left open the Mohawk Gap to an American advance, and thus enabled it to take on its natural topographical function as an easier exit to the sea for the produce both of the interior plains and of the eastern shores of Lakes Erie and Ontario than the St. Lawrence route. It was this disappearance of the Iroquois confederacy from the gap that justified the creation of the new mid-lake boundary.

Of the boundary between New Brunswick (still at the time a part of Nova Scotia) and Maine, it is sufficient to note that the St. Croix River was adopted instead of the Penobscot,[1] and this meant that a block of foreign territory is thrust northward between Quebec province and the coast of the Bay of Fundy. To this extent Canada's need of free access at all seasons to the sea was insufficiently guarded by the negotiators of the treaty.

Even though the peace deprived Canada of a vast part of the area assigned to it under the Quebec Act, there remained attached to it a compact block of fertile land, bounded to the south-east by Lakes Ontario and Erie

[1] Map X.

and to the north-west by Lake Huron and its arm of Georgian Bay. This region, more especially its southern portion, the true Lake Peninsula between Huron and Erie,[1] has a climate favourable to mixed farming. As a result of the War of Independence it received for the first time a considerable body of white settlers, the United Empire Loyalists.

The total number of the Loyalist immigrants into the whole area assigned to Britain by the Peace of 1783 has been variously estimated at from 40,000 to 60,000. More important than the actual figures was the distribution, which was influenced both by the need of easy lines of access from the United States, and by that of finding vacant areas suitable for subsistence farming. The continuous strip of French settlement between Quebec and Montreal, combined with the barren tract which extends from below Quebec to the end of Gaspé peninsula, repelled the incomers and, as a rock divides a tidal wave, separated them into two sections, an eastern and a western, one destined to be the holders of the sea-gate, to link Canada with Europe, the other to be an advanced post towards the unknown west. The fact that French Canada lay between the two was to make confederation necessary in the future.

The loyalists of the Atlantic coast of the old colonies went for the most part to what had been Acadia. Many landed at the mouth of the St. John River, and in 1784 the presence of new settlements here led to the separation of New Brunswick from Nova Scotia, and its constitution as a new province. Others went to Nova Scotia proper, where they proved once again that the Atlantic coast, despite the attraction of its good harbours, is

[1] Map. VII.

barren and unpromising; still others occupied Prince Edward and Cape Breton Islands. A considerable number of the earlier immigrants from New England [1] had taken the colonists' part during the War of Independence, so that it was the loyalists who gave their character to the provinces here.

From the interior of the old colonies the loyalists crossed the water-line which now formed the international boundary and settled round the lake shores in the area that was to become the province of Ontario. A proportion took the well-trodden route by Lake Champlain and settled in the Eastern Townships,[2] though a considerable number of these moved on later.

Difficulties there were in abundance; even in the fertile lowlands of Ontario it was not easy for the newcomers to make a start, and in the Maritime Provinces severe hardships were experienced, leading in some cases to new migrations. Many problems also presented themselves as between the older and the newer sections of the population. With these, however, we need not concern ourselves; they were but the growing pains of a vigorous new community, attaining stability and harmony through experiment and wrangling. The interdependence which was the cause of many of the disputes was in reality the great hope of the future. Upper Canada or Ontario had fertile lands and easy inter-communication among its different parts, but had to learn to adjust itself to older Quebec, which held the way to the sea and some of the ways to the further west. The Maritime Provinces were of great importance as including the limited belt of Atlantic seaboard and the gate of the Gulf, but the very moderate amount of

[1] p. 288. [2] p. 108

fertile land which they contained, and the somewhat unfavourable climate here, were signs that the future lay to the west. The separation in space between the English-speaking communities of the extreme east and of Ontario ensured that French Canada would retain its position as the stable, conservative element so essential to a young nation in a land of great possibilities. Thus we need only note, without detail, that in 1791 the Constitutional Act separated Upper or English Canada from Lower or French Canada. This was obviously but a temporary makeshift indicating that the necessary adjustments between the different elements were not easy to attain.

The new nation on the other side of the border was far from convinced that there was room for a separate community outside its limits and yet so near, and after various threats of war a new outbreak took place in 1812, though Canadian affairs formed of course but one element in this. It was the middle of the Napoleonic wars, Britain seemed fully occupied elsewhere, and it was expected that the two Canadas would fall an easy prey. The war led, however, to no change in the pre-existing frontier, and on the whole strengthened rather than weakened the future Dominion. This came about in two ways. In the first place, despite the fact that the homeland was at war with France, from which Lower Canada had been wrested, and with the United States which, in the Detroit and Niagara areas particularly, was in close contact with Upper Canada, the Canadians acted as a unit in repelling the invaders, and both provinces displayed much patriotic fervour. The war was thus a factor in the growth of a national consciousness. Second, the conditions in the British Islands at

the close of the greater war of which the American one formed a part, encouraged emigration, and led to a large increase in the population of the two Canadas.

Meanwhile developments were beginning in the west. The Hudson Bay Company, now come fully to its strength, had a younger rival in the North-west Company, whose headquarters were at Montreal. There was much competition between the two for fur-producing territory, for though the lines by which they took the furs out were widely separated, the hunting-grounds which they utilised overlapped. The Hudson Bay Company employed mainly the route from York Factory at the mouth of Hayes River[1] by the Bay and Strait, the North-west Company the portage route which led from the Red River valley, that is the Winnipeg area, to Lake Superior, and so to Montreal. The antagonism between the two was accentuated by the fact that the employés of the Hudson Bay Company were chiefly Scotsmen from the Orkney Islands, and those of the rival company largely half-breeds, or men of mixed blood, due to unions between French Canadian *voyageurs* and Indian women.

It was, however, a Scotsman, Alexander Mackenzie, in the employ of the North-west Company, who in 1793 first reached the Pacific coast of British Columbia from the interior of Canada. About the same time (1792) Vancouver visited the great island which bears his name.

But despite Lord Selkirk's vigorous attempts, from 1812 onwards, to establish agricultural settlers in the fertile Red River valley, the whole of the vast western territories, both the prairies and the mountain belt which now forms British Columbia, remained for a long

[1] Map VI.

period mere fur-producing wastes, it being to the interest of both companies to discourage anything in the form of permanent settlement. The two were united in 1831 after prolonged rivalry, and the union increased their power. It would be easy to trace analogies between the history of the Canadian prairies and that of the Ohio region of the United States. The part played by the Indians there was taken in the Canadian west by the French half-breeds who similarly resented the advance of settlement and civil administration. Just as the settled populations of Pennsylvania and Virginia also were slow to recognise the need of giving support to the pioneers who crossed the gaps in the Appalachian Upland to the Ohio plains, so it took time before settled Canada felt the need of organising the prairies.

In the east the next event of importance was the Act of Union of 1840, by which Upper and Lower Canada were united. Many years elapsed before this was followed by Confederation (1867), which at first involved only the four provinces of Upper and Lower Canada (Ontario and Quebec), Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island not coming in till 1873. Prior to this, in 1869, the Hudson Bay Company was induced to yield up its privileges in the North-west Territories, and the Red River settlement became the province of Manitoba. The change was not effected without some trouble, the half-breed Louis Riel leading a minor outbreak. In 1871 British Columbia joined the confederation on condition that a railway was built to connect the province with the rest of Canada. This led to the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, the first train running from Montreal to the Pacific coast in 1886. A fresh rebellion under Louis Riel took place

in the Saskatchewan area in 1885, and proved of a more serious nature than the first in that it involved a number of the Indians of the North-west; it was, however, soon put down. In 1905 the organisation of the west was completed by the erection of the two other prairie provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta, carved like Manitoba out of the originally undifferentiated block of the Territories.

This, in baldest outline, completes the story of Canada from the point at which we stopped our detailed survey till the present day. It is meant mainly as a commentary on the points made in the introductory chapter. It may be noted in particular that the building of the first trans-continental railway, itself a vast undertaking for a small community of less than three and a half million souls, and one not accomplished without difficulties and setbacks, was fundamental for the permanent attachment alike of the prairie provinces and of British Columbia to Canada. Before it was begun the prairies could only reach the sea through Canadian territory either by way of Hudson Bay, or by the long and tedious route over the rugged upland which separates Lake Superior from the feeders of Lake Winnipeg. Without railway construction the Red River basin and probably the whole of the prairies would have necessarily gravitated towards the United States. Till the completion of the railway, again, British Columbia could only be reached easily from the Pacific or over land from the States, and would similarly have almost certainly seceded, if the line had not been built. The authority of France could not be maintained in the Ohio plains when the birch-bark canoe was the only means of communication, but the Canada of the maple leaf, by

the help of the iron rail, was able to extend through the treeless prairies to the shore of the Western Sea of Champlain's dreams.

Though the full meaning of this cannot be elaborated here, the mere statement is an illustration of what has already been said, that while the great facts of relief cannot be changed by man's action, their significance varies with his stage of development. Thus part of the fascination of looking at man and place together and not as separate entities is that the possibilities of the combination are endless. The whole drama of existence unfolds itself, enabling us to trace in the endless becoming the realities which lie behind appearances. The story we have tried to tell escapes constantly from the narrow framework in which we have sought to confine it, and becomes an epitome of world history. It is more even than this ; for man's effort to adapt himself to particular parts of the earth's surface may be said to be but one side of that struggle for fitness—with a consciousness of purpose added—which seems the essential mystery of the universe.

APPENDIX

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

CARTIER'S narratives may be read in "The Voyages of Jacques Cartier," published from the originals with translations, notes and appendices, by H. P. Biggar, in *Publications of the Public Archives of Canada*, No. 11, Ottawa, 1924. Hakluyt's translation appears in "Principal Navigations, etc.," Vol. VIII of the *Hakluyt Society's Publications*. Champlain's works are now in course of re-publication by the Champlain Society of Toronto, under the editorship of H. P. Biggar. Extracts appear in "Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes," Vol. XVIII, Glasgow, 1906. Full details of the story of exploration from the St. Lawrence are given in "The Saint Lawrence Basin," by S. E. Dawson, in *Story of Exploration Series*, London, 1905, which has a copious bibliography and a good map.

There are many books on the geography of Canada. Particular mention should be made of *North America*, Vol. I, "Canada and Newfoundland," edited by H. M. Ami, in the new issue of Stanford's *Compendium of Geography and Travel*, London, 1915. This gives the main historical facts in addition to the geography, is copiously illustrated and has a lengthy bibliography. Mention may also be made of "North America, an Historical, Economic and Regional Geography," by Ll. Rodwell Jones and P. W. Bryan, London, 1924.

For the history the long series of books published by Francis Parkman should be consulted; a centenary edition has recently been issued at Boston. The volumes which bear upon the text are the following—"Pioneers of France in the New World"; "The Jesuits in North America";

" La Salle and the Discovery of the Great West " ; " The Old Régime in Canada " ; " Count Frontenac and New France " ; " A Half-Century of Conflict " ; " Montcalm and Wolfe."

Of the numerous shorter books it may be sufficient to mention Sir Charles Lucas' " Historical Geography of the British Colonies," Vol. V, *Canada*, Part I (New France), with its companion volume by J. D. Rogers, *Canada*, Part III, *Geographical*, both published at Oxford, and " A History of Canada," by Charles G. D. Roberts, London, 1898. For parts of the later period, " A History of Canada, 1763–1812," by Sir Charles Lucas, Oxford, 1909, and " The Fight for Canada," by Major William Wood, London, 1904, are valuable.

INDEX

Abenaki Indians, 166, 167, 174, 175, 177, 196, 197, 209, 224, 228.
Abercromby, General, 272.
Abitibi, L. and R., 148.
Acadia, 55, 57, 75, 119, 120, 125, 166, 177, 178, 193-205, 209, 211, 214, 220, 222, 233-235, 238, 252, 253, 257, 262, 294.
Acadians, 198, 202, 203, 205, 214, 215, 225, 234, 237, 253, 254, 257, 267, 289.
Adirondack, Mts., 21.
Aix-la-Chapelle, treaty of, 165, 220, 225, 233.
Albanel, Father, 149.
Albany (New York), 102, 145, 152, 154, 174, 181, 183, 192, 221, 227, 239, 252, 257, 270, 271.
  Ft. (James Bay), 148, 151, 200.
Alberta, 299.
Alexandria, 251, 252.
Algonquin Indians, 31, 41, 43, 47-52, 61, 84, 98, 134, 166, 171, 174, 203, 228, 240, 266.
Allegheny, R., 134, 244, 245, 249, 250, 264, 274, 292.
Amherst, General, 254, 277, 278, 279.
Annapolis (Port Royal), 194, 195, 210, 211, 224, 225, 234, 253.
Anticosti Island, 15.
Appalachian Upland, 91, 107, 108, 191, 192, 210, 212, 215, 219, 240, 241, 244, 245, 247, 258, 265, 274, 287, 298.
Arkansas, R., 135.
Ashland, 130.
Austrian Succession, war of, 165.

Baie Verte, 253.
Basques, 56, 63.
Beaubassin, 237.
Beaupré, 107.
Beauséjour, Ft., 237, 253.
Bedford, 273.
Bienville, Céleron de, 243-248, 262.
Bigot, Intendant, 219.
Birch-bark canoe, 41, 42, 62, 137, 244, 247, 261-265.
Bobé, Father, 210.
Boston, 150, 193, 194, 198, 199, 201, 203, 223, 226, 229, 253.
Braddock, General, 251-252, 254-257, 264, 273, 290.
Bradstreet, 272.
British Columbia, 3, 297-299.
British North America Act, 288.
Buffalo, 160.

Cabot Strait, 213.
Cabots, the, 13, 14, 282.
Canada, Dominion of, 8-10, 13.
  Lower and Upper, 6, 7, 288, 295, 296, 298.
  Origin of name, 13.
Canadian Pacific Railway, 298.
Canadian Shield (Laurentian Plateau), 20, 47, 50, 60, 69, 107, 147, 148, 266, 281.
Canso, 224, 225.
  Strait of, 214.
Cape Breton Island (Île Royale), 193, 200-202, 205, 214, 215, 225, 235, 236, 271, 295.
Cape Cod, 193.
Cap Rouge, 29, 30, 44, 59.
Carolina, South, 210.
Cartier, Jacques, 13-32, 35-38, 41, 44, 48, 50, 61, 121, 133, 198, 213, 215, 266, 278, 281, 282.
Caughnawaga (St. Louis), 182, 183, 192, 239.
Cayugas (Iroquois), 173.
Central Low Plains, 240, 245, 265.
Chaleur Bay, 15, 16, 37, 193, 205.
Chambly, Basin of, 47, 48, 62.
  Ft., 101, 223.

Champlain, L., 51, 62, 102, 174, 177, 184, 223, 237, 239, 257, 270, 271, 276, 277, 279, 289, 292, 295.
Samuel, 23, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42-46, 48-52, 55, 72, 75, 76, 78, 79, 83-89, 92, 98, 101, 122, 123, 128, 129, 160, 165, 170, 171, 203, 204, 212, 215, 217, 240, 242, 256, 266, 268, 277, 278, 282, 283, 289, 300.
Chaudière Falls, 66, 67.
Chaudière-Kennebec portage, 205, 213, 252.
Chautauqua, L., 244, 249, 262.
Chequamegon Bay, 130, 131.
Chesapeake Bay, 256.
Chicago, 136.
R., 136-138.
Chicoutimi, 42.
Chignecto Bay, 195, 214, 234, 253.
Church, Major, 198.
Clinton, Governor, 226, 227, 229.
Compagnie du Nord, 150, 151.
Company of New France, 78, 79, 80, 85, 86, 93, 97, 105.
Company of the West, 99, 104.
Confederation of Canada, 288, 298.
Connecticut, colony, 224, 228.
R., 174, 196.
Constitutional Act, 296.
Cornwall, 5.
Coureurs de bois, 101, 112, 144, 147, 154, 172, 178, 190.
Crown Pt., 223, 225-227, 229, 233, 238, 239, 248, 252, 255-257, 276, 277, 279.
Cumberland, Ft., 250, 254, 273.

Deerfield, 196, 197, 198.
Delaware Bay, 251.
Denonville, Marquis de, 153-157, 178, 188.
Des Plaines, R., 135.
Detroit, Ft., 160, 181, 182, 188, 216, 220, 239, 241, 247, 248, 274, 277, 289, 296.
R., 5, 129, 137, 154, 240.
Dieskau, Baron, 256, 257, 265.
Dinwiddie, Governor, 248, 249.
Dongan, Governor, 153-155, 188.
Donnacona, 26, 27, 28.
Duquesne, Ft., 251, 266, 269, 272, 274. *See also* Pittsburg.
Governor, 249.
Duquesnel, Governor, 224, 249, 254.
Dutch of New York, 99, 102, 121, 174, 176, 226, 227, 239.

Edward, Ft., 256.
Erie, L., 5, 8, 69, 90, 129, 134, 136, 137, 154, 159, 160, 181, 182, 189, 216, 221, 240-242, 244, 246, 249, 250, 268, 277, 290, 292-294.

Fisheries, 192, 194, 201, 205, 211, 215, 224, 226, 234.
Five Nations, 51, 90, 92, 123, 124-126, 147, 155, 157, 165, 169, 170, 180, 200, 202, 221, 242, 292. *See also* Iroquois.
Florida, 49.
French Creek, 249, 274.
R., 69, 72, 90, 160.
Forbes, Brig.-Gen., 272-274.
Fox, R., 131, 135.
Franklin, Benjamin, 252.
Frontenac, Count, 7, 125, 126, 132, 141-143, 145-147, 149, 152, 153, 156, 157, 160, 161, 165, 167-173, 175-180, 182, 190, 196, 205, 215, 222.
Ft. (Kingston), 114, 129, 136, 154, 156, 157, 161, 180, 181, 190, 216, 221, 239, 241, 255, 260, 270, 272.
Fundy, Bay of, 193-195, 198, 212, 225, 235, 236, 253, 293.
Fur trade, 35, 36, 38, 42, 43, 45, 46, 55, 56, 63-68, 75-77, 80, 85, 98-100, 110, 121, 124, 127, 136, 137, 144-147, 151, 157, 160, 167, 168, 176, 179, 181, 183, 184, 190, 192, 204, 205, 218-221, 239, 242, 243, 245, 282, 287, 298.

Gaspé Bay, 15, 16, 213.
Peninsular, 193, 294.
Gaspereau, Ft., 253.
Gatineau, R., 84.
Genesee, R., 133, 134.
George, L., 49, 50, 51, 102, 256-258, 278.
Georgian Bay, 7, 69, 90, 120, 127, 129, 134, 135, 160, 221, 294.
Gist, Christopher, 246.
Grand R., 134.
Great Carrying Place, 255, 263, 270, 272.

Great Lakes, 4, 49, 61, 83, 90, 120, 126, 136, 137, 181, 188, 192, 200, 210, 215, 218, 287, 292.
Green Bay (L. Michigan), 128, 130, 131, 135, 137, 248.
  Mts., 21.
Groseilliers, Chouart, Sieur des, 115, 130, 149, 151.
Grosse Île, 17.
Goyau, Georges, 81, 84.

Habitants, 76, 82, 106, 108, 109.
Halifax, 213, 214, 233-235, 237, 238, 253, 275.
Hamilton (Ont.), 133.
Hamilton, Governor, 248.
Hampton, 251.
Haviland, Brigadier, 279.
Hayes, R., 150, 297.
Heartbreak, Ft , 138.
Hébert family, 75, 76, 78, 81, 82, 105, 268.
Height of Land, 123, 149, 158.
Helen's Isle, 66.
Hochelaga, 17-22, 25, 27, 29-31, 38, 41, 48, 51, 92. *See also* Montreal.
Howe, Lord, 272.
Hudson Bay, 43, 46, 72, 100, 115, 127, 147, 148, 150, 151, 154, 200, 218, 299.
  Company, 97, 99, 123, 127, 137, 145, 148, 151, 152, 297, 298.
  Strait, 46, 161.
  R. (New York), 49, 50, 51, 71, 98, 100, 102, 123, 145, 159, 174, 238, 239, 241, 256, 262.
  Champlain route, 124, 199, 233, 270.
  Mohawk area, 63, 174, 270, 271.
Huguenots, 77, 80, 112.
Huron Indians, 31, 50, 51, 61, 63, 64, 69, 70-72, 80, 83, 89, 90, 92, 93, 98, 123, 130, 160, 179.
Huron-Iroquois group, 31, 203.
Huron, L., 69, 80, 128, 129, 132, 134, 292, 294.
Huron Missions, 85, 89, 91-93, 128.

Iberville, Le Moyne d', 187.
Illinois Indians, 152, 153.
  Region, 274.
  R., 135, 137, 138, 189, 241.
International Frontier, 4, 8, 90.
Iroquois, 6, 38, 39, 43, 45, 47-51, 61-64, 68, 70, 71, 77, 80, 83, 84, 87, 88, 90-93, 98, 99, 102, 103, 122-126, 130, 132, 134, 136, 145, 147, 151-157, 165, 166, 168, 170, 172-5, 181, 183, 189, 192, 197, 198, 202, 215-217, 220, 222, 228, 238, 240, 256, 262, 266, 283. *See also* Five Nations.

James Bay, 145, 147-150, 200.
Jesuits, 77-84, 88, 89, 92, 93, 103, 124, 128, 130-132, 144, 149, 167.
  Mission Stations, 7, 130, 134.

Kanawha, R., 247.
Kankakee, R., 137.
Kennebec, R., 59, 175, 210, 228.
Keweenaw Peninsula, 133.
Kingston, 7, 72, 114. *See also* Frontenac, Ft.
Kirke, D., 78, 79, 177, 211.

La Barre, Sieur de, 153.
Lachine Massacre, 156, 165, 170, 172, 189.
Lachine Rapids, 21, 22, 29, 30, 43, 66, 115, 129, 133, 244, 266, 280.
  Siegnory and village, 114, 133, 170, 172.
Lallemant, Father, 85, 86, 88.
Laurence, Ft., 237, 253.
Le Jeune, 81, 82, 84.
La Prairie, R., 48.
La Salle, 97, 99, 114, 115, 126, 132-138, 152, 153, 155, 160, 161, 188, 190, 217, 240.
Le Bœuf, Ft., 249, 274, 289.
Le Caron, 68, 70, 72, 89.
Le Loutre, 236, 237, 267.
Lescarbot, 55 59.
Lévis, 279.
Louisbourg, 202, 209, 211, 213, 214, 223-226, 228, 233-238, 253, 254, 256, 258, 269, 271, 275.
Louisiana, 138, 187, 245, 277, 280
Loyal, Ft., 175.
Lucas, Sir Charles, 225.

Mackenzie, Alexander, 297.
Maine, 175, 193, 196, 205-206, 211, 235, 293.
Maisonneuve, Paul de Chomedy, Sieur de, 86, 87.

Manhattan Island, 71.
Manitoba, 4, 5, 298, 299.
Maritime Provinces, 295.
Marquette, Father, 132, 135, 240.
Maryland, 228, 241.
Massachusetts, 125, 175, 194, 196, 206, 223, 224, 226-229, 252.
Matchedash Bay, 69, 70, 89.
Mattawa, R., 68, 69, 72, 90, 160.
Maumee, R., 246, 247, 249, 263.
Mexico, Gulf of, 126, 135, 136, 138, 152, 187, 198, 212, 217.
  Settlements on, 188, 189.
Miami, R., 246, 247, 263.
Michigan, L., 128, 130-132, 134, 136, 161, 182, 189, 216, 240, 241, 262.
Michilimackinac (Mackinac), Strait of, 128, 130, 131, 135, 153, 248.
  Mission station, 131, 154, 176, 178, 181, 216, 289.
Micmac Indians, 166, 167, 236.
Midland, 89.
Mines (Minas), Basin of, 195, 198, 213, 234, 253.
Miquelon Island, 280.
Mississippi, R., 90, 127, 134-138, 147, 151, 161, 181, 187, 188, 210, 215, 217, 240, 241, 245, 280, 287, 290.
Misstassini, L., 148, 149.
Mohawk Indians, 123, 125, 170, 173, 174, 177, 180, 182, 183, 189, 227, 228, 257.
Mohawk, R., 50, 51, 102, 120, 124, 159, 181, 184, 188, 221, 238, 239, 242, 256, 257, 270-272, 292.
  Gap, 262, 263, 293.
Monongahela, R., 244, 246, 247, 251.
Montcalm, Marquis de, 267, 271, 272, 275, 276.
Montmagny, Governor, 86, 87.
Montreal, 5-8, 19, 20, 30, 48, 50, 59, 64, 68, 71, 75, 87, 88, 91-93, 105, 107, 114-116, 119-121, 124, 127, 129, 130, 132, 133, 135, 144-147, 152, 155-157, 159, 160, 168, 173-178, 183, 188, 189, 199, 211, 216, 217, 221, 223, 228, 246, 247, 249, 266, 270, 274, 275, 279, 280, 283, 287, 291, 294, 297, 298. *See also* Hochelaga.
  Founding of, 65, 85, 87, 88.
  Island of, 48, 65, 67, 84-87, 105, 114.
Monts, Sieur de, 55, 56, 58, 63, 204, 211, 277.
Moose, R., 148, 151.
Mount Royal, 20-22, 48.
Murray, 277-279, 291.

Nelson, R., 150, 200.
New Amsterdam, *see* New York, 71, 97, 102.
New Brunswick, 55, 193, 196, 203-205, 211, 235, 288, 293, 294, 298.
New England, 119, 120, 125, 166, 173, 174, 177, 178, 192, 194-196, 200, 204, 206, 215, 223, 224, 226, 235, 238, 239, 253, 258, 263, 288, 295.
New Englanders, 177, 178, 194, 197, 198, 201, 203, 209, 214, 215, 222, 225, 226, 234, 263.
Newfoundland, 13, 35, 192, 198, 200-202.
  Banks, 194.
New Hampshire, 125, 173, 175, 223, 224, 226-228.
New Jersey, 228.
New Orleans, 161, 188, 212, 280.
New York (City), 31, 51, 121, 159-161, 200, 241.
  (Colony), 97, 119, 120, 123-126, 145, 153, 166, 169, 170, 173, 175, 176, 180, 188, 191, 199, 222, 226-229, 238, 239, 242, 243.
Neutral Nation, 90, 92.
Niagara, Falls, 160, 216, 244.
  Ft., 129, 136, 137, 155, 216, 220, 221, 239-241, 252, 255, 270, 274, 277.
  Portage, 134, 154, 188, 239, 241.
  R., 69, 127, 129, 160, 220, 290, 296.
Nicholson, Col., 199, 211.
Nipigon, L., 148, 217.
Nipissing, L., 69, 72, 90, 129, 160, 289, 290.
North-West Company, 80, 297.
Novia Scotia, 3, 35, 119, 193, 194, 200, 201, 203, 205, 209-212, 214, 224, 233-237, 253, 267, 288, 293, 294, 298.

Ohio, R., 133, 134, 138, 188, 189, 216, 233, 240-250, 252, 263, 266, 268, 277, 290-292, 298, 299.
Ohio-Mississippi Confluence, 290.

Old Britain, 246, 248, 249.
Oneida Indians, 172.
L., 50, 51, 70, 221, 256, 293.
Onondagas Indians, 173, 180.
Ontario, L., 8, 49-51, 69, 70, 72, 90, 91, 114, 120, 121, 123, 124, 129, 132-134, 154, 159, 160, 180-182, 188, 220-222, 233, 237, 239, 241, 242, 244, 270-272, 276, 277, 290-293.
Province of, 4, 5, 295, 296, 298.
Orleans, I. of, 17, 59, 107.
Oswego, Ft., 188, 220-223, 233, 238, 239, 242, 252, 255, 256, 258, 263, 270-272, 277, 279.
Ottawa (City), 66, 84.
Indians, 61, 64, 289.
R., 22, 27, 65-69, 72, 84, 90, 120, 127, 128, 132, 134, 148, 151, 155, 160, 181, 228, 240, 277, 290.

Paris, Peace of, 7, 166, 280, 287, 288.
Parkman, Francis, 60, 78, 106, 225.
Pennsylvania, 224, 228, 241, 242, 245, 248, 252, 253, 258, 269, 273, 289, 290.
Penobscot, R., 205, 293.
Pepperell, William, 225.
Philadelphia, 251, 252, 254, 255, 272.
Phips, Sir William, 175, 177, 201, 211.
Pickawillany, 246, 247, 249.
Pilgrim Fathers, 120, 205.
Pittsburg (Fort Pitt) 244 274. *See also* Duquesne, Ft.
Placentia, 202.
Plains of Abraham, 275, 276, 279.
Pontgravé, 38, 55-57, 61, 63, 68.
Pontiac's war, 289.
Portage, 131.
Portland, 175, 193.
Port Royal, 195, 198, 199, 291. *See also* Annapolis.
Portsmouth, 175.
Potomac R., 244, 250, 251.
Presqu' Île, 249, 277, 289.
Prince Edward I. (Île St. Jean), 193, 200, 214, 235, 236, 295, 298.
Purchas His Pilgrimes, 38, 57.
Quebec, 4, 5, 8, 17, 29, 30, 44, 50, 58-60, 63, 65, 68, 72, 75-79, 81, 84, 86-91, 93, 100, 101, 103, 112, 115, 116, 119, 122, 133, 141, 144, 148, 173, 175, 177, 183, 191, 199, 201, 204, 211-213, 215, 216, 222, 234, 235, 241, 254, 267-269, 271, 275-280, 283, 293-295, 298. *See also* Stadacona.
Act, 290, 291.
Founding of, 56-60, 212.
Sieges of, 78, 275, 279, 291.
Quinté, Bay of, 70.

Radisson, Pierre Esprit, 115, 130, 149, 150, 151.
Râle, or Rasle, Sebastien, 206.
Recollet Friars, 67, 75, 78, 89.
Red R., 297, 299.
Rhode Island, 224, 228.
Richelieu, Cardinal, 78.
Ft., 88, 92, 101.
R., 23, 31, 38, 43, 45, 47-49, 51, 59, 61-63, 83, 84, 88, 105, 107, 108, 119, 124, 173, 177, 256, 257, 277, 279.
Rideau Falls, 66.
Riel, Louis, 298.
Roberval, Sieur de, 28-30.
Rochester, 133.
Rouillé, Ft. (Toronto), 239.
Rupert, Ft., 148, 149, 151.
R., 148, 149.
Ryswick, Peace of, 165, 180, 200.

Saguenay, R., 17, 22, 25-29, 35, 36, 38, 42-45, 58, 68, 148, 149, 243.
St. Charles, R., 23, 37, 59, 60, 75.
St. Clair, L., 69, 134, 137, 262.
R., 192.
St. Croix, R., 59, 131, 204, 205, 293
St. Esprit, 130, 13, 181.
St. Francis, R., 108, 174.
St. François Xavier, 131, 135.
St. Ignace, 131, 135, 137.
St. John, Ft. (New Brunswick), 253.
L. (Quebec), 42, 44, 123,148, 149, 205.
R. (New Brunswick), 253, 294.
St. Joseph, R., 137.
St. Lawrence, Gulf of, 14, 15, 31, 35, 193, 198, 211-213, 216, 217, 234, 237, 269, 295.
R., 3-6, 8, 13, 20, 29, 35, 36, 42, 44-48, 51, 55, 58-63, 66, 67, 69, 71, 72, 76, 78, 84, 86, 90, 91, 93, 98, 101-103, 106, 107, 109, 114, 115, 120, 124, 126, 129, 133, 136, 138, 144, 145, 148, 149, 152, 154,

155, 160, 161, 170, 174, 177, 180, 181, 183, 188, 193, 203, 204, 214-216, 236, 239, 241, 264, 267, 270, 275, 276, 279, 280, 288, 289, 290, 292, 293.
Sainte Marie (of the Hurons), 89.
St. Mary (Sainte Marie), R., 128.
St. Maurice, R , 23, 44, 46, 47, 84.
St. Peter, L., 19, 23, 47, 48.
St. Pierre Island, 280.
Salmon Falls, 175.
Saratoga, Ft., 227.
Saskatchewan, 299.
Saunders, Admiral, 275.
Sault St. Louis (The Sault), 21, 43, 48, 64, 114, 128. *See also* Lachine Rapids.
Sault Sainte Marie, 128-131, 135, 148, 160, 161, 181, 240.
Schenectady, 102, 174, 180.
Selkirk, Lord, 297.
Selkirk settlers, 80.
Senecas (Iroquois), 51, 133, 154, 155, 173, 188, 220.
Severn, R., 70, 129.
Seven Years' War, 166, 237, 268.
Shirley, Governor, 226, 228, 252, 253, 255, 263.
Simcoe, L., 69, 70, 72, 89, 129.
Six Nations, 292, 293.
Sorel, Ft., 101.
Spanish Succession, war of, 165, 196.
Stadacona, 17, 23, 30, 31, 43, 51. *See also* Quebec.
Sulpicians, 132, 133.
Superior, L., 69, 128-130, 132-134, 148, 161, 181, 182, 200, 216, 218, 292, 299.
Susquehanna, R., 245.

Tadoussac, 36, 38, 40, 42-44, 46, 56, 63, 64, 68, 75, 91, 100, 122, 123, 148, 149.
Talon, Indendant, 126, 141, 148.
Thousand Islands, 114, 127, 129.
Three Rivers, 17, 23, 44-46, 48, 57, 59, 64, 75, 84, 87, 88, 91, 101, 115, 155, 173, 174, 193.
Ticonderoga, Ft., 256-258, 265, 269, 270, 272, 276, 277.
Toronto, 5, 7.
Trent, R., 70, 129, 221.
Tuscarora Indians, 292.
Two Mountains, L. of, 66.

United Empire Loyalists, 7, 8, 21, 294-296.
States, 6, 98, 218, 240, 292, 294, 298, 299.
Union, Act of, 298.
Utrecht, Treaty of, 165, 182, 199, 200, 206, 209.

Vancouver Island, 297.
Vaudreuil, Marquis de, the elder, 196, 198, 206 ; The younger, 275.
Venango, Ft., 274, 289.
Vercheres, Madeleine de, 189.
Verendrye, Pierre de Varennes de la, 217-219.
Ville Marie de Montréal, *see* Montreal.
Virginia, 228, 241-243, 245-250, 253, 258, 264, 269, 273, 290, 298.

Walker, Admiral, 199, 213.
War of Independence, 290, 291, 294, 295.
Warren, Admiral Peter, 225, 257.
Washington, George, 242, 243, 249-251, 264, 269, 273, 274.
Webb, Col. Daniel, 271.
Welland Canal, 160.
Wheat routes, 159, 160.
William Henry, Ft., 256-258, 271.
Wills Creek, 250, 251, 254, 264.
Windsor, 5.
Winnipeg (city), 5, 218.
L., 150, 218, 219, 297, 299.
Wisconsin, R., 131, 135, 241.
Wolfe, General, 254, 271, 275, 276, 278, 279.
Wolfe's Cove (Anse au Foulon), 275.
Wood Creek (L. Champlain), 199, 257.
(L. Oneida), 221, 256, 293.
Woods, Lake of the, 3, 4, 8, 218, 292.

Yamaska, R., 108.
York Factory, 297.
Youghiogheny, R., 244.

THE LONDON AND NORWICH PRESS, LIMITED, ST. GILES' WORKS, NORWICH

173 — 5 Nations



Date Due

DAN 5 '65			
JAN 22 '65	T. J. BATA		
[illegible]	NOV 2 1 1970		
OCT 24	LIBRARY		NOV - 9 1976
OCT 26	T. J. BATA		
DEC 15 '66	T. J. BATA		
OCT 3	DEC DEC 18 1970		
OCT 13	LIBRARY LIBRARY		
OCT 25	SEP 3 0 1972		
NOV 13			
NOV 17	NOV 7 1974		
DEC 26	NOV 1 1973		
DEC 27		NOV 2 2 1974	
SEP 30			
NOV 15 1972		NOV 14 1987	

PRINTED IN U. S. A. CAT. NO. 23233

F 5057 .N49
Newbigin, Marion Isabel,
Canada, the great river, the l
010101 000
0 1163 0194298 7
TRENT UNIVERSITY

F5057 .N49

RECON

Newbigin, Marion Isabel
Canada, the great river, the lands and the men.

8930

NEWBIGIN, M. I.

8930